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The proliferation of counterfeit plant protection products (pesticides) has been 
widely reported in agricultural trade journals and in the popular press. A review of these 
publications showed that there is a common narrative, and one which draws heavily on 
industry derived data. A recent UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) review of the 
calibre of contemporary counterfeiting research cast doubt upon the veracity of such 
data sources.  
The aim of the study was to ascertain the nature of this crime as it occurs in the 
UK and to determine the threat it poses to the agricultural industry. This was achieved 
by mixed-methods research, a strategy endorsed by the IPO as a means of more 
accurately capturing the characteristics of a counterfeiting problem when compared to 
a single strand study.  
The results of the research suggested that the industry derived narrative is a 
reasonable reflection of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem, at least in so far that it 
recognises the mechanics of the crime. However, the data also revealed that there are 
characteristics of this illicit trade that have not been previously described. It was 
apparent that whilst the modus operandi is widely appreciated it is underpinned by a 
market dynamic that is far less well understood. This dynamic is the product of the 
confluence of a poorly policed amenity market for pesticides, an industry response that 
is unduly focused on legislative change, and a rural police force that is largely 
concerned with reducing theft from farms. 
It was the conclusion of the thesis that a means of reducing the counterfeit 
pesticide threat is to be found in disrupting its underlying dynamic. Recommendations 
are made to achieve this, including making better use of industry derived intelligence 
and raising awareness of the problem amongst farmer users of pesticides and 
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“The illegal trade in counterfeit pesticides has grown into a multimillion-euro industry in 
Europe, putting consumers’ lives and farmers’ livelihoods at risk as unregulated and 
often toxic chemicals enter the food chain.” (Henshaw, 2011) 
 
In 2011 the Wall Street Journal published an online article entitled Fake 
Pesticides Are a Growing Danger, the extract given above being the piece’s impactive 
opening statement. In her article Caroline Henshaw described a trade dominated by 
highly organised transnational crime gangs who are exploiting a lucrative illicit market. 
She gave graphic examples of unapproved pesticides being produced in the Far East 
and entering Europe through permeable Eastern borders. Once inside European 
boundaries they find their way into the distribution network and ultimately to farms 
where they are used on crops destined for human consumption. Henshaw quoted an 
industry spokesman who warned of “a massive inflow of untested and potentially 
dangerous pesticides into the EU, thus critically undermining one of the most regulated 
product markets”. Whilst this was certainly not the first time this crime had been the 
subject of popular reporting it was, at the time of publication, the highest profile media 
source in which an article had appeared on the subject. It was the decision of such a 
renowned media outlet to highlight this crime that prompted the author of this thesis to 
question whether what was being described as a European problem had implications 
for the agricultural sector in the United Kingdom (UK) and if it did to what extent the risk 
it posed had been investigated1.  
                                                          
1 The UK in this context is understood to mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. It is recognised that there are variations in both pesticide regulation and 
enforcement practice (including the police) between England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
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This was a reasonable question to ask, for recent history suggests that this was 
not a crime that could be safely ignored. Over several decades repeated incursions into 
the legitimate pesticide markets by counterfeiters has had a devastating impact on 
local agricultural economies. In 1979 an incident of widespread crop failure that 
subsequently became known as the ‘great Kenyan coffee crop disaster’ was the result 
of a fake Chevron fungicide being used on a large proportion of the crop (Wadlow, 
2009). The longer-term consequence was an industry with a much diminished 
international reputation from which it took many years to recover. In 2007 peppers that 
were for sale on German supermarket shelves were tested and found to contain 
residues of an illicit insecticide (CVUA Stuttgart, 2007; British Association to Stop 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, 2008). The source of the peppers was traced back to the 
Almeria region of Spain, an area whose agricultural economy relies heavily on this 
particular crop. Exports were immediately halted and, in a similar fashion to the earlier 
Kenyan coffee crop incident, the economy of the area almost collapsed. It was recently 
estimated that in 2013 30% of the Indian pesticides market was lost to counterfeit 
products (Business Standard, 2015). In 2015, across India as a whole, 10.6 million 
tonnes of agricultural product will have been destroyed as a direct result of it being 
found to have been treated with counterfeit pesticide (Business Standard, 2015). It is 
also suggested that, if the activities of those crime gangs responsible goes unchecked, 
by 2019 almost 40% of all pesticides sold will be illegal (Business Standard, 2015). 
Whilst such dramatic incidents might not be commonplace they reflect the tip of 
a very large fake product iceberg (OECD, 2008) for the pesticides industry is but one 
amongst many industrial sectors that have fallen victim to the activities of the 
counterfeiter (Stewart et al., 2007). Unfortunately a true measure of the scale of the 
                                                          
Scotland. However, the extent of commonality was such that this was not deemed to be a 
limiting factor and indeed in the course of the study this proved to be the case. 
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problem has proved elusive, in part because despite its seemingly ubiquitous nature 
counterfeiting is a crime that lacks a universal definition. That said common usage of 
the term generally reflects the meaning adopted in UK Government literature wherein it 
is described as “the manufacture, importation, distribution and sale of products which 
falsely carry the trademark of a genuine brand without permission and for gain or loss 
to another” (Intellectual Property Office, 2014). A preliminary review of industry, 
governmental, and non-governmental (NGO) sources suggested that, despite variation 
in strict definition, it is recognised as being a major and rapidly growing worldwide 
crime problem (Phillips, 2007). It has been suggested that the value of counterfeit 
goods traded in 2015 is likely to be in the order of $1.77 trillion (International Chamber 
of Commerce, 2015). Such estimates of the overall scale of the problem run parallel to 
accounts of counterfeit goods appearing in increasingly diverse market sectors, often 
far removed from their long established stronghold in luxury goods such as designer 
clothing or watches (Stewart et al., 2007). Henshaw’s article may have focused on the 
trade in illegal pesticides but such reporting is far from unusual; similar stories are to be 
found in trade journals and popular press articles spanning numerous industries. 
However, and despite the plethora of popular writing on the wider counterfeiting 
problem, a preliminary search of the literature found few examples of methodologically 
defined study of the problem at industry sector level. There was no evidence of 
recognisably academic research being conducted into a UK counterfeit pesticides 
problem.  
Whilst this initial scoping exercise was far from being a comprehensive review 
of the problem it did suggest that there may be a significant gap in the literature and 
therefore a potential need for research. Indeed the seeming extent of this omission was 
such that it would have been easy to have been over-ambitious as to what this study 
might hope to achieve. With this in mind, and recognising that this was to be a resource 
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constrained single researcher project, the aim of this study was focused solely on the 
question prompted by the author’s original reading of the Henshaw article; that is to say 
whether counterfeit pesticides represent a substantive threat to the UK agricultural 
industry rather than the wider implications of such products entering the UK 
marketplace (for example the long term environmental or consumer health 
implications). In this context a ‘threat’ is understood to be something that is 
recognisable as being able to exploit a weakness or vulnerability to cause damage or 
loss, in this case to the UK agricultural industry, and ‘substantive’ that this threat can be 
demonstrated if not quantified.  
A search of the Police National Legal Database shows that counterfeiting is a 
crime that is legally complex and characterised by diverse responsibility for enforcing 
the multifarious legislation and regulation associated with it (PNLD, 2015). Consider, 
for example, a counterfeit pesticide sold in the UK. Pesticide regulations will have been 
breached, to be dealt with by the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (part of the Health 
and Safety Executive), consumer protection offences will have been committed, which 
will be the concern of Trading Standards, and a fraud will have occurred, to be dealt 
with by the police. Aside from this there will undoubtedly have been some element of 
illegality in the importation of the product, suggesting a Revenue and Customs interest, 
and most probably an offence in transporting an incorrectly labelled hazardous material 
by ship or road, potentially giving rise to a maritime law enforcement or Department of 
Transport investigation. Of course these offences are in addition to any civil claim for 
breach of intellectual property and patent rights that the company whose product has 
been counterfeited may wish to pursue. Given this level of enforcement complexity, 
and again to ensure that this was an achievable project, the study also limited its scope 
to looking solely at the police response to the problem rather than that of other 
enforcement agencies. The decision to do so was not intended to suggest that the 
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fraud element of this criminal activity is of greater import than any other offence that 
may be committed. Rather this reflected a finding of a preliminary review of the 
literature which suggested that a principle characteristic of counterfeiting is that it is an 
illicit enterprise that is intrinsically associated with organised crime group (OCG) 
activity. The police are the primary agency dealing with organised crime and that they 
should be the focus of research therefore seemed appropriate. It was then these three 
parameters, that is to say geographical occurrence, specific industry impact, and the 
police response, that defined the boundaries of the study.  
The direction that the resulting research took was the product of two meetings 
arranged with a view to determining at the outset if the Henshaw article had any 
foundation, or whether it may be simply journalistic hyperbole. These meetings 
occurred within a matter of days of each other in June 2013. The first was with senior 
members of staff with responsibility for UK product security for a major pesticide 
manufacturing company. The second, reflecting the link to organised criminality 
suggested by Henshaw, was with police intelligence officers working within a large non-
metropolitan police force. These officers had extensive knowledge of OCG activity in 
both the urban and rural setting. The meeting with manufacturing company subject 
experts revealed that they had considerable experience of fake versions of their 
products being produced in the Far East and being shipped to the UK by seemingly 
legitimate companies, of inadequate regulatory support and an unwillingness on the 
part of enforcement agencies to engage with the problem, and of significant loss of 
corporate revenue as a consequence. The meeting with police intelligence officers 
suggested that they had no knowledge of this crime.  
It was this seeming mismatch in awareness of what appeared to be a 
substantive UK OCG crime activity that prompted the first three study objectives 

















Figure 1.1: Consecutive study objectives 
 
being contingent upon it being found that, in light of the preceding consecutive 
objectives, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a substantive threat. 
This final objective, to produce recommendations intended to reduce the risk posed to 
the UK agricultural industry by counterfeit pesticides, reflected the overall ethos of this 
 
To determine if there is evidence of 
counterfeit pesticides being prevalent in the 
UK agricultural marketplace;  
Assuming there is evidence of a counterfeit 
pesticide problem to ascertain if this is being 
addressed through police engagement; 
If the police are not engaged with the problem 
to further consider why this might be the 
case; 
If there is a substantive threat to make 




study; that it should be a pragmatic consideration of a potentially significant crime 
problem.  
Whilst the research was guided by these four objectives the seeming absence 
of previous subject specific research suggested that, within this framework, it would be 
necessary for the study to be flexible such that it might be modified in response to 
emerging evidence. Moreover in the absence of an obvious theoretical approach to the 
subject it was anticipated that, at least in its preliminary stages, the research would 
progress most easily were it to be grounded in outlook. That is not to suggest that this 
was a study that set out with the intent of generating theory. Rather it meant that some 
of the advantages of a grounded approach, notably the adoption of systematic 
procedures for data collection and analysis, could be utilised to give structure to the 
study. This allowed an established explanatory theory to be identified in the latter 
phases to help interpret what had been observed. In practice then the review of the 
literature and subsequent research design were both conducted in the absence of a 
guiding theoretical model of criminal behaviour or justice system response. The 
summary of the thesis that follows reflects this approach.  
 
1.1 Summary of the thesis  
 The thesis begins with a review of the literature. This serves two functions; 
firstly to give context to this particular counterfeiting problem, and secondly to 
determine the extent to which research had addressed the study objectives. The review 
was cross-discipline in design, a reasonable approach given the absence of any 
consolidated body of work on the subject of counterfeiting. To overcome the limitations 
of there also being a lack of academic material relating specifically to counterfeit 
pesticides the review was also expansive in outlook. It drew upon a mix of sources 
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ranging from mainstream academic publication, through industry and governmental 
publication, to media generated content. Use was also made of internet alerts to 
capture real-time reporting of counterfeit pesticide incidence.  
This eclectic mix of source and method is made manifest in the two sections 
that make up the review. The first of these considers counterfeiting in the wider context, 
recognising the rapid growth in the problem and the increasingly diverse range of 
products falling foul of the counterfeiter. This ‘scene-setting’ section describes four 
standout themes within the literature; the predominance of China as the source of 
counterfeit goods including pesticides; the role of the consumer and the numerous 
elements that together constitute the ‘pull factor’; the link between organised crime and 
large-scale counterfeiting; and the economic, environmental, and human costs of the 
trade in counterfeit goods.  
The second section of the review focuses on counterfeit pesticides, considering 
what is known about the problem in a global and European context and the evidence 
for there being a UK problem. This identifies the weakness of industry generated data 
pertaining to the problem before describing how, despite this weakness, a narrative 
based on this data has been widely promulgated. The review continues by considering 
the police and other agency response to the problem, recognising that there is some 
evidence of enforcement activity in parts of Europe but not specifically within the UK. 
The final part considers the contribution of criminological studies with regard to 
understanding this crime problem. The review ends by concluding that although there 
is a considerable amount of industry generated material and media output concerning 
counterfeit pesticides there is a near absence of directly related academic research into 
the problem itself or agency response to it. The study objectives were therefore 
deemed to represent a significant gap in the literature. 
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Following this review of the literature the thesis continues by describing how the 
resulting study was located within the bounds of criminal justice studies rather than 
criminology, a reflection of its emphasis on the police response to the crime rather than 
its cause. The lack of an obvious theoretical approach to the research is recognised 
before acknowledging the contribution of work undertaken by the Intellectual Property 
Office (IPO) in identifying the weakness of much contemporary counterfeiting research. 
It also acknowledges its influence over the choice of a convergent parallel variant of the 
mixed method approach for the data gathering phase. This approach has four distinct 
steps: 
i. designing qualitative and quantitative research strands and establishing 
appropriate methods of data collection; 
ii. analysing the qualitative and quantitative data; 
iii. merging the qualitative and quantitative data, and; 
iv. interpreting the merged results. 
 
The thesis then describes the progression through these four steps, beginning with 
a summary of the various quantitative and qualitative research methods employed in 
the gathering of data. These methods were chosen for their collective potential to 
inform the previously stated study objectives and so to achieve a ‘blended approach’ to 
counterfeiting research, a strategy endorsed by the IPO in their report as a means of 
more accurately capturing the nature of any counterfeiting problem. The primary 
purpose of the qualitative strand was, through a series of stakeholder interviews, to 
understand the nature of the crime and how it manifests itself in the UK setting. This 
strand also made use of Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) derived data to determine if 
police rural policing strategies/policies address this crime problem. A case study of an 
incident involving a counterfeit pesticide was also included in this qualitative strand. 
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This gave a victim’s perspective of the crime and to provide an example of its 
occurrence which could subsequently be used as a source of illustration. The 
quantitative strand of the study examined the relative levels of awareness of the 
counterfeit pesticide problem amongst police staff and, having hypothesised that this 
would be relatively low, to ascertain where rural policing is actually focused. This strand 
of research also considered if, in the data held by public bodies with an enforcement 
interest in the problem, there is indication of pattern or trend in occurrence of 
counterfeit pesticides in UK.  
Having concluded the first step of the convergent parallel approach the results 
of each of the various strands of the research are presented. This represents the 
second step in the research design. It would be fair to say that these results are 
dominated by the data generated by the twenty-two expert opinions that collectively 
made up the in-depth stakeholder interviews. That is not to underestimate the value of 
the data generated by the other research for in the third step in the process, what 
amounts to an overall summary of the analysed data, the various research strands 
become mutually supportive and collectively informative. Once merged the data paints 
a picture of a recurring crime that relies on the systematic abuse of European parallel 
trading, a regulatory facility that supports the free movement of goods between 
member states. However, despite this illicit trade being intrinsically associated with 
organised criminality, it is apparent that this is a crime that is poorly policed.  
Turning to interpret the merged results of the research, the fourth and final step 
in the convergent parallel approach, it is apparent that the collective industry, 
government, and media reporting of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem is a 
reasonable expression of the mechanics of this crime. However, what it is equally 
apparent is that there has been a collective failure to recognise a market dynamic that 
underpins the problem, and that it is this dynamic that makes undertaking the 
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mechanics of the crime a worthwhile endeavour for the OCG counterfeiter. Three 
sources of influence are described; firstly the diverse profile of the UK pesticide 
marketplace, there being an underlying baseline market for counterfeit pesticides that 
resides in a comparatively poorly regulated market outside of the core agricultural 
industry; secondly the response of the legitimate manufacturing industry, not least a 
pervading emphasis on the need for regulatory change as a means of tackling the 
problem and a failure to make effective use of collective industry knowledge of the 
problem; thirdly the narrow focus of rural policing, the consequence of a growing 
dependence on insurance company data as a benchmark for the success or otherwise 
of rural policing, to the detriment of the policing of other rural crime such as counterfeit 
pesticides. These factors combine to produce an operating environment for the 
counterfeiter, the dynamic, where they can trade with relative impunity. There is a 
reliable market for their illicit products even when demand from the agricultural market 
is low, the manufacturing industry response is less than fully effective, and their 
activities are not being actively policed. 
The concluding chapter ends by returning to the aim of the study, determining 
that counterfeit pesticides do indeed represent a substantive threat to the UK 
agricultural industry. It is suggested that a means of reducing this threat may be found 
in adopting policy and practices which are designed to disrupt the dynamic that 
underpins the UK counterfeit pesticide market. A number of recommendations are 
made to achieve this disruption, which would make the market place a less attractive 
place for the counterfeiter to operate, along with an indication as to where the research 
might now reasonably proceed.  
The thesis now continues with a review of the literature, beginning with a 




2.0. A review of the literature 
“Though governments as well as management have clearly identified the problem, very 
little is known – both in practice and theory – about the mechanisms and structure of 
the illicit market, the tactics of counterfeit producers, consumer behaviour with respect 
to imitation products and the financial impact on individual companies... the clandestine 
nature of the counterfeit market limits direct accessibility to the phenomenon. 
Consequently, the existing body of literature does not necessarily cover all aspects of 
counterfeit activities.” (Staake et al., 2009, p.320) 
 
In 2009 Staake et al considered the emergence of counterfeiting as a worldwide 
crime phenomena, seeking to illuminate the economic principles of counterfeit trade 
and the describe the underlying illicit supply chains. In bringing together previous 
research on the subject for fresh analysis they undoubtedly advanced the collective 
knowledge on the subject. Most significantly, and in particular in terms of this thesis, 
they highlighted an important emerging trend in the modus operandi of this illicit trade 
that has, in the relatively short time that has elapsed since the review was carried out, 
become firmly entrenched. Counterfeiters are no longer just targeting luxury items but 
are diversifying into non-luxury markets such as pharmaceuticals and automotive parts. 
Highlighting this characteristic certainly contributed to a wider appreciation of the 
contemporary pattern of counterfeiting activity. However, it could be argued that the 
true significance of Staake et al was not in noting the shifting nature of this illicit trade 
but in recognising the limited scope of the research that had been carried out into this 
phenomena up until that point. Whilst acknowledging the obvious problems faced by 
researchers, working on a subject where the clandestine nature of the market severely 
hinders accessibility to usable data, Staake et al highlighted a number of shortcomings. 
Notable amongst these was that there had been little research carried out into the 
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potential impact of the counterfeit trade on specific business sectors. This was despite 
estimates that the cost in terms of lost profit and tax revenue is estimated to be in the 
order of £1.3 billion in the UK alone (Harper, 2013).  
This review begins with an overview of the worldwide counterfeiting problem. It 
continues by considering whether, despite the findings of Staake et al, there is a 
recognisable body of work concerning counterfeit pesticides and the evidence for there 
being a substantive UK problem. It then reflects upon the contribution of criminological 
studies toward understanding the problem and the enforcement, and more specifically 
police, response. The review concludes by considering the extent to which the study 




In the context of this study ‘pesticide’ is taken to have the same meaning as the 
phrase ‘plant protection product’. This in turn is taken to have the meaning defined by 
the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (Health and Safety Executive, 2014), this being 
products in the form in which they are supplied to the user, consisting of, or containing 
active substances, safeners or synergists, and intended for one of the following uses:  
a) protecting plants or plant products against all harmful organisms or preventing 
the action of such organisms, unless the main purpose of these products is 
considered to be for reasons of hygiene rather than for the protection of plants 
or plant products (e.g. fungicides, insecticides); 
b) influencing the life processes of plants, such as substances influencing their 




c) preserving plant products, in so far as such substances or products are not 
subject to special community provisions on preservatives (e.g. extending the life 
of cut flowers);  
d) destroying undesired plants or parts of plants, except algae unless the products 
are applied on soil or water to protect plants (e.g. herbicides/weedkillers to kill 
actively growing weeds);  
e) checking or preventing undesired growth of plants, except algae unless the 
products are applied on soil or water to protect plants (e.g. 
herbicides/weedkillers preventing the growth of weeds). 
Counterfeiting, as previously defined in the introduction to the thesis, is a 
category of crime that is littered with ambiguous phraseology and what might be 
considered slang words. In addition many of the frequently used terms are interrelated 
and sometimes liberally substituted for each other in the literature. In an attempt to 
make sense of the relationship between these various terms Figure 2.1 shows how the 
most commonly used terms are clustered as an overall counterfeiting nomenclature. At 
the same time the figure illustrates how some terms have a close relationship with 
others within the cluster and a less close relationship with the remainder. For example 
the term Deceptive Counterfeit is closely associated with Fake but less closely 
associated with Pirate (the first being a term used to describe a type of deceptive 
counterfeit and the second a non-deceptive variant). The subject of this study, 
Counterfeit Pesticides, is shown in its relevant position at the periphery of this cluster; 
that is to say it is closely associated with Deceptive Counterfeits and Illicit Parallel 
Imports but not with Knock-Off or Pirate goods. Each of the words used in the cluster is 
defined in Table 2.1, specifically in the sense they are understood in the context of this 
study. Understanding this relationship between descriptive terms, and in particular 
those most closely associated with counterfeit pesticides, will help the reader to better 
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understand the complex nature of counterfeiting. It will also help in appreciating why 
particular subject areas feature more strongly than others in the review.  
 
2.2 Review method 
In considering an appropriate method of review what follows owes much to the fact that 
the history of counterfeiting as a discreet subject of academic study is a relatively short 
one. This is unsurprising, given that the dramatic expansion of this transnational crime 
problem is a relatively recent occurrence2. This has two significant implications; firstly 
there is no consolidated body of knowledge on the subject. Secondly, and quite 
possibly as a consequence of the first, there is a considerable time lag between 
emerging trends and the recognition of the same in peer reviewed material.  
                                                          
2 This is not to suggest that counterfeiting is in any way a new crime phenomenon. The trade in 
fake goods, for example olive oil, goes back at least to the time of the Romans (Mueller, 2012) 
and given that evidence of the trade has been found across the geographical span of their 












Pesticide   




Table 2.1: Definitions of key counterfeiting terms 
 
Counterfeiting Term Definition 
 
Deceptive counterfeit An item purchased or acquired by a consumer where they 




An item purchased or acquired by a consumer where they 
are aware that it is not genuine. 
 
Fake A widely used term generally accepted to mean a 
deceptive counterfeit. 
 
Knock-off A commonly used colloquialism generally accepted to 
mean a non-deceptive counterfeit. 
 
Pirate goods Describes copyrighted works that have been reproduced 
without the permission of the copyright holder. Such goods 
may be deceptive or non-deceptive counterfeits. 
 
Illicit parallel import A product imported into an EU member state from another 
member state, under the terms of parallel trade 
procedures, which does not meet the criteria for it being 
authorised for placing on the market and use in the country 
from which it is purchased and/or it is not identical to one 
that is already authorised for placing on the market and for 
use in the UK. When sold to an unwitting consumer it can 
be considered to be a deceptive counterfeit. 
 
Counterfeit pesticide A plant protection product which pertains to be a genuine 
item authorised for use in the UK by the Chemicals 




To address the first of these implications the review is cross-discipline in 
design, drawing on academic writing on the subject from a variety of different sources. 
Much of this work, which includes for example psychology, business and marketing, 
and economics, is niche in perspective. However, if considered in totum it contains 
much to further understanding of the subject in a criminal justice context. The time lag 
issue was overcome by including within the review reports and analysis produced by 
industry associations, government departments, and specialist non-governmental 
organisations with a specific commercial or law enforcement interest in the subject. 
Given that this so called ‘grey’ literature is often the precursor to academic study, and 
indeed is often used as a source of primary data, this was deemed to be a reasonable 
and pragmatic approach. Moreover, and given the rapidly evolving nature of the 
subject, it was also deemed appropriate to use media reporting of incidents and 
enforcement initiatives as a means of identifying emerging patterns or trends.  
The first part of the review, that is to say the introduction to the subject of 
counterfeiting, reflects the authors wide ranging reading of the subject over a two year 
period. This might be described as a constrained snowball approach to the literature, 
the focus being on the keywords given in the subject nomenclature. The starting point 
for the second part of the review, which looks at the counterfeit pesticide problem, was 
a structured search of relevant electronic databases; EBSCOhost (Business Source 
Complete; Criminal Justice Abstracts), Web of Knowledge (Social Science Citation 
Index), JSTOR (Business and Economics; Social Sciences), ProQuest and LexisNexis. 
The search criteria applied was as summarised in Table 2.2. Each of the key words 
given in the two primary search term lines were combined in turn with each word 
contained within the subsequent search set(s) these reflecting broad review areas. For 
example the word Counterfeit, from the primary search term line, was combined with 
each of the words in sets 1-3 in turn. The key words from the second primary search 
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term line (for example Pesticide) were combined with each of the words in set 4 only. 
Wildcard and combined searches were as indicated. This process was applied in turn 





This search method was also used for a more general internet search, seeking 
those government, industry and specialist organisation reports previously discussed to 
give depth to the review. This proved to be effective. However, given the dynamic 
nature of incident reporting such a ‘single-hit’ approach was considered less 
appropriate for identifying relevant media coverage of the subject which, by the very 
nature of online reporting, is more transient in nature. In recognition of this a series of 
online alerts were designed and run to capture relevant news reporting in close to real-
time. These alerts were less expansive than those used for the electronic journal and 
Counterfeit Fake ‘Knock-Off’ Pirate ‘Parallel 
Import’ 
Set 1 Set 2  Set 3  
+ Pesticide  + Agricultur* + Crime 
+ Spray* + Horticultur* + Criminal* 
+ Fungicide + Farm* + Offence 
+ Herbicide + Rural* + Law 
+ Insecticide  + Legislation 
Pesticide Spray Fungicide Herbicide Insecticide 






+ ‘Parallel Import’ + illegal 
and/or illicit 




report searches because what was being sought was very specifically the reporting of 
counterfeit pesticide incidents rather than any wider comment or analysis. A summary 






Online alerts provide a means by which a continuous search of the internet may 
be conducted over a defined time period, in this case the eighteen month period from 
January 2013 to January 2015. The resulting alerts were then reviewed and filtered for 
relevance and items from non-established media outlets were discarded. Any indication 
of counterfeit pesticide incidents was followed up using a stand-alone internet search 
using whatever information the source article provided. Again the results of these 
searches were filtered according to relevance and source credibility.  
The results of all searches, including online alert derived material, were 
subsequently analysed using proprietary Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) software. 
The constant comparison method of analysis described in section 4.2.1 of the thesis 
was used to identify the primary and subsidiary themes. These themes then provided 
the structure to the review that now follows.  
 
Counterfeit  Fake  ‘Knock-Off’  Pirate  ‘Parallel Import’ + illegal and/or 
illicit  






Table 2.3: Summary of the online alert search criteria relating to counterfeit pesticides. 
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2.3 Setting the scene; counterfeiting as a worldwide crime problem 
“The magnitude and effects of counterfeiting and piracy are of such significance that they 
compel strong and sustained action from governments, business and consumers”. 
(OECD, 2008, p.13) 
Having recognised in the introduction to this review a lack of depth in writing 
which addresses the impact of counterfeiting on specific business sectors it would be 
fair to say that, by contrast, there is a much more robust body of work describing the 
wider significance of this illicit activity. In particular there is a sustained strand, largely 
generated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which is concerned with its 
growing international economic impact (OECD, 2008; World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2009). Some of the most comprehensive and arguably most authoritative 
of these reports are now a number of years old. However, more recent strategic 
analysis, which has a greater emphasis on the criminal aspects of the problem, 
suggests that the problem has continued to grow and that there is unlikely to be a 
reduction in this expansion in the foreseeable future (National Crime Agency, 2014). 
In considering what underpins this growth the early part of the twenty-first 
century saw the convergence of a number of factors which have collectively served to 
create a comparatively benign operating environment for counterfeiters. Firstly, rapidly 
evolving manufacturing technologies have enabled them to reverse engineer and 
subsequently to mass produce convincing copies of genuine items (Endeshaw, 2005; 
Minagawa et al., 2007). Secondly the evolution of digital mobile communication and the 
internet has brought together, at least in a virtual sense, illicit manufacturer, distributor 
and buyer. This has provided a variety of means by which the proceeds of the 
consequential crime can be legitimised (Levi, 2008;  World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2009; International Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicines, 
2013; Robbins, 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). Finally the 
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ease with which goods can be transported across national borders, especially within 
the European free internal market, means that the movement of counterfeit goods is 
not constrained to anything like the extent it once was (Vithlani, 1998).  
The literature is relatively plentiful on the subject of cause. However, 
comparatively few of those concerned with explaining the growth in counterfeiting have 
considered the global economic imbalance which some have suggested might be the 
primary but overlooked driving force behind the world trade in such goods (Palombi, 
2007). That is not to say that it is entirely ignored. A number of analysts, Palombi 
(2007) included, believe that it is highly significant that resources and manufacturing 
knowledge are centred on the developing world whilst the majority of intellectual 
property is owned by the developed world.  
Aside from such structural influences, and considering much shorter term global 
economic determinants there is some evidence to suggest that the recent rapid growth 
in the counterfeit problem has, somewhat paradoxically, been encouraged by a 
worldwide economic downturn. This downturn may have had a significant negative 
impact on many legitimate businesses but seemingly not on the counterfeiter. Whilst 
their illegal enterprises mirror the organisational sophistication of their legitimate 
counterparts (Hetzer, 2002; Williams & Godson, 2002)  they are free from much of the 
normal cost of enterprise such as research and development or compliance with 
regulatory regimes (World Trade Organization, 1994; FTI Consulting, 2013). Moreover 
it would seem that the same economic pressures have stimulated a market with an 
increasing willingness on the part of consumers to accept the risks associated with 
acquiring goods they know not to be genuine (Rutter & Bryce, 2008; Barnato, 2013) 3. 
Taken together these factors have seemingly prompted a rapid diversification of the 
                                                          
3 The role of the consumer in the growth of the market for counterfeit good is discussed at 
section 2.3.2 of the thesis. 
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counterfeit market. It now includes much more than the mainstream luxury items which 
have historically been the bedrock of the trade (Stewart et al., 2007). There is now no 
apparent limit to what can, and is, counterfeited. From pharmaceuticals to safety critical 
aircraft parts few, if any, industries have been immune from the problem (Phillips, 
2007).  
The consequence of this benign and arguably nurturing environment for the 
counterfeiter has been a crime-wave that has been estimated to be worth something in 
excess of 2% of total world trade (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2009). It 
seems somewhat surprising then that this could hardly be described as a headline 
crime. Perhaps more accurately it might be said that it is not a headline crime in those 
countries where its impact as a proportion of total economic activity is relatively modest 
(OECD, 2009). That is not to say that the cost to both national economies and 
businesses is not well recognised and documented (World Intellectual Property 
Organization, 2009). Rather it would seem that in the majority of countries, for example 
the UK, there is a baseline level of counterfeiting activity which has become essentially 
normalised. This is a crime that goes largely without popular comment, at least until 
such time as a counterfeiting incident occurs which, for whatever reason, causes 
widespread consumer alarm. This was certainly the case in the UK in 2013 with the so 
called ‘horse-meat scandal’ (Lichfield et al., 2013)4.  
There is much to support the view that counterfeiting has undergone a rapid 
growth in terms of both volume and diversity. Out of this emerges four strands that 
stand out to the extent that they deserve individual consideration; the significance of 
China as a source of counterfeit goods, the extent and implications of consumer 
                                                          
4 In the 2013 meat adulteration scandal that had an impact across Europe foods advertised as 
containing beef were found to contain undeclared or improperly declared horse meat. The 
scandal has been variously described but at its core it was a case of repeated counterfeiting. 
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complicity, the link between this illicit trade and organised crime groups, and the 
economic, environmental, and human costs of the trade in counterfeit goods. Each of 
these strands will now be reviewed in turn. 
 
2.3.1 China as a source of counterfeit goods 
Writers on the worldwide counterfeiting problem frequently cite China as being 
the source of the majority of counterfeit goods. It has been suggested that there is an 
intrinsic relationship between this criminal activity and the state (see for example 
Mertha, 2007; Dimitrov, 2012). Some analysts have estimated that China is the origin 
of something in the order of 75% of all counterfeit products traded annually worldwide 
(Stewart et al., 2007;  FTI Consulting, 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2013). This generalisation would seem to hold good for counterfeit plant protection 
products. The industrial city of Jintan, located in Jiangsu province in the south of the 
country is cited as being a production hot-spot (CropLife International, 2006; Rowe, 
n/k). The proximity of this industrial centre relative to the known counterfeit export 
routes of Taiwan and Hong Kong is likely to be a significant factor in its link to 
counterfeit chemicals (Chow, 2003). However, whilst the finger of blame is generally 
pointed toward China some have questioned the legitimacy of the frequently repeated 
discourse of the ‘Chinese pirate’. Writers identify evidence that the authorities there are 
increasingly willing to acknowledge their country’s key role in the worldwide 
counterfeiting problem (Pang, 2008). They offer as evidence regular and widely 
reported initiatives being launched to demonstrate to the wider business community 
that the problem is being taken seriously (CropLife International, 2011a; China Daily, 
2013). These anti-counterfeiting activities include the targeting of fake agricultural 
products, such as counterfeit pesticides, and have prompted qualified public 
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recognition from the legitimate agrochemical industry (CropLife International, 2009b; 
Pakistan Today, 2013; Xinhua News Agency, 2013). 
Although at state level the Chinese are increasingly inclined to recognise the 
problem some writers and agencies suggest that, despite governmental 
acknowledgement, it will not be tackled quickly (New York Times, 2007; National Crime 
Agency, 2014). Various reasons as to why this should be the case have been 
proposed, dominant amongst these being that traditional Chinese beliefs do not 
conform to Western notions about the ownership of inventions and ideas (Zimmerman, 
2013). A number of authors on Information Law, Endeshaw included, have proposed 
that social and cultural factors across Asia make the enforcements of intellectual 
property rights inherently problematic. Copying the work of others is not regarded as a 
questionable practice (Endeshaw, 2005). This cultural barrier manifests itself in the 
form of business practices which make it difficult for enforcement agencies to gather 
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Offenders reportedly do not keep their 
products on-site, refuse to deal with anyone they do not know personally (Levin, 2013), 
or adopt decentralized manufacturing methods that circumvent local anti-counterfeiting 
regulations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). Others have highlighted 
that even when anti-counterfeiting legislation and regulations are successfully applied 
they carry comparatively light financial penalties and do little to deter the determined 
counterfeiter (CropLife International, 2006; Zimmerman, 2013). Typically penalties 
under Chinese law for the possession of counterfeit goods are based on the value of 
material seized. Provided the trafficker ensures that shipments are split into relatively 
small consignments then the financial consequences of being caught are relatively 
modest (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). This inability to make any 
prosecution inroads into this illicit trade may, when taken alongside a suggested 
degree of official corruption (CropLife International, 2006), explain why some 
25 
 
commentators on the Chinese counterfeit phenomena have argued that there is a 
general unwillingness on the part of local enforcement agencies to pursue offenders. 
This essentially leaves legitimate companies to build their own prosecution cases if 
they are determined to achieve legal redress (Minagawa et al., 2007).  
This writing carries a strong suggestion that legitimate manufacturers are, more 
often than not, entirely isolated in their quest to protect their IP rights. Perhaps 
inevitably in the context of an economy that is in a state of transition (Endeshaw, 2005) 
despite public acknowledgement of the problem there appears to be little sympathy on 
the part of Chinese officials for the Western sensibilities of legitimate manufacturing 
companies (Phillips, 2007). It is a situation seemingly exacerbated if claims that the 
activities of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has done little to bridge the gap 
between the developed and developing world are correct (Palombi, 2007). However, 
such comments need to be considered in light of previously discussed comments that 
Chinese attitudes are changing. There are some who believe that, as the country 
gradually becomes less reliant on importing foreign technologies and cheap 
manufacturing and moves toward a more innovative economy, it will become 
increasingly respectful of intellectual property rights (Wells, 2013).  
Whilst seeking to address the source of production is potentially an important 
factor in tackling the overall counterfeiting problem it is not necessarily the complete 
answer. Others highlight what is essentially the opposite side of the equation as being 
an equal if not more significant factor in the growth of counterfeits; consumer complicity 
in the problem through buying habits that encourage the production and distribution of 





2.3.2 The role of the consumer in the growth of the market for counterfeit goods 
If the literature reviewed in the previous section on the role of China in the world 
trade in counterfeiting implied that the problem was primarily a function of so called 
‘push’ factors then there is an equally robust body of work which presents the counter-
perspective5. Primarily derived from research within the spheres of business 
management and the psychology of consumer behaviour an alternative view is 
proposed; that the rise of the counterfeit can be largely attributed to consumer demand 
or ‘pull’ factors. It is interesting to note how often it is claimed that consumer complicity 
in the market for counterfeit goods has not been thoroughly researched and is poorly 
documented (see for example Chaudhry & Stumpf, 2011; Thorsten Staake et al., 
2012). However, the results of this review suggest that this may be consequential to a 
failure to take a sufficiently broad view rather than a general weakness in the overall 
body of work. By taking a cross-discipline approach a number of themes emerge. 
Together these amount to a useful summary of the key strands in contemporary 
thinking on what drives consumer demand for counterfeit goods. 
Contrary to the belief that prevailed at the start of the current boom in 
counterfeiting, that for most consumers the possibility that a product may be counterfeit 
never occurs to them (Bamossy & Scammon, 1985), it is increasingly apparent that 
consumers are sophisticated decision makers who are capable of recognising a fake 
product (Chaudhry et al., 2009). Moreover those that have considered consumer 
complicity in the trade in counterfeit goods suggest that typically a third of consumers 
would knowingly purchase such products (Tom et al., 1998). This would imply a 
conscious decision to engage, and indeed other sources support this view. However, 
there is little consensus as to the relative weight of each influencing factor. Foundation 
                                                          
5 The significance of push and pull factors in theory of crime terms is discussed in section 2.4.4 
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work into consumer behaviour with respect to counterfeit goods indicates that price is a 
recurring and essentially non-disputed element (see for example Tom et al., 1998; 
Albers-Miller, 1999; Kim et al., 2009). It would also be fair to say that in moving beyond 
this seemingly obvious influence an increasingly complex blend of factors begins to 
emerge. Some of these are inevitably linked to price, notably income (Stumpf et al., 
2011) and individual materialism (Furnham & Valgeirsson, 2007). The remainder 
suggest a complex but largely subconscious process wherein consumers are not 
necessarily looking for a counterfeit product but rather are looking to satisfy a need 
(Stumpf et al., 2011).  
Predominant amongst these factors is the perceived quality of the counterfeit 
product, to the extent that willingness to buy increases in parallel with how well it 
compares with the original (Chaudhry & Stumpf, 2011). That is to say that a consumer 
will, to some varying extent, have a perception of the quality and the somewhat 
indistinct concept of the brand personality of the genuine item (Bian & Moutinho, 2009), 
and the corporate image of the manufacturer of that product (Penz & Stöttinger, 2008). 
Bian and Moutinho (2011) have suggested that these factors, when combined with 
product knowledge (in the sense of appreciating the unique features of the original) are 
key to understanding purchase behaviour in relation to counterfeits.  
These concepts of brand and corporate image are often nebulous in the way 
they are described. Nonetheless they are seemingly important for they are often 
reflected in those studies that consider how consumers navigate the risks associated 
with the purchase of counterfeit goods (Penz et al., 2008). Consumer involvement with 
a brand translates into trust, and it is by building brand trust that legitimate 
manufacturers encourage risk aversity amongst their consumer base (Matos et al., 
2007). However, and as has already been noted in considering what proportion of 
individuals will knowingly buy counterfeit products, the strategy is not universally 
28 
 
successful. Certainly it has been recognised that once a customer starts buying fake 
products, and assuming their experience is that any reduction in product quality is more 
than compensated for by cost saving, any residual averseness dissipates (Matos et al., 
2007; Penz et al., 2008). Moreover it has been suggested by some, for example 
Chaudhry and Stumpf (2011), that one of the strongest predictors of consumer 
complicity with counterfeit goods is the personal pleasure to be found in buying them. 
These writers imply a potential consumer attitudinal shift from fear toward pleasure in 
acquiring counterfeit goods once a positive experience has assuaged any concerns 
associated with the potential risks that legitimate manufacturers may have 
promulgated.  
Interestingly, and importantly in the context of this study, there is an indication 
these generalisations about consumer willingness to take risk may not be consistent 
across product groups. There is, for example, much less inclination toward knowingly 
buying counterfeit pharmaceuticals or automotive parts, products where the 
consequences of failure are potentially far more serious, than there is, for example, in 
buying non-genuine clothing or watches (Penz & Stöttinger, 2008). Similarly complicity 
varies across and within consumer groups and, as one might expect, individual honesty 
plays an important role. Moral judgement has a direct influence over purchase intent 
(Kim et al., 2009) as does fear of punishment (Penz & Stöttinger, 2005). Such 
individual factors, which would also include perceived image in the sight of significant 
others (Bearden et al., 1989) or the influence of professional advice when making 
strategic high value buying decisions, have been noted particularly in the context of the 
professional purchase decision making process within the agricultural industry 
(Agricultural Industries Confederation, 2013).   
The study of consumer complicity with counterfeit products is well served, albeit 
it is spread across a number of disciplines and is far from consistent in its view as to 
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what the most important influencing factors are. However, one point that is seemingly 
overlooked is the extent to which there is a lack of concern on the part of consumers 
about the link between counterfeiting and organised crime6. As Bullock et al. (2009) 
describe crimes that are ‘organised’ by definition, selling counterfeit goods included, do 
not generate concern amongst the public in the same way that crimes such as burglary 
or vehicles crimes do. Nonetheless whilst this factor is largely absent from consumer 
orientated research it does feature more prominently in other writing. 
 
2.3.3 The link between counterfeiting and organised crime 
Research that implicates an ability to mass produce counterfeit goods or 
consumer willingness to buy them as causal factors are insufficient fully explain the 
extent of the current counterfeit problem. It is only on examining the body of work that 
describes how the juncture of these factors is exploited by Organised Crime Groups 
(OCGs) that it becomes apparent how, and why, there has been a rapid growth in this 
crime problem. The link between OCGs and counterfeit goods is well established and 
is a common theme within a broad cross-section of writing associated with the subject 
(see, for example Lowe, 2006; FTI Consulting, 2013; International Institute of Research 
Against Counterfeit Medicines, 2013). Indeed it has been suggested that the growth in 
counterfeiting as a worldwide crime problem has been driven more by the activities of 
OCG counterfeiters than any other factor (Stumpf et al., 2011). However, the extent to 
which this link has been properly explored is open to question, particularly given that 
                                                          
6 Organised crime is variously defined but for the purposes of the study the definition used by 
the UK National Crime Agency is utilised. Organised crime is therefore defined as serious crime 
planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their 
motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. Organised criminals working together for a 
particular criminal activity or activities are called an organised crime group (OCGs). 
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some have described the whole genre of organised crime as still being poorly 
represented in the literature (Hall, 2013).  
This implied weakness may have some foundation. Whilst there have been 
numerous popular texts on the classic crime gang and the gangster (see for example 
Thompson, 2005) there has been much less written about the evolution of those Mafia 
style gangs which by and large only exerted local influence into OCGs that are run like 
sophisticated and modern multi-national businesses (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 
2009; Varese, 2013). That said the available literature is still enlightening. For example 
Hetzer (2002), when describing such groups, suggested that organised crime is more 
akin to a shadow economy and that this may be an extreme example of capitalist 
accumulation. Indeed this focus on capital accumulation rather than local influence and 
status is increasingly reflected in national strategic assessments of OCG activity 
(National Crime Agency, 2014).  
Considering the overall tenor of the literature it seems that part of the problem 
with addressing the activities of OCGs, both academically and practically, has been this 
very problem; an increasingly blurred line between organised crime and legitimate 
business and the increasing propensity for them to be one and both at the same time 
(Spink, 2011; Levi, 2014). Nonetheless by taking a cross-discipline approach to the 
question of why counterfeiting should be such an important element of the illicit 
business portfolio of many OCGs it was possible to isolate two noteworthy factors. 
Firstly there is a firm link back to the extent of consumer complicity previously 
considered in this review. A willingness to step outside of established supply channels 
readily exposes consumers to the activities of OCGs and creates a market place where 
fake products can be sold at high profit (Catizone, 2006). Secondly an unwillingness on 
the part of governments or local enforcement agencies in what might be described as 
‘victim countries’ to actively engage with matters of intellectual property means that 
31 
 
counterfeiting represents a low risk activity to OCGs (see for example Williams & 
Godson, 2002; Phillips, 2007; Staake et al., 2009; Fink et al., 2010; Coyne & Bell, 
2011; The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, 2013).  
The high profit, low risk nature of counterfeiting as a crime opportunity is an 
often quoted maxim that regularly occurs in academic studies and business reports as 
well as media coverage of the problem (FTI Consulting, 2013). The profit element of 
the equation is largely self-evident; these groups are trading high volume and often 
high value goods, this to the extent that some have suggested that this activity is now 
as profitable to them as illegal drug trafficking (see for example FTI Consulting, 2013). 
At the same time the risk of being caught let alone prosecuted is perceived as being 
very low, largely the consequence of there being demonstrably poor rates of incidence 
reporting to the police or other enforcement agencies (Tilley & Hopkins, 2008). As a 
result counterfeiting is seen by OCGs as a soft crime (National Crime Agency, 2014), 
that is to say one where they can exploit the unregulated gaps in enforcement with 
relative impunity. As Coyne & Bell (2011) describe they can respond quickly and avoid 
unnecessary risk. It would seem then that OCGs have recognised that humdrum crime 
is safer (The Economist, 2014).  
This lack of enforcement agency engagement with the counterfeiting problem 
must be seen in the context of wide recognition that the illegal revenue from this trade 
supports secondary OCG activities (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015). 
Often these are crimes which rank much higher in enforcement priorities and which in 
total are estimated to generate $870 billion a year (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2015). It has been suggested, for example, that the proceeds of counterfeiting 
activity have been used to fund the importation of illegal drugs, the trafficking of people 
into modern day slavery (Fink et al., 2010), and to support terrorist activity (Lowe, 
2006; Heinonen et al., 2012). Whilst the validity of this last association has been 
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questioned by some (see for example Harris, 2005; Phillips, 2007) seen in the context 
of a global upsurge in terrorist activity (Ellis, 2015) such a link cannot be dismissed. It 
remains a possibility, however, that a failure to give a higher priority to counterfeiting is 
not the result of enforcement agency ignorance of the problem7 . Rather there is a lack 
of public concern. It has been suggested that it is generally not recognised that the 
revenue generated by counterfeit products is used to fund other types of potentially 
even more harmful organised crime (Bullock et al., 2009, p.1) . 
It has already been noted that, as a general observation, organised crime is 
poorly represented in criminological writing8 (Hall, 2013). This weakness is particularly 
evident with regard to describing how OCGs operate at a practical level. Whilst it is 
recognised that they have a global influence, and indeed given the opportunities 
presented by easy travel and rapid communication systems their activities may be 
considered to be more dependent upon opportunity than upon location (Levi, 2008), no 
study in the public domain has been identified which comprehensively describes the 
modus operandi of an OCG that is active in the counterfeit market. That said it is 
possible to glean a number of key characteristics of their structure, operational 
practices, and prevalence from recurring themes within the available literature, 
primarily from government or agency sponsored reports and analysis. 
Organised crime groups are, by definition, organised (Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit, 2009; Pottenger, 2013; Secretariat of the Directorate General Human Rights and 
Rule of Law, 2013). However, any suggestion that this is implies a static organisational 
                                                          
7 To accuse policy makers and national policing bodies of being entirely disengaged with the 
counterfeiting problem would be unfair. Whilst it has not attracted widespread coverage or 
comment this review recognises the establishment of The Intellectual Property Office within City 
of London Police, which is the National Lead Force for fraud (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills, 2013). 
8 Theoretical approaches to organised crime are discussed in section 2.4.4 of this review. 
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structure is refuted (Levi, 2014). Typically such groups are rather dynamic, often relying 
on relatively loose associations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010; 
Coyne & Bell, 2011; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013) and that they 
can repeatedly reform to take advantage of specific opportunities wherever, and 
whenever, they might arise (Levi, 2008; Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2009; Spink, 
2011, Braun & Maurin, 2013). Moreover this flexibility allows them to be involved in the 
counterfeiting process from manufacturing, through distribution and ultimately sale of 
the product (FTI Consulting, 2013). Such groups are seemingly numerous. The 2013 
Europol Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment expressed concern about 
the growth of OCG activity within Europe, making specific reference to the scale of 
counterfeiting activity (Europol, 2013). Recognising yet again the attractiveness of 
counterfeiting to OCGs, because it is seen as a low risk and high profit activity, the 
analyses estimates that at the time of the report there were 3,600 such groups active in 
the European Union. Turning to consider UK analyses of the same issues the National 
Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime concurs with the European 
analyses in that it also suggests that the problem is growing (National Crime Agency, 
2014). In terms of their impact it has been separately estimated that the total cost to the 
UK economy of OCG counterfeiting activity is somewhere between £20 and £40 billion 
a year (HM Government, 2010).  
This review has previously described a widespread unwillingness at the state 
level to intervene in matters of intellectual property right enforcement. However, 
arguably this unwillingness is paradoxical given the demonstrable link between 
organised criminality and the trade in counterfeit goods. A failure to adequately engage 
with the national counterfeiting problem is seemingly at odds with a clear intent on the 
part of the UK Government to address the problem of OCGs (HM Government, 2011a) 
made manifest in the establishment of the National Crime Agency, which has been 
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tasked with addressing organised criminality in the UK as a priority (HM Government, 
2011b). Some have described the establishment of this Agency as a tacit admission of 
a failure on the part of the Government to thus far come to terms with the OCG 
problem and that fighting organised crime has generally taken second lace to tackling 
the threat from international terrorism (Royal United Services Institute). Nonetheless it 
seems that, by a somewhat circuitous route, the UK Government has now put in place 
the means by which it may address the demands of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, cited at the head of this overview, for sustained action to 
tackle the counterfeiting problem (OECD, 2008, p.13). 
 
2.3.4 The economic, environmental, and human costs of the trade in counterfeit 
goods 
Given that the literature is indicative of the relationship between counterfeiting 
and OCGs being manifestly at the centre of a serious crime problem it might 
reasonably be hypothesised that it would also be a feature of criminological and 
criminal justice research. However, and has been previously noted in this review, those 
who have previously considered the body of work relating to counterfeiting have 
suggested that these are disciplines whose academic contribution to the subject has 
been noticeable by its near absence. Heinonen et al. (2012), for example, have gone 
as far as to suggest that there is no clear understanding of product counterfeiting from 
a criminological perspective. This lack of engagement may be indicative of the 
methodological problems associated with researching organised crime. As Abadinsky 
(1981) has noted such criminal activities are concealed from public view and that much 
of what we learn is gleaned from indirect sources. What is perhaps much more 
surprising is that those researchers who consider the victim’s perspective (victimology) 
have similarly failed to engage with this subject, even though material might be more 
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accessible. That said there is a significant body of victim centred comment on the 
economic, environmental and human cost of the trade in counterfeit goods, albeit not 
within the criminological canon.  
The likely scale of the worldwide counterfeiting problem and its cost to the world 
economy has been a matter of continuing concern to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2008 this major international economic 
organisation published a wide ranging report into the global problem, within which it 
was estimated that the international trade in counterfeit goods could was worth as 
much as USD 200 billion in 2005 (OECD, 2008). Subsequent reports, building on this 
original analysis, have confirmed that this trade has grown rapidly over recent years 
with one specialist industry study estimating that it will be worth between USD 770 
billion and USD 960 billion by 2015 (Frontier Economics Ltd, 2011, p.5). However, 
whilst such macro-data is probably useful for estimating the broader economy-wide 
consequences of the trade, and they certainly give an indication of the growing scale of 
associated worldwide criminal activity, it does not illuminate how this problem is 
experienced by individual manufacturing companies. From such all-encompassing 
estimates it cannot be appreciated, as the original OECD report recognised, that there 
are multiple impacts including upon sales volume, prices, and brand value (OECD, 
2008). Moreover these figures do not give any meaningful indication of the more 
tangible consequences of this trade, for example the environmental damage that it is 
believed to cause.  
The criminologist Professor Michael Levi (2014), when considering perceptions 
of organised crime in a discussion piece for the Royal United Services Institute, 
recognised that the harms caused by the activities of organised crime groups are likely 
to far exceed the benefits to the offenders. Levi cites the dumping of toxic waste as a 
good example of an inevitable consequence of many counterfeiting activities. Moreover 
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the use of the finished counterfeit item can have equally serious environmental 
consequences. It is worth considering the example given by Kenaway in his 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of counterfeit goods in Egypt where he notes 
documented cases of counterfeit fertilizers causing much damage to the environment 
(Kenaway, 2013). Beyond the obvious long term implications of such environmental 
damage there is of course a much shorter term, and very direct, threat to the wellbeing 
of people exposed to counterfeit goods. 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have been very vocal in 
highlighting the direct health threat posed by fake goods. In a WIPO press release 
which coincided with a subject specific congress hosted by Interpol they claimed that 
the transnational organised crime groups behind the world trade in counterfeit goods 
commit these crimes with no thought for the potentially deadly effect of their products 
(World Intellectual Property Organization, 2009). There would seemingly be evidence 
to support this claim, in particular relating to the counterfeiting experience of the 
pharmaceutical industry which is often cited as an example (see for example Catizone, 
2006). It is not surprising given its inherent scientific leaning that this particular industry 
also has a much greater body of sector specific academic writing on the counterfeiting 
problem than any other, a significant proportion of which extends beyond the 
efficaciousness or toxicological properties of counterfeit products. Indeed there is a 
body of journal published work which considers technical means to counter the 
counterfeiter (see for example Catizone, 2006; Deus, 2006; Kontnik, 2006) as well as 
industry specific reports concerning the link between counterfeit medicines and 
organised criminality (International Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicines, 
2013). In terms of other coverage the review recognises the widespread reporting of 
some of the tragic human aspects of the counterfeit pharmaceutical problem. This is 
typified by media reporting of the devastating impact of non-genuine malaria treatments 
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in East Africa where it is believed that as many as a third of administered drugs are 




By taking a broad approach to writing concerning the worldwide counterfeiting 
problem the review has demonstrated a number of core themes which dominate both 
academic and popular writing on the subject. Foremost amongst these are the 
collective agreement that China is the source of the majority of counterfeit product, that 
there are variety of factors that generate consumer demand for such goods, and that 
there is invariably an organised crime link to any significant counterfeiting problem. It is 
also recognised that the true cost of the problem extends beyond simple economics to 
include environmental damage and harm to people. These themes are certainly useful 
in developing a broad understanding of the subject but, with the notable exception of 
the pharmaceutical industry, they collectively support the Staake et al. (2009) 
conclusion that the literature lacks sector specific focus. To that end this review will 
continue by considering the robustness of material relating counterfeit pesticides and if 
it is indicative of there being a substantive UK problem. 
 
2.4 A specific counterfeiting problem: plant protection products (pesticides) 
“Pesticides are among the most regulated products in the world. However, in recent 
years, more and more counterfeit and illicit pesticides have been seized all over 
Europe. These pesticide products are finding their way into the European agricultural 
system with increasing regularity. As a result, they can ruin crops, affect food chains 
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and ultimately threaten public health and safety”. (Europol & The Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market, 2012, p.4) 
 
The review has thus far drawn upon a body of cross-discipline literature which 
gives a fair overview of the worldwide counterfeiting problem. However, in turning to 
consider the counterfeiting of pesticides it quickly becomes apparent that there is a 
near absence of academic engagement, at least at the business sector level. That is 
not to say that the subject has not generated a substantial body of what Auger 
describes as reports literature (Auger, 1975), primarily derived from industry 
representative bodies and individual trading companies. Auger recognised the value of 
such sources because of the speed with which an emerging subject, of which this is a 
good example, is brought to public attention when compared with the traditional 
academic route. The same could also be said for media reporting of the subject which, 
weak as it inevitably is in terms of academic rigour, still provides a useful indicator of 
‘real-time’ occurrence. In the absence of published research this section of the review 
will make use of these sources as a means of determining whether this particular 
counterfeiting problem is typical or whether there are indications that it is substantially 
different to that described thus far. This section of the review is split into three parts, 
the first considering counterfeit pesticides on a global and European level and the 
second part focusing on these products in the UK context. The final part considers the 
enforcement, and specifically the police, response to the problem. 
 
2.4.1 Understanding the global context 
When considering the wider coverage of this crime issue it is immediately clear 
that it is a significant global problem, this to the extent that it commands specific 
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attention within OECD analysis of the global impact of counterfeiting and piracy 
(OECD, 2008). In broad terms the problem bears many similarities to the majority of 
other counterfeiting problems, that is to say the illicit manufacturing and distribution of 
an imitation of the genuine product in totality, including the container and label 
(CropLife International, 2006). Distribution of the product also conforms to widely 
recognised practice with bottles and labels being shipped from source entirely 
independent of the product itself (Toth, 2011). It is a modus operandi that significantly 
diminishes the capacity for customs regulation to facilitate the interception and seizure 
of counterfeit pesticides before they reach their intended destination (Schmider et al., 
2012). In common with the majority of other counterfeit products fake pesticides 
generally have their origins in Asia, and predominately China (Pesticides Forum, 2011; 
Rowe, n/k) the city of Jintan having been previously noted in this review as a 
production centre. Interestingly there is some indication, albeit state derived and 
unsubstantiated, to suggest that as has been previously described the Chinese 
authorities are beginning to engage with the problem and are attempting to stem the 
manufacture and distribution of such products (China Daily, 2011).  
Considering the economic impact of the proliferation of counterfeit pesticides 
available material is marked by a reticence on the part of individual manufacturers to 
publish or publicly acknowledge their consequential losses. Elsewhere in this review it 
was recognised that this is not an uncommon stance on the part of the victims of 
counterfeiting, not least because of the potential impact on brand image and consumer 
confidence (Loken & Amaral, 2010). Whilst the reporting in reputable industry 
publications of named product being counterfeited is not entirely unknown, for example 
the case of a fake DuPont product being distributed in Russia (Watson, 2004), it is only 
possible to glean the potential industry cost by drawing upon data published elsewhere. 
A recent European Parliament library briefing estimated the market value of pesticides 
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within the European Union to be in the order of €8 billion per year (Erbach, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the discussion on the efficacy of such data which follows the European 
Crop Protection Association estimate that in Europe somewhere between 7% and 10% 
of the crop protection products in the open market are counterfeit (Drury, 2014). It may 
therefore be extrapolated that the cost to manufacturers of lost business is likely to be 
in excess of €0.5 billion a year within Europe alone. Of course this financial loss to 
manufacturers carries much wider economic implications. It has been estimated that 
the consequential annual loss in revenue to European governments, as a result of 
these products by-passing taxation legislation, is somewhere between €21 million and 
€30 million (ICC Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, 2009). 
Whilst these figures are impressive in themselves they fail to give a true 
impression of the local economic impact when counterfeit products find their way into 
the marketplace. Largely in the form of warnings to farmers and growers publications 
continually seeks to highlight the risks associated with such products, exampling the 
inclusion of inferior coformulants or a reduction or a complete absence of active 
ingredient as being the reason behind a lack of product efficacy (Watson, 2004; Drury, 
2014). It is acknowledged that making any meaningful estimate of potential crop losses 
due to the use of counterfeit pesticides is inherently difficult because they may go 
unrecognised for some considerable time, or indeed never be detected (Drury, 2014). 
Nonetheless there are documented examples of consequential damage and indeed it 
seems likely that it was one particular incident, the complete failure of the Kenyan 
coffee crop in 1979-80 as a result of the use of a counterfeit Chevron pesticide, which 
originally brought the problem of illegal pesticides into the wider public consciousness 
(Wadlow, 2009). Since the so called ‘Kenyan coffee crop disaster’ there have been 
several high profile incidents involving counterfeit pesticides. Most recently, and 
probably most notably, the crisis that befell the Punjab agricultural sector in the latter 
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part of 2015 wherein counterfeit pesticide distributed across the entire region failed to 
control whitefly leading to the almost complete failure of the cotton crop (India Samved, 
2015). 
The Punjab incident, locally significant as it was, is both physically and 
economically remote from the UK agricultural industry. However, there have been 
incidents much closer to home. The damage caused to hundreds of hectares of maize, 
potatoes and tomatoes in Italy due a poorly formulated counterfeit pesticide was a well-
documented example (CropLife International, 2006). The local economic losses 
consequential to such incidents are difficult to estimate (CropLife International, 2006), 
not least because they are not necessarily immediate. An incident involving a non-
authorised insecticide being found in peppers originating from the Almeria region of 
Spain (CVUA Stuttgart, 2007) had consequences far beyond the short-term rejection of 
crops by distributors. Given that this incident involved residues found in peppers that 
had reached the supermarket shelf (Mezcuza et al., 2009), and that such residues 
have been shown to be the most important food-related concern for EU citizens (TNS 
Opinion & Social, 2010), it is not surprising that long-term confidence in this industry 
sector was severely damaged. Indeed it has been suggested that the economy of the 
area almost collapsed as a direct consequence of this incident (Hellenic Crop 
Protection Association, 1999).  
Whereas manufacturers and representative bodies are seemingly reluctant to 
discuss the economic consequences of the proliferation of counterfeit pesticides they 
are quick to point out and publicise the potential environmental impact of such 
products. The word potential is used advisedly here, for there is no published data to 
indicate the extent to which environmental damage has occurred thus far. Nonetheless 
it is widely reported that these products are unregulated, untested, and that a 
detrimental impact upon the environment is a distinct possibility (Sanderson, 2006; 
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International Pest Control, 2008). This environmental threat is broadly perceived as 
being twofold; the damage caused by unregulated manufacturing through the 
inadequate management of potentially toxic material and unregulated waste disposal, 
and the residue risks associated with unapproved products being used on crops 
(CropLife International, 2006; EurActive, 2012; Drury, 2014). Whilst lacking case 
derived evidence a common sense stance is taken pointing out that, because of their 
low detectability and the possibility if not probability that they will go entirely undetected 
(Drury, 2014), farmers run an unpredictable risk of causing environmental damage 
(European Crop Protection Association, 2011b).  
A very similar message appears with respect to the likely human cost of the 
manufacture and use of these products, the emphasis again being on the unknown 
degree of risk posed by untested and unapproved product.  However, whereas the 
potential environmental damage is largely discussed in theoretical terms the human 
costs of illegal and counterfeit pesticides is supported by some limited case evidence. 
Most obvious amongst these is the direct effect on users of such products, a cited 
example being a case where a laboratory assistant was exposed to an illegal product 
resulting in severe headaches and vomiting (CropLife International, 2006). The longer 
term consequences to the on-farm user of the sustained use of such products is better 
documented, an frequently quoted case being kidney disease allegedly caused to 
farmers in the North Central Province of Sri Lanka due to high levels of arsenic and 
cadmium in illegal farm chemicals (Chatterjee, 2012). It is interesting to note that the 
evidence linking the numerous cases of chronic illness and death with pesticides and 
herbicides is contested, companies that import such products pointing out the lack of 
published scientific data to support the World Health Organization study which 
originally forged the link (Chatterjee, 2012). Moreover the case for there being a 
potential risk to the wider population as a result of crop residue from illegal pesticide is 
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similarly unclear. The widely publicised incident of the contamination of the sweet 
pepper crop in the Almeria region of Spain, the economic consequences of which have 
already been noted, was notable for the fact that the associated published paper 
recognised the limitations of current methodology for detecting potentially hazardous 
crop residue resulting from the use of such products (Mezcuza et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, the threat to the food chain posed by counterfeit pesticides is recognised 
in popular media reporting where it is, more often than not, framed in terms designed to 
maximise the shock factor (see for example Elliott, 2006 and Schmider et al., 2012). 
The general tenor of the counterfeit pesticide narrative would suggest that many 
of the characteristics of the wider problem are also features of this particular crime. 
Predominant amongst these is the seeming universality of the problem. Reporting of 
incidence is commonplace across the entire globe, however, a number of probable 
‘hotspots’ are identifiable by virtue of the regularity with which the problem produces 
headlines in both specialist and popular media; the Punjab and Kashmir regions within 
the Indian subcontinent (see for example Business Recorder, 2012; Business 
Recorder, 2013; Rafiqi, 2014; Ul-Hassan, 2014), Vietnam and Malaysia (for example 
Nguyen, 2013; Wen, 2013) and parts of Africa (Mwita, 2013). More often than not case 
specific coverage is accompanied by editorial demands for official action to be taken or 
by state reassurance that such action is already in hand (see for example CropLife 
International, 2009b; Business Recorder, 2013; Horti Daily, 2013; Mwita, 2013; 
Nguyen, 2013). In the context of this study what is also apparent is that the problem is 
not confined to emerging economies, with both industry and popular media reports 
providing at least circumstantial evidence of a growing European problem.  
This review has already made mention of the high profile case of the use of an 
illegal pesticide which blighted the Spanish pepper industry (British Association to Stop 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, 2008). Whilst this remains the most widely reported 
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European incident of such product directly affecting a crop it is not an entirely isolated 
incident. A similar case of potentially dangerous residue from eight illegal products 
being found in supermarket products in the UK, and the destruction of several hundred 
hectares of wheat in France, Italy and Spain as a consequence of the use of a 
counterfeit herbicide is noted if poorly documented in publicly available industry 
intelligence reports (ICC Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, 2009) . The review also 
notes the regular reporting of the seizure of counterfeit products across Europe (for 
example see Horti Daily, 2013). Perhaps most notable amongst these reports was the 
120 tonnes of counterfeit product seized in Italy and described as the biggest haul in 
the EU at the time of the associated operation by the Anticounterfeit and Health Unit of 
the NAS Carabinieri (Collen, 2009). More recently a ports and airport initiative across 
seven countries (the UK not being when of them) under the heading of Operation Silver 
Axe which reportedly led to the seizure of 190 tonnes of counterfeit pesticide over a 
twelve day period (Europol, 2015). It is also significant that reporting of the Italian 
incident reinforced the link between the appearance of this illegal product and 
organised crime activity and quotes an industry expert as suggesting that, given the 
scale of the problem, such an incident could occur anywhere in Europe (European 
Crop Protection Association, 2009a). The same expert comment also describes 
distribution routes into Europe as complex (European Crop Protection Association, 
2009b). However, others have been more specific naming Russia and the Ukraine as 
the primary point of entry (EurActive, 2012). Others, as will be discussed later in this 
review, have suggested that the ports of north-western Europe are the predominant 
entry point (Food Chain Evaluation Consortium, 2015). Regardless of the point of entry 
it is claimed that once such products have crossed the primary border they are shipped 
to various countries without challenge where they are falsely labelled and sold by 
OCGs (Toth, 2011).  
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The suggestion of a Russian organised crime link is supported by reporting 
which recognises the growth in influence and diversity of operation of post-soviet 
organised crime, suggesting that there may be as many as 6,000 active Russian 
organised crime groups (Vassalo, 1996; Galeotti, 2013). Whilst the current ‘hot-spot’ for 
European counterfeit pesticide activity seems to be at the eastern periphery a direct 
link to the UK has been implied. The disappearance of 135 tons of such product in 
Cherkassy, Ukraine at the end of 2010 prompted warnings of illegal and dangerous 
products finding their way to other countries which could include the UK (European 
Crop Protection Association, 2011a). Whilst in this particular instance the UK link is 
only presented as a possibility it prompts the review to now consider the evidence for 
there being a substantive UK counterfeit pesticide problem. 
 
2.4.2 The evidence for there being a UK counterfeit pesticide problem 
There is a relative abundance of published research which relates or refers 
directly to the counterfeiting of plant protection products, albeit this is largely to be 
found amongst so called grey sources. This material points firmly toward counterfeit 
pesticides of foreign origin finding their way into the UK agricultural supply sector and 
ultimately on to farms. This reflects the extent of the publicly acknowledged problem, 
there being no indication in this body of grey literature of ‘home-grown’ counterfeit 
pesticide manufacturing or distribution. 
With the possible exception of an ad-hoc study conducted by the European 
Commission DG Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) this alternative material is, by 
and large, methodologically weak. The European Commission report was published in 
response to the perceived growth across Europe in the trade in illegal and counterfeit 
pesticides (Food Chain Evaluation Consortium, 2015). Whilst only the executive 
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summary of the report was made publicly available it is still a valuable contribution to 
the subject being based upon interviews with industry and Commission 
representatives, a number of authority and industry surveys, and port specific studies. 
The report does not specifically make mention of a UK problem but it does make some 
general points in the European context that are relevant. Notable amongst these is that 
no feasible method of identifying the true scale of the problem was identified, a feature 
of all counterfeiting issues that this review has already noted. Interestingly, and 
contrary to that previously suggested, it identifies the large north-western ports, 
specifically Antwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam, as being the primary point of entry for 
illegal products from where parallel trading provisions allow their relatively unhindered 
distribution throughout the EU. The report does not detail how these provisions are 
abused to facilitate this distribution beyond recognising that it is the lack of a uniform 
approach to repackaging and the sanctions for cases of misuse that are the major 
shortcomings in the application of regulation. It makes legislative and non-legislative 
recommendations, notable amongst which is a need for legislative harmonisation and 
clarity and a need to enhance awareness of the problem. This study forms part of a 
wider body of non-academic reporting and comment, much of which lacks the evidence 
base of the DG SANTE report. Nonetheless the very regularity with which comment 
appears might in itself be indicative of a substantive UK crime problem. The review will 
continue by considering this alternative material, highlighting weaknesses where they 
are apparent and drawing conclusions as to the likely veracity of data contained therein 
concerning the prevalence of counterfeit pesticides in the UK marketplace. 
Considering the general tenor of this material, and in particular industry specific 
publications, its most striking feature is an frequently repeated message which warns 
both of the risks associated with such products and an associated increase in 
incidence. Phrases such as "many farmers were unwittingly using sprays which could 
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be dangerous to human health and the environment" (Surman, 2012) warn of the dire 
consequences associated with the proliferation of products that are both untested and 
unregulated (Case, 2014), whilst others describe their UK use as growing at an 
alarming rate (Bounds, 2008, European Crop Protection Association, 2008). These 
admonitory pieces are primarily aimed at farmers and growers but not exclusively so 
for a variation on the theme is observed and directed at the supply trade, this having a 
somewhat greater emphasis on the likely impact of the problem upon industry profits 
(Toth, 2011). However, it is important to note that in the course of this review no 
articles were identified in either reporting strand which could be said to contain proven 
evidence of a counterfeit pesticide being found and positively identified on a UK farm9. 
Nonetheless, and despite a lack of documented case evidence, the very 
regularity with which the proliferation and risk messages are promulgated by popular 
media sources might indicate that the threat is well understood. However, whilst it is 
perfectly possible that there is widespread industry appreciation of the problem there is 
little or no evidence to suggest that this is supported by independent study or analysis. 
Indeed the solitary subject specific university derived paper identified in the course of 
this review is predominantly a summary of the industry generated discourse on the 
subject. It draws heavily on European Crop Protection Association (ECPA) data to 
support the argument that there has been a significant increase in the trade in 
counterfeit pesticides (Fishel, 2012, pp.1-4). Unfortunately, despite a lack of primary 
                                                          
9 As was described in the methodology to this review to increase the likelihood of identifying on-
farm incidence of this a series of real-time internet alerts, based on the search terms used for 
the wider review, were designed and run over an eighteen month period. This technique was 
used to capture reporting that would not generally find its way into academic writing. In 
combination these searches identified fewer than five reports that referred directly to the 
possibility of a counterfeit product being found on a UK farm, none of which were subsequently 
reported as being confirmed.  
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research and a failure to critically assess the secondary sources upon which he relies, 
the author lends academic credence to unverifiable estimates as to the scale and 
impact of the European problem including the UK. That said, and in defence of the 
Fishel paper, it does represent a relatively comprehensive summary of current industry 
understanding of the subject. Moreover, and as has been previously noted in this 
review, the problems associated with researching a clandestine trade dominated by 
organised crime groups renders any original research into counterfeiting problems 
inherently problematic. Considered in this context the paper could be seen as simply 
utilising ‘best evidence’ in what is clearly a difficult academic situation. Nevertheless, 
the manifest weakness of what is ostensibly an independent analysis of this crime 
problem prompts this review to consider the veracity of the material which collectively 
forms the popular narrative on counterfeit pesticides and which underpins this solitary 
example of academic comment on the subject. 
Perhaps the most obvious incongruity within this material can be seen in 
popular reporting of the problem where, as has been previously noted, there is an 
absence of reports of any confirmed incidence on UK farms. As has also been 
previously discussed this is evidently not the case in those parts of the world where the 
problem of counterfeit plant protection products is known to be deep-seated and where 
media reports often appear at a rate of several a week. Significantly this wider case 
reporting often alludes to the link between the appearance of a counterfeit pesticide 
and local organised crime activity (see for example Collen, 2009). Herein lies a further 
inconsistency; at least one industry report suggests that the UK counterfeit pesticide 
problem is not characterised by such a link (CropLife International, 2006). Such 
reporting anomalies may be indicative of this crime having some entirely novel 
character in the UK setting, or a lack of understanding as to the meaning of ‘organised 
crime’. It is also possible that it is characteristic of a relatively sophisticated plant 
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protection product market. As has been previously noted in relation to other industries 
a lack of incidence reporting or acknowledgment of an organised crime link is often 
consequential to a general unwillingness on the part of manufacturers to acknowledge 
incidence for fear of damaging the reputation of their high value brands.  
Potentially of greater concern then is that when the scale of the problem in the 
UK becomes the subject of direct questioning outside of the core industry the response 
is also at odds with the dire warnings previously discussed. Some informed comment, 
such as a representative of the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (CRD) telling a 
Pesticides Forum meeting that there was little evidence that such counterfeit products 
were common in the UK (Pesticides Forum, 2011), does not reflect the common 
industry discourse or associated media coverage. Indeed there appears to be a 
considerable degree of uncertainty as to the scale of the problem in the UK. Figures 
given by industry representative bodies for the percentage of the market being lost to 
counterfeit products vary anywhere between 2% and 10% (European Crop Protection 
Association, 2008; Surman, 2012). Moreover where incidence data is cited there is an 
inclination toward quoting figures for the entire European Union, often as high as 25% 
of the market, but with scant or no reference to the likelihood that it is not necessarily 
consistent across the entire area (for example Bounds, 2008; Matthews, 2010). As this 
review has already noted there is some evidence to suggest that the European 
problem is concentrated on those areas at the Eastern periphery notably Ukraine 
(Sissell, 2008; European Crop Protection Association, 2011a). If this is the case then 
this renders the cited European average largely meaningless, at least in the context of 
a study concerned specifically with the problem as it manifests itself in the UK.   
Perhaps most significantly, and well demonstrated by the previously discussed 
Fishel (2012) paper, there is no indication as to the source of cited occurrence figures. 
Inevitably this brings into question their intrinsic value as research data and it would 
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seem that this study is not the first time that this issue has been recognised. In 2013 
the European Parliament, in response to a written question which asked what was 
being done to tackle the problem of illegal pesticides, questioned the regularly quoted 
occurrence figures. They suggest that published information has usually referred to a 
single case and has been based on private investigations rather than on official 
collected data (European Parliament, 2013). If, as this statement implies, the 
information being promulgated is industry derived rather than produced by an 
independent source then this is typical for a counterfeiting problem. Indeed those who 
have previously reviewed the research concerning the economic effects of 
counterfeiting have concluded that the very basis for empirical research is weak. Study 
has often been forced to rely on indirect data and selected information provided by the 
holders of intellectual property rights (see for example Fink et al., 2010).  
Crucially in the context of this study these and other concerns relating to the 
methodology applied in counterfeiting research have prompted an extensive 
investigation and report into the matter. This was commissioned by the Intellectual 
Property Office (IPO), an executive agency sponsored by the UK Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (Collopy et al., 2014). The IPO report is wide ranging 
and is highly critical of much of the current research into the overall counterfeiting 
problem. Highlighted to be of particular concern are industry derived studies, such as 
those that largely inform current thinking on the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. The 
report concludes that they are generally ad hoc in design and that unsubstantiated 
opinions are often treated as facts. The study found a lack of transparency in both the 
methodologies adopted and the data used to evidence claims and that source data is 
generally not made available for verification. Moreover commercial interests are often 
cited as justification for a lack of clarity and that, presumably as a consequence, little 
effort is made to benchmark data provided by individual companies. Ultimately the IPO 
51 
 
found that such studies and the data contained therein are an unreliable basis for 
policy formulation. It is an important conclusion for it is one that concurs with the 
findings of other informed writers on the subject. For example Fink et al. (2010) found 
that all data concerning counterfeiting is based on crude assumptions whilst others 
have deduced that there is a near absence of valid and reliable data (Heinonen et al., 
2012). As a consequence it is all but impossible to reveal the true extent of the 
counterfeiters’ activities (Vithlani, 1998; OECD, 2008). Collectively these criticisms 
should be a cause for some concern. If the ECPA (2008) report, which was used as the 
data source for the Fishel (2012) paper and has dominated popular UK comment on 
the subject since its publication, is considered in the light of the IPO study it is found 
severely wanting.  
The ECPA report claims to present the ‘facts’ about the counterfeit pesticide 
problem. This is without indication as to the source of the data upon which this claim 
relies beyond stating that it is based on statistics, market dynamics, percentage of 
customs seizures and case-by-case country studies (European Crop Protection 
Association, 2008). There is no indication of the overall methodology utilised nor does it 
indicate whether data gathering was standardised in any shape or form across the 
various subject countries. Moreover the calculations used to estimate counterfeit 
market share are not given, nor is the source data disclosed. In fairness the report 
does cite a modest amount of published material, primarily drawn from an OECD 
(2008) report. However, this is only used in the context of describing the impact of the 
wider counterfeiting problem. Beyond this the ECPA (2008) report is, to use the IPO 
locution, an ad hoc piece of research and one that, if subjected to their standards, 
would most likely be deemed inadequate for developing a response strategy. This 
review is therefore bound to consider how, if industry derived data is considered so 
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inherently unreliable, such information concerning counterfeit pesticides came to be so 
widely promulgated in the context of the UK problem without challenge?  
Interestingly in reviewing the provenance of this data it becomes apparent that 
the lack of critical analysis may, at least in part, be because it has gone through a 
process that might be described as ‘knowledge laundering’. It is not suggest that there 
has been a deliberate attempt to deceive. What is observed is a subtle and seemingly 
overlooked process by which industry derived data has acquired legitimacy through 
official use, and has then been recycled by the industry having acquired an official tag 
in the intervening period. Looking specifically at incidence data for the EU and the UK 
Figure 2.2 illustrates how this process appears to have occurred. The ECPA report, 
which began the process illustrated in Figure 2.2, concluded with a summary of the 
problem across a broad cross-section of European countries including the UK. The 
headline points from the UK section were that counterfeit products were estimated to 
account for 2% of the market and the key driver was believed to be price. The industry 
was described as being in close contact and collaboration with enforcement agencies 
to tackle the problem (European Crop Protection Association, 2008). No source is 
given for the basis of these claims. It is apparent then that commonly cited occurrence 
data for counterfeit plant protection products in the UK may be significantly flawed. 
Nonetheless this data, often accompanied by a summary of the potential risks that the 
use of such products carries, has long been a feature of industry and media comment 
on the subject. Whilst the narrative is consistent in its message it lacks supporting 
evidence. As such it leaves the possibility that the pervading common knowledge on 
the subject and the current response are both based on a set of unsupported 
assumptions. This represents a significant area of uncertainty. What is also less than 
clear is the extent to which the industry narrative, accurate or otherwise, has prompted 





In 2008 the ECPA published the previously discussed report on the extent of 
the counterfeit pesticide problem across Europe (European Crop Protection 
Association, 2008). This report was self-described as containing the facts, 
consequences and actions needed in relation to this problem and included a 
section summarising the extent and nature of the UK problem. 
Media coverage of the problem soon began to cite this industry derived 
report including a suggestion that there are ‘hotspots’ within Europe where 
as much as 25% of the pesticide used may be illegal in some shape or form 
(see for example International Pest Control, 2008). 
By 2012 Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, had 
responded to the now widely circulating industry discourse that this trade 
was linked to organised crime activity and they began to warn of the 
growing problem of counterfeit pesticides, using the same headline 
incidence figures and suggesting that this growing illegal trade is worth 
billions of Euros a year (Europol, 2012). 
In the same year the European Parliament seemingly accepted the 
legitimacy of this figure, citing Europol as its source, and quoting it in its 
own publications and reports (Erbach, 2012; Moss, 2013). 
What was originally industry derived data had now seemingly become 
official comment with the media, including within the UK, now citing 
Europol and the EU as their source and describing what they believe to 
be the true threat of counterfeit pesticides (see for example Blocks, 2012; 
EurActive, 2012; Drury, 2014). 
Figure 2.2: The ‘knowledge laundering’ of counterfeit pesticide data 
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2.4.3 The police and other enforcement response 
As with any recurring crime a review of the literature might reasonably expect to 
find evidence of an enforcement agency response that reflects the extent or impact of 
that crime. However, and as this review has already highlighted, in the context of 
unsubstantiated industry generated data it is inherently difficult to determine the true 
extent of any counterfeiting problem with any degree of confidence. In the case of 
counterfeit pesticides, and again as has been previously highlighted, this problem is 
exacerbated because the consequences of using such a product on a growing crop are 
likely to be masked by other yield influencing variables. As such even determining that 
a crime has occurred is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, and solely for the 
purpose of achieving a rudimentary indication as to whether the probable magnitude of 
the problem is such that it would be reasonable to expect to observe some form of 
police response, this review will assume that incidence is at the lower end of UK 
estimates, that is to say 2% of the total market. Extrapolating the potential economic 
cost of this, on the basis of published industry statistics for the net value of the UK 
national agrochemical market (European Crop Protection Association, 2014), it is 
apparent that even a conservative estimate of the economic cost of this crime would be 
in the order of £9.2m a year10. Of course the actual figure may be somewhat larger if, 
as one industry commentator has suggested, the UK market for counterfeit pesticides 
may be significantly greater than 2% of the total and may conceivably be as much as 
10% (Surman, 2012). Potentially then this is a substantive crime. To put this in context 
                                                          
10 This estimate of the size of the counterfeit pesticide problem is derived from European Crop 
Protection Association (ECPA) estimates of the likely percentage of the market lost to these 
products within seventeen individual European states, the United Kingdom being one 
(European Crop Protection Association, 2008, p.19). The given figure of 2% was then applied to 
the most recently available published data for the total size of the UK crop protection product 
market of £460m (European Crop Protection Association, 2014). 
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when compared to published data for theft from UK farms in simple economic terms it 
is admittedly a somewhat smaller problem (NFU Mutual, 2014). Nonetheless it is far 
from insignificant, for if the two were to be combined counterfeit pesticides would 
account for over 17% of the total. It is perhaps somewhat surprising then that, as will 
become apparent, it is suggested that where UK police engagement with farm theft is 
consistently high there is a near absence of reporting which would indicate that they 
are engaged in any meaningful fashion with the problem of counterfeit pesticides11. 
Whilst this lack of engagement may be indicative of the police having determined that 
this is an issue that does not necessitate response if this is the case it is seemingly at 
odds with other jurisdictions. Reporting from elsewhere would suggest evidence of 
enforcement activity at source, in transit and national borders, and elsewhere in the 
European marketplace.  
This review has previously considered publications where the Chinese 
authorities are criticised for failing to tackle counterfeit problems at what is widely 
acknowledged as being the primary source. However, there is also a strand of 
reporting which suggests a growing inclination on the part of the Chinese state to meet 
the demands of the WIPO and to more actively intervene to support the trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights contained within the prevailing WTO agreement 
(World Trade Organization, 1994; World Intellectual Property Organization, 2009). The 
English speaking Chinese media regularly reports on local enforcement agency 
intervention to clamp down on the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit 
agricultural inputs, pesticides included (see for example China Daily, 2011; Xinhua 
News Agency, 2013). This enforcement activity has been sufficiently robust for  the 
                                                          
11 A notable exception to this absence of police engagement has been Operation Silo, a 
Thames Valley Police initiative that focused on the counterfeit pesticide problem and was 
prompted by this study and supported as part of the data gathering phase of the research.  
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resulting prosecutions to be acknowledged and praised by at least one renowned 
representative trade body (CropLife International, 2009a). However, it does not appear 
that pesticides are receiving any special attention and that this simply reflects a 
growing inclination on the part of the Chinese authorities to intervene in the overall 
counterfeiting problem. Moreover despite any state intervention illegal products are still 
finding their way out of the country in very large quantities (Europol and The Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market, 2015). Much has been made of the need for 
robust legislation to enable customs authorities to intercept such goods before they 
reach the marketplace (OECD, 2011, Schmider et al., 2012; IPKat, 2013; Florczyk, 
2014) and indeed there is some evidence of success (Henshaw, 2011; Europol, 2015). 
However, large quantities of counterfeit pesticides are not intercepted en route and 
presumably this finds its way into the local distribution chain and then to farms. In 
response it seems that some European authorities have recognised the threat that this 
poses to the market and have actively engaged in enforcement initiatives. This ranges 
from the technical revocation of authority to place a product on the market (BVL, 2014), 
through local initiative and investigation (Horti Daily, 2013), to major intelligence lead 
operations conducted at a national level and involving pan-European agencies (OLAF, 
2014).  
The last of these examples illustrates the potential for a coordinated multi-
agency approach to have a significant impact on the trade in counterfeit pesticides; 21 
tonnes of illicit product was seized and a criminal investigation initiated as the result of 
a joint operation between the Polish State Plant Health and Seeds Inspection Service, 
Polish customs authorities and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The 
importance of such market level intervention as a means of stemming the flow of 
counterfeit goods is recognised. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) suggesting that organised crime groups have become less important than 
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the markets with which they engage (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010). 
Taken alongside the current World Intellectual Property Organization emphasis on the 
importance of agencies taking the initiative to enforce intellectual property legislation in 
the absence of a right holders’ complaint, so-called ex-officio actions (Fink et al., 2010), 
it paints a picture of a growing expectation for direct engagement at a market level on 
the part of enforcement agencies.  
Whilst sporadic examples of effective enforcement practice can be identified it 
is also suggested that, on the whole, this expectation is not being met, containing as it 
does criticism of the efficacy of local engagement. Credible comment, such as that 
outlined within a UNODC analysis of the response to transnational organised crime 
activity, questions the overall ability of enforcement agencies to engage with 
counterfeiting problems at a market level (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2010). This concern is mirrored in the somewhat critical observations of Europol which 
endorses a campaign group claim that, with specific reference to counterfeit pesticides, 
enforcement activity is weak in some countries and doesn’t exist in others (EurActive, 
2012). Industry comment is rather more reserved, suggesting as it does that this lack of 
enforcement engagement is a consequence of a lack of awareness on their part of the 
diverse adverse effects of counterfeit pesticides (CropLife International, 2006). There 
may well be an element of ignorance with regard to the physical and economic 
consequences of the use of such products on the part of the police. Nonetheless their 
seeming lack of engagement with the counterfeit pesticide problem is surprising given 
that they have already forged the links between this trade and organised crime group 
activity. At a transnational level Interpol have recognised and highlighted the 
association between counterfeiting, organised crime group activity and terrorism 
(Interpol, 2014) and Europol have extended this association to include counterfeit 
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pesticides, seeing fit to include the wider counterfeiting problem in their strategic 
serious and organised crime threat assessment (European Police Office, 2013).  
Where evidence of an awareness of the OCG link is observed it also seems 
that, in the context of the overall organised crime threat, intellectual property theft is 
seen as a rather modest component. Cabinet Office strategic analysis suggests that its 
annual economic cost to the UK is in the order of £300 million, of which this review has 
already surmised that something in the order of £9 million, approximately 3% of the 
total, may be accounted for by counterfeit pesticides (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 
2009). Compared to the trade in illicit drugs, at £17.6 billion and nearly sixty times 
bigger than the total for all counterfeit goods (HM Government, 2011a), it could be 
argued that the trade in counterfeit pesticides is too small a problem to reasonably 
expect any form of concerted police response.  
Such a disparity might lead to a conclusion that it is probably inevitable that the 
headline commanding trade in illegal drugs, people trafficking, and the smuggling of 
alcohol and tobacco will dominate police priorities. However, this should not 
necessarily be the case for there is evidence of a significant shift in government policy 
toward tackling local manifestations of organised criminality. With the launch of the 
Local to Global initiative, and the establishment of the National Crime Agency, there is 
an explicit recognition that “unlike other national security threats the effects of 
organised crime are felt by individuals, communities, businesses and our economy on 
a daily basis” (HM Government, 2011a, p.5). This new strategic focus is firmly on the 
police actively engaging with organised crime at a local level, the sale of counterfeit 
pesticides being an example in the rural setting.  
Initiatives aside because there is undoubtedly a criminal element to the 
distribution of counterfeit goods there is a statutory obligation for the police to respond 
(Rahmatian, 2004; Barrie & Wright, 2010). However, it has also been observed that the 
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police simply have other more pressing priorities, a feature that that is likely to become 
more pronounced as funding constraints force rationalisation of core policing activities 
(Phillips, 2007; HMIC, 2014) . Informed comment implies that the result of this is that 
the industry is left somewhat isolated, trying to tackle the problem using the civil law 
provisions available to commercial companies to protect their intellectual property 
(CropLife International, 2011b). Despite a recognisable effort on the part of the industry 
to reinforce the importance of the detection and prosecution of offenders as an 
effective means of tackling the counterfeit pesticide problem (Drury, 2014), and a call 
by way of a parliamentary early day motion for a wider appreciation of the potential 
consequences to the consumer of this illicit trade (Farron, 2008), the enforcement 
agency response still appears to be negligible.  
Despite this lack of direct response there are at least some indications of a 
growing police awareness of the consequences of counterfeiting at a national level. 
The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit, an operationally dependent unit based 
within the City of London Police, is a specialised unit committed to protecting UK 
industries from intellectual property crime (City of London Police, 2015). However, it is 
clear from their media and online output that the focus is very much on offences 
committed online and there is no evidence to suggest any concerted engagement with 
physical counterfeiting problems such as pesticides (albeit there remains the possibility 
that the trade in these goods may be facilitated by web-based trading facilities). The 
same could also be said for Action Fraud, again a specialist unit based within the City 
of London Police, which is the national policing lead for fraud based crime (City of 
London Police, 2014). Again there is no evidence in their published output to suggest 
engagement with counterfeit pesticides, despite the core offence being one of fraud. 
Nonetheless the very existence of these units at least suggests the potential for police 
engagement with this crime problem at a national strategic level, albeit without 
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evidence of this having occurred thus far. Whether this is also true of local policing, that 
is to say policing in the rural environment, is also a matter of conjecture. With a few 
notable exceptions, for example the articles contained in the Mawby and Yarwood 
edited collection of rural policing case studies (Mawby and Yarwood, 2010), there is a 
relative paucity of criminological and criminal justice writing which refers or relates 
directly to the setting of policing priorities in the rural environment12. In particular the 
question of how the police construct their definition of what constitutes ‘rural crime’ and 
what should, or should not, be on the rural policing agenda is not addressed.  
It would seem then that, at least in the case of counterfeit pesticides, there is a 
considerable disjoint between the strategic aspiration of government for the police to 
engage with the activities of organised crime groups at a local level, and the extent to 
which media reporting of the policing of rural crime indicates this is actually happening. 
In seeking to understand why this might be the case a number of factors emerge which 
are worthy of consideration. Not least is the possibility that the UK police are simply 
poor at recognising and engaging with organised crime at a local level (Galeotti, 2013). 
This, taken alongside the sheer complexity of the legislative framework that surrounds 
counterfeiting and the practical complications associated with prosecution when it 
requires the coordination of multiple public prosecution agencies (House of Commons 
Justice Committee, 2009), may at least partly explain this failing. There would seem 
then to be no imperative for the police to engage. A case, as Phillips (2007, p.188) puts 
it, of this being seen as largely a victimless crime and their being unwilling to get 
involved “unless there’s a dead body”. It is at this point that the review turns to the rural 
criminology literature to consider if helps in understanding this. 
 
                                                          




2.4.4 Theories of crime and counterfeit pesticides   
Having described the characteristics of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem, at 
least so far as they can be ascertained, the review continues by considering if theory 
can aid our understanding of the crime and the police response to it. This is an offence 
that has been recognised elsewhere in this review as being intrinsically linked to 
organised crime. Theory that seeks to aid understanding of organised criminality would 
therefore seem to be a reasonable starting point. Of the relevant theoretical 
approaches observed in publications two that make a convincing case for explaining 
the emergence and growth of organised crime are strain theory and enterprise theory. 
These two theories have been chosen for discussion because together they link the 
previous discussion on the role of consumers in the growth of the market for counterfeit 
goods (section 2.3.2), and specifically push and pull factors, to crime theory.  
Strain theory proposes that society is structured in such a way that it 
encourages deviance. Specifically it claims that societal pressure to achieve socially 
accepted goals is crucial in understanding the motivation of offenders including those 
involved in organised crime (Abadinsky, 2009). It is the strain of achieving these goals, 
regardless of means, which gives the theory its name. Given the likely financial returns 
from trading counterfeit pesticides, a means of achieving financial goals, there seems 
no reason why this theoretical approach should not be as useful in understanding this 
manifestation of organised crime as any other. It is a theory that sits comfortably 
alongside the previously described push factors that are believed to influence the 
growth in the volume and range of counterfeits reaching the marketplace. However, 
this is a theoretical approach that is offender focused and so it is probably has much 
less to offer in terms of explaining the enforcement response.  
Enterprise theory, as described by Smith (1978), states that the emergence of 
organised crime can be explained by a failure on the part of legitimate markets to 
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satisfy actual and potential customers; organised crime is therefore a response to 
consumer demand. This has a strong resonance with the work of Stumpf et al. (2011), 
described in section 2.3.2 of this review, who describe this same phenomena from a 
consumer motivation point of view. Certainly this is an approach that has resonance 
when considering non-deceptive counterfeit products, that is to say ones where the 
consumer knowingly engages with a counterfeit product. However, it seems less likely 
to be applicable where the consumer is not aware that they are buying a non-genuine 
product (as would appear to be the case with counterfeit pesticides that are passed off 
as parallel product). Moreover, and in common with strain theory, it is primarily 
concerned with offender motivation and similarly unlikely to contribute a great deal 
toward explaining police response. 
Besides these two theoretical approaches there are various less widely known 
approaches which have been applied to the understanding organised crime. A number 
of these are summarised by Kleemans (2014) who offers various alternative 
perspectives including alien conspiracy theory, the bureaucracy model, illegal 
enterprise theory, protection theory, the social network approach, and the logistic or 
situational approach toward organised crime. Each of these theoretical variants has its 
own inherent logic and may well be useful in explaining individual aspects of organised 
crime. Indeed they would be useful were this study concerned with explaining the 
emergence of counterfeiting as a crime of choice for OCGs. However, across this 
spectrum of theorising there is nothing to suggest that consideration has been given to 
the influence of ‘the rural’ in the emergence or policing of organised crime. For this 
reason, and without diminishing their wider value, they are likely to be of limited value 
in this context. In the circumstances then it seems appropriate to approach the 
question from the opposite direction; to consider if rural criminology and its associated 
theorising offers any greater promise. 
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Rural criminology, as a discrete academic subset, exists at the margins of the 
wider discipline. The core focus of criminology continues to be on crime in the urban 
setting (Donnermeyer et al., 2013). Given the relative paucity of research that is 
specifically concerned with police policy and priority setting in the UK rural context it 
seems likely that criminal justice studies are similarly marginalised13. In Australian 
studies this bias has produced what Hogg and Carrington (2006) describe as a 
sociological and criminological urbanism. It is a description that could equally well be 
applied in the UK context. Moody (1999, p.9) tells us that here the rural dimension to 
crime has been ignored in favour of the setting provided by inner cities or peripheral 
housing estates and as a result “the field of rural criminology remains largely 
unexplored, at least in any analytical or critical sense”. Perhaps as a consequence rural 
criminology suffers from what Donnermeyer et al. (2013, p.71) describe as a 
“theoretical under-development”. This is seen as a contributory factor in the discipline’s 
narrow perspective on rural crime wherein crime and disorder are seen as the “by-
products of urbanisation and not endemic to rural places” (Donnermeyer et al., 2013, 
p.70).  
Elsewhere the notion of a ‘rural idyll’, a concept extensively described by 
Mingay (1989), is framed as one that maintains the allusion of a rural homogeneity. 
This is to the extent that beliefs about rural crime are generalised and largely incorrect 
(Buttle, 2006). It is a feature which Donnermeyer and Dekeseredy (2013) tell us has 
hindered research into rural crime as a consequence of a reliance on place-based 
theories. The net result of this has been that academics have essentially “ignored 
                                                          
13 In describing a near absence of research into rural police policy setting this study 
acknowledges the work of Professor Rob I Mawby in this area, and particularly the contribution 
of Mawby and Yarwood (2016) in using an international inter-disciplinary perspective to bring 
together work that considers the range and consequences of policing across rural localities in a 
number of countries.  
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structural characteristics of rural places that engender crime” (Donnermeyer & 
Dekeseredy, 2008, p.8). This is not to suggest that there is a complete absence of 
research that steps beyond the artificial confines created by the notion of a utopian 
countryside. For example some have considered the consequences of rural poverty 
and exclusion as causes of a local crime problem (see, for example, Petee & Kowalski, 
1993). Moreover recent ethnographic studies, such as that conducted by Smith and 
McElwee (2013), have made some modest progress toward dispelling the widely held 
belief that crime in the rural setting is largely down to the activities of the ‘urban 
marauder’. This particular study examined alternative income generating strategies at 
the margins and beyond the bounds of legitimate agricultural practice. It documented 
the activities of the farming community as a source of offending rather than accepting 
the long-standing notion of the farmer being typically the victim of crime.  However, 
whilst such individual studies make a notable individual contribution, the overall 
literature points toward the work of those who pursue a critical strand of thinking as 
being at the forefront of challenging the traditional view of crime in the rural setting (see 
for example Donnermeyer et al., 2013).  
Chadwick and Scraton (2005) describe a critical criminology as one that 
emphasises the importance of structure and agency in the study of crime and the 
administration of criminal justice. Discourses concerning crime are seen as being 
sustained by those in society that benefit from power and knowledge and that such 
discourses inform the legislation, policy and practice of institutions, organisations and 
professions. In the context of this thesis this is a concept that may prove valuable for it 
is concerned with a crime that is largely understood through just such a discourse. 
However, enthusiasm for this possibility must be tempered for Chadwick and Scraton 
also suggest that such discourses “are developed and reproduced through the primary 
determining contexts of class, race and gender” (Chadwick & Scraton, 2005, p.71). 
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These are contexts that have not been immediately obvious in the industry generated 
material concerning counterfeit pesticides. Nonetheless a critical approach should not 
be dismissed out of hand. Writers have recognised a bias in policing, and one that may 
be more prevalent in rural places than it is elsewhere (DeKeseredy & Rennison, 2013). 
Moving to consider whether there may be other potentially useful theory outside 
of that expounded by critical thinkers Donnermeyer and DeKeseredy (2008), whilst 
expressing a view that the study of rural crime has been largely descriptive and 
atheoretical, are prepared to concede that it has not been entirely devoid of alternative 
theory. However, they conclude that even where there is evidence of researchers 
venturing outside of the rural idyll paradigm the resulting work is narrow in theoretical 
focus and tending toward social disorganisation theory (Donnermeyer & DeKeseredy, 
2008; Donnermeyer & DeKeseredy, 2013). This particular approach presumes that 
crime in rural communities is due to a lack of social cohesion and solidarity. 
Donnermeyer and DeKeseredy, drawing on earlier work by Barclay et al. (2004) and 
Jobes et al. (2004), suggest that this represents a major failing in the social 
disorganisation paradigm because those who use it to frame their research fail to 
recognise that what they are describing is a difference in, rather than a lack of, social 
and normative structure. In support of this position those who have critically reviewed 
the efficacy of this theory when applied in the rural setting recognise that, despite a 
convergence in rural-urban crime differences, there remains nuances that render social 
disorganisation theory at best only partly applicable (Petee & Kowalski, 1993). 
Nonetheless, and whilst accepting that the predominance of this theoretical approach 
has probably been to the detriment of wider research into rural crime, social 
disorganisation theory should not be dismissed as being without value. It may still have 
an important place in aiding understanding of forms of social cohesion which may have 
influenced the uptake of counterfeit pesticides in the UK. However, as a theoretical 
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approach its true value probably lies in developing an appreciation of the cause of the 
crime, the ‘pull’ factors previously described, rather than understanding police response 
to it. This review may therefore reasonably conclude that the Donnermeyer and 
DeKeseredy assessment of social disorganisation theory holds good and it is therefore 
unlikely to be helpful in understanding the police response to counterfeit pesticides.  
For the sake of completeness the author of this review looked extensively at 
texts describing criminological and criminal justice theories, including Lilly et al. (2002), 
Hopkins Burke (2005), and Duffee and Maguire (2007), seeking theory that might 
provide a useful framework for examining the police response to this particular crime, 
and in particular the influence of rurality. It would be fair to say that this finding 
reinforced the assertion of Donnermeyer et al. (2013) that there is a theoretical under-
development with regard to rural crime and policing. Nevertheless a critical approach, 
with its focus on the influence of power and knowledge, the importance of discourse, 
and recognition of bias in rural policing, would seem to hold the most promise for 
understanding the UK counterfeit pesticide problem and the police response to it.  
 
2.4.5 Summary 
This section of the review has recognised that, on a European and indeed 
worldwide scale, the counterfeiting of plant protection products appears to be a 
significant crime problem. However, when considering the problem in the UK context it 
is apparent that cited data may be significantly flawed. Nonetheless this data, often 
accompanied by a narrative that expounds the potential risks that the use of such 
products carries, has been a key feature of industry and media comment on the 
subject. That is not to suggest that the problem does not exist, rather that despite the 
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message being consistent it lacks supporting evidence leaving the possibility that the 
pervading ‘common knowledge’ on the subject is the product of industry hyperbole.  
It has been suggested that the enforcement response to the worldwide 
counterfeit pesticide problem is, at best, sporadic. In the European context there is 
evidence of some police engagement, however, this does not extend to the UK where 
there is no suggestion of any police response to the problem. Importantly in the context 
of this study rural criminology seems an unlikely source of theory that might shed light 
on this seeming detachment. 
 
2.5 Conclusions of the review 
Counterfeiting is a huge global crime problem and one that in recent years has 
moved beyond its ‘traditional’ home in luxury goods to include every conceivable type 
of product from foodstuffs to aircraft part. This review found a large body of literature 
associated with the problem across numerous disciplines, each taking its own 
particular slant on the problem and reflecting their own disciplinary focus. However, 
and possibly as a consequence of this selective focus, what was also found was a that 
research which took an eclectic view of the many factors that contribute towards a 
counterfeiting problem in any given industry sector were relatively scarce. This was 
consistent with the Staake et al (2009) findings discussed in the introduction to this 
review. It was also certainly the case for the pesticide manufacturing industry as 
becomes apparent when considering the extent to which the first study objectives has 
been previously addressed. 
In considering whether there is evidence of counterfeit pesticides being present 
in the UK agricultural marketplace popular reporting media would indicate that they 
certainly are. However, this was found to be almost exclusively the perspective of a 
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select group of industry commentators whose interpretations had been recycled to 
become the accepted European enforcement and legislative narrative. It was a 
narrative that was poorly evidenced, contained little if any methodological detail, and 
entirely lacked the perspective of other stakeholders. Whilst this may well have been a 
reasonable interpretation of the problem it seems likely that it was a far from complete 
picture. For example a frequently cited link between the trade in parallel products and 
the import and distribution of counterfeit products was observed but this mechanism 
was inadequately described and there was no indication as to the market drivers that 
underpin this illicit trade. This lack of clarity owed much to there being no documented 
incident of a counterfeit pesticide finding its way onto a UK farm and having a tangible 
impact. Similarly the review found no published case study of product being seized by 
an enforcement authority and its provenance scrutinised. It followed, therefore, that the 
perceived link to organised criminality is not proven. 
Turning to the second study objective which, assuming there is a substantive 
problem, sought evidence of police engagement with it there was evidence of 
enforcement activity on the European mainland. However, considering the UK in 
isolation, there was no indication of a similar response. Whilst the review would not 
have encountered covert or non-publicised police activity what was available in the 
public domain was indicative of this crime not being addressed at a national level 
through the activities of the NCA, PIPCU, or Action Fraud, the most obvious points of 
contact. Of course this still left the possibility that, in policing terms, this might be 
considered to be a local problem to be dealt with as such. However, the available 
material was not helpful in ascertaining if this problem appears on local policing 




Assuming that there is a substantive problem, and further assuming there is no 
police engagement with it, the third study objective considered why this might be the 
case. Nothing was found in industry or police publication or media reporting to indicate 
what lies behind this lack of engagement. In addition there was a near absence of 
literature on the setting of police priorities in the UK rural environment. Moreover it 
could not be determined where the operational focus falls and consequently it was not 
possible to say why the police might not be tackling the counterfeit pesticide problem.  
Collectively these omissions represented a significant gap in the overall 
appreciation and understanding of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. This is a gap 
that needed to be addressed by research if the study objectives were to be met and the 
aim of determining whether it represents a substantive threat to the UK agricultural 
industry achieved. However, the review of relevant criminological theory failed to 
identify an obvious explanatory framework that would assist in developing such 
research. That is not to say that the use of theory was dismissed for a critical approach 
certainly held some promise. However, given what was known about this particular 
crime it was difficult to say with any certainty that this was a reasonable theoretical 
approach within which to proceed. This conundrum informs the discussion on locating 











3.0 Establishing the principles of the research 
Having identified a need for research this chapter will firstly locate the resulting 
study in terms of an appropriate academic discipline before presenting a statement of 
ethics and considering the choice of methodology and research design.  
 
3.1 Locating the research within an academic discipline 
Given that this is a multi-faceted problem it is one that would, or at least should, 
be of academic and practical interest to a number of disciplines. The study could, for 
example, have been undertaken by one inclined towards the natural sciences to 
determine the potential physical impact of counterfeit pesticides on crop production, or 
alternatively a student of business management who might have considered the 
implications for high value pesticide brands consequential to the proliferation of such 
products. However, whilst such studies would undoubtedly have furthered the wider 
understanding of the problem they would not necessarily have helped to mitigate the 
immediate threat that counterfeit pesticides potentially pose to the UK agricultural 
industry. Arguably this might only be achieved by recognising that it is a crime threat, 
and therefore one that might be addressed through an appropriate criminal justice 
response. For this reason the research was conducted within the academic compass of 
criminal justice studies which, in this context, was understood to be: 
…the applied and scientific study of the practical applications of criminal 
behaviour; that is, the actions, policies, or functions of the agencies within the 
criminal justice system charged with addressing this behaviour. [Italics in 
original]        




It is acknowledged that locating the study within the bounds of criminal justice 
rather than under the wider rural criminology heading might seem to be an 
unnecessarily fine distinction. However, as Maguire and Duffee (2007) have argued, 
criminal justice is not simply applied criminology rather it has an independent identity 
as the study of law making and law enforcing. It is, therefore, fundamentally more than 
a practical variant of a parent discipline. Moreover this decision reflects a finding of the 
literature review that contemporary rural criminology theorising is insufficiently 
developed to aid understanding of emerging crimes such as counterfeit pesticides.  
This is not to entirely overlook the relevance of criminological theory in this 
context, indeed the potential value of a critical approach was recognised in the 
literature review. Moreover it is arguably also necessary to have at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the cause of any crime in order to appreciate the relevance and 
proportionality of a police response to it. However, as Heinonen et al. (2012) observed 
there is a general lack of criminological theorising with regard to the crime of 
counterfeiting. This may well be a reflection of the multifarious nature of the problem, 
and if this is so then arguably no single criminological theory could conceivably hope to 
fully encompass the plethora of economic, environmental and social influences that 
characterise this illicit activity. Moreover for the same reason any attempt to construct 
an original explanatory theory of cause was certainly beyond the scope of this, and 
conceivably any other, study. The pragmatic response was, therefore, to accept that 
the crime simply is what it is, making no further attempt to explain causal factors 
beyond those observed in the literature review.  
Qualifying the study in this manner does not imply that the research did not 
endeavour to identify and describe the modus operandi of this crime and those factors 
that may underpin its proliferation when seen in the UK context. This certainly forms 
part of an overall understanding of the threat and is fundamental to formulating a 
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response. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the aim of this study was not to 
understand the root cause of the crime, a criminological analysis that would by 
implication suggest an attempt to explain the wider causes of counterfeiting, but rather 
to consider whether, in the context of the criminal justice response, one specific variant 
of the counterfeit problem poses a substantive threat to the UK agricultural industry. 
Fundamentally this approach owed much to the thinking of Ulrich Beck and his 
consideration of uncertainty in the modern age; what he described as the ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1992). Beck’s perspective, which sets the context for the research that follows, 
focuses on ‘modernisation risks’, that is to say risks that are the product of the coming 
together of capitalism and technology. This may include, for example, threats as 
diverse as global warming and the worldwide financial crisis which characterised the 
early part of the twenty-first century. As was noted in the review of the literature the 
threat posed by contemporary counterfeiting presents just such a risk; it has emerged 
out of the coming together of new technologies which facilitate the mass production of 
copies of genuine items to meet the demand for such goods which is consequential to 
the globalisation of world trade. This being the case seeking criminal justice theory that 
might explain the police response to this particular counterfeiting problem, and one that 
had the management of risk as its core concern, seemed an entirely appropriate. 
However, given the lack of previous research into the subject there was patently no 
academic experience to draw upon and understandably the literature review did not 
illicit an obvious theoretical approach which would satisfy this criteria. As a 
consequence the study entered the research phase atheoretically and might, therefore, 
have been described as grounded in its approach. However, and acknowledging that 
grounded theory purists might have taken exception to a declared predilection toward a 
risk focused explanatory theory, the study made no claim to be one rooted in 
mainstream grounded theory. Rather the research is better described using the much 
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broader classification of inductive; that is to say it sought to find theory to explain what 
was observed in the data rather than starting with a theoretical standpoint and then 
seeking to prove its validity. An inductive approach to research begins with 
observations and the search for patterns and, as (Neuman, 2013) describes, 
explanations for those patterns. Theory emerges only later, and indeed the question of 
a suitable approach is returned to later in the thesis. The study design which follows 
reflects this principle. 
 
3.2 A statement of research ethics 
The following ethics statement was written following the outline and guidance 
provided in the Economic and Social Research Council sponsored Research Ethics 
Guidebook (Boddy et al., 2010):  
The research was necessary and justified because counterfeit pesticides have 
been widely reported as having a considerable impact in those parts of the world where 
they have become an endemic problem. In these regions the local agricultural 
economy has suffered and in addition there is believed to have been significant, but 
largely unquantifiable, environmental and human costs. Prior to this study no research 
had been undertaken to ascertain if the UK was at risk of counterfeit pesticides having 
a similar impact. The purpose of the research was therefore to achieve an 
understanding of the threat posed to the UK agricultural industry by counterfeit 
pesticides with a view to making recommendations to mitigate the threat should it be 
shown to exist.  
The choice of study methodology was largely determined by the need to look 
beyond the industry generated narrative which a review of the literature found to 
dominate the popular discourse pertaining to counterfeit pesticides. In being thus 
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guided the study negated the risk of accusation that it simply reinforced what might be 
perceived as entrenched industry bias or vested interest. The quality of the ensuing 
research was assured through strict adherence to the Doctoral research monitoring 
framework detailed in the Harper Adams University Postgraduate Research Students’ 
Handbook (Harper Adams University, 2015). 
 All participants in the study did so voluntarily and with no coercion employed or 
incentive offered. Individual participants were assured that all of their personal 
information and any data supplied would be held securely. They were further assured 
that if the data they supplied were to be used in the study it would be suitably selected 
and redacted to ensure that it could not be attributed to an individual. For the purpose 
of anonymity throughout the thesis and in any associated article individual study 
participants were referred to by way of a coded reference rather than by name. 
Absolute assurance was given that copies of interview recordings or associated 
transcripts would not be placed in the public domain. These measures, along with 
assurances that all of the information supplied and any residual personal data would be 
destroyed on completion of the study, were intended to minimise the risk of financial or 
reputational damage or of upset or emotional harm which may have been caused by 
the loss or injudicious use of data. It is acknowledged that in the course of describing 
data gathering and presenting the results some organisations are identified. Where this 
is the case it is with the prior knowledge and approval of that organisation. 
No attempt was made to directly engage with the organised crime groups or 
members thereof that were believed to be implicated in the trade in counterfeit 
pesticides. It was therefore not anticipated that there was an increased risk of physical 
harm to University staff or participant as a consequence of the association of the study 
subject matter with organised criminality.  
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The above matters were brought to the attention of participants as appropriate 
at the earliest opportunity, and in any case prior to the commencement of any interview 
or other form of engagement, when agreement to participate was secured and 
recorded. It was therefore taken that in every case participation was fully informed and 
consensual.    
 The study was sponsored by a multi-national pesticide manufacturing company. 
This company had no influence over the design or practice of the research nor did they 
exert influence over the selection of participants. Moreover this thesis was written and 
is presented free from sponsor influence. The author had no previous relationship with, 
or residual obligation to, the study sponsor.  
 
3.3 Identifying an appropriate methodology and research design 
The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) sponsored investigation into the efficacy 
of counterfeiting research considered in the literature review was critical of 
counterfeiting research where a narrow perspective of a problem is used as the 
foundation for response. The report proffers an alternative approach, founded upon a 
more eclectic attitude toward evidence gathering. It concluded that the product of a 
broader approach to data is a more reliable picture of the problem, at least when 
compared to that achieved by single-strand studies (Collopy et al., 2014). Whilst the 
IPO report endorsed this general strategy it did not propose a standard approach to 
counterfeit research, concluding that there is no formulaic ‘one size fits all’ set of 
methods for assessing the counterfeit threat across all business sectors. However, it 
did favour a general framework for research which included cross-referencing data 
across and beyond the core manufacturing industry. The IPO described this as a 
‘blended approach’, suggesting that drawing upon multiple sources was more likely to 
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capture the true nature of a counterfeiting problem than industry generated occurrence 
data alone14. In research terms this blended approach is most closely akin to a mixed 
methods enquiry.  
Mixed methods research has been variously described but, for the purposes of 
this study, the definition of “those that include at least one quantitative method 
(designed to collect numbers) and one qualitative method (designed to collect words), 
where neither type of method is inherently linked to any particular enquiry paradigm” is 
sufficiently comprehensive (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p.2). As Creswell and Clark (2011, 
p.8) suggest this is an appropriate approach to research questions when “one data 
source may be insufficient” reflecting the IPO justification for their blended approach. 
Moreover whilst qualitative research and quantitative research each have their own 
limitations (the limitations of quantitative research in this context having already been 
discussed at length) in combination they can “provide a more complete understanding 
of the research problem than either approach by itself” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p.8), 
each at least partly offsetting the weaknesses inherent to the other.  
                                                          
14In recommending a blended approach to research the IPO also advocated what might 
amounted to a quality assurance framework. It was suggested that: 
 
 Research should be carried  out by trusted third parties who are independent of 
vested interest; 
 Research should be based on transparent and comparable methodologies; 
 Any quantitative methods utilised must be designed to ensure validity and reliability 
by allowing for replicability; 
 Any study should disclose who commissioned the research; 
 That the research be repeated on a regular basis to overcome issues of random 
uncertainty and to maintain statistical independence. 
 
This study adhered to the first four of these criteria but the final one remains an aspiration being 
essentially beyond the scope of a stand-alone study. 
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Opting for a mixed methods approach is not a singular decision for it is a term 
that embraces a broad typology of research design, as recognised and described by 
Creswell et al. (2003). It was therefore necessary to consider which design would be 
most appropriate to this study. Creswell and Clark (2011, pp.63-68) suggest that there 
are four key decisions to be made when deciding which mixed methods design is 
appropriate for any given study:  
i. Determining the level of interaction between the quantitative and qualitative 
strands – the extent to which quantitative and qualitative strands of the study 
are kept independent or interact with each other. In this study the strands had to 
be mutually supportive and therefore interactive;  
ii. The priority of quantitative and qualitative strands – requiring an implicit or 
explicit decision about the relative importance of each strand within the study 
design. Here the ‘newness’ of the subject was an important factor for it could 
not be reasonably anticipated from which strand of the research significant 
findings would emerge. The study therefore had to afford equal priority to each 
strand; 
iii. Determining the timing of the quantitative and qualitative strands – the temporal 
relationship between the two both in terms of data collection. In this study 
concurrent timing was appropriate because this enhanced the likelihood of 
cross-fertilisation between strands during the course of data gathering thus 
prompting further research; 
iv. Determining where and how to mix the quantitative and qualitative strands – the 
point in the research process when the interactive relationship between the two 
strands is implemented. The study made use of SPSS Statistics software for 
the analysis of quantitative data and NVivo QDA software for the analysis of 
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qualitative data15. These software packages do not have facility for real-time 
merger of the data they produce. In practice this mattered little for it was 
necessary to merge the data after separate analysis but before interpretation, 
each and every research strand therefore being drawn upon to produce the 
richer picture described in the IPO report. 
On overlaying these key decisions onto the six common mixed method study 
designs described by Creswell and Clark (2011, pp.69-72) the one that most accurately 
reflected the interaction, priority, timing, and mixing requirements of this study was a 
Convergent Parallel Mixed Method (CPMM) design. The primary purpose of this 
approach is to obtain different but complementary data on the same topic and by 
synthesising the results “to develop a more complete understanding of the 
phenomenon” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p.77).This was a strategy that was entirely 
compatible with the IPO blended approach. The design follows a distinct four-step 
process, as shown in Figure 3.1, which involves the concurrent collection of 
quantitative and qualitative data, the results of the various strands of data gathering 
then being independently analysed before being merged. In this study it was at the 
point of merger, when all of the data was available, that the research objectives were 
addressed.  
In formulating an approach to the research based on the prototypical 
convergent parallel mixed method described above foremost in mind was that it had to 
serve two distinct functions. Firstly to address the study objectives by way of the gaps 
in the literature identified in the review, and secondly to include, as far as was possible, 
all significant stakeholders in the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. Secondly to 
                                                          
15 The use of these two proprietary data analysis software packages is described in sections 



















Figure 3.1: Flowchart showing the steps in implementing a convergent parallel mixed 
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ensure that the research conformed to the ethos of the IPO blended approach and 
specifically their recommendation that evidence should be gathered from victims, 
consumers, and relevant government departments (Collopy et al., 2014). In the context 
of this study these model groups were most closely represented by: 
i. Pesticides manufacturing industry victims; 
ii. Farmer consumers and other businesses and representative bodies associated 
with or operating within the pesticides market; 
iii. Pesticide regulation and relevant legislation enforcement agencies. 
 
Returning to the design outlined in Figure 3.1 the thesis now continues by 
describing the first step in this process, designing the qualitative and quantitative 
research strands, which includes how evidence was gathered from each of the 












4.0 The research design 
To achieve the study objectives stated in the introduction to this thesis a series 
of research questions were proposed which reflected the study objectives in a data 
friendly format. These questions, the associated methods of data collection and 
analysis, and the data strand within which they fell, are shown in Table 4.1. Collectively 
this constituted the first step in the convergent parallel mixed method. The rationale 
behind the choice of each data gathering and analysis method and the means by which 
they were employed are now described.  
 
4.1 Data gathering methods 
4.1.1 In-depth interviews 
Whilst the literature pertaining to counterfeit pesticides in the UK marketplace is 
methodologically weak it is sufficiently profuse to be reasonably confident that the 
problem is probably real. This element of the research was therefore intended to 
explore the nature of the problem as it occurs in the UK setting (research Q.1). This 
was achieved by way of a series of in-depth interviews conducted across the subject 
groups described in the introduction to data gathering. The same research method was 
also used to explore where, in so far as it impacts upon the counterfeit pesticide 
problem, the police rural policing focus lies (research Q.5), a question that was 
intrinsically linked to research questions 4, 6, and 7 which are discussed elsewhere.  
In research terms this was essentially a descriptive strategy, an approach that 
has been widely endorsed where the objective is to ‘paint a picture’ of a crime (see for 
example Semmens, 2011). At a practical level, and as Ouchi (2004, p.2) suggests, in 




                                                          
16 Whilst this particular strand of the research was quantitative in design the resulting data 












1. What is the nature of the UK counterfeit 
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3. Can a case study example of a counterfeit 
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7. What is the awareness level of this crime 












8. If the police have not engaged with this crime 












Table 4.1: Summary of the research questions and the corresponding data 
collection and analysis methods employed in the research. 
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paint that picture the use of expert opinion is “critical, and often inevitable”. This study 
drew upon this assertion, initially looking to identify the primary features of the UK 
counterfeit pesticide problem by exploring the attitudes, perceptions and knowledge of 
those closest to the problem.  
Having determined that this was an appropriate strategy it was necessary to 
define what was meant by the term ‘expert’ in this context, the term being somewhat 
subjective. Nonetheless for the purposes of this study it was taken to mean an 
individual considered by the organisation they represent to be an authoritative voice on 
the subject and one who may fairly represent the corporate or collective view of that 
organisation. Given that ultimately the ambition for this thesis was that it should make 
recommendations to reduce the risk posed by counterfeit pesticides, and that those 
recommendations would most likely influence corporate policy, it was also deemed 
appropriate to reflect this in the sample. The participant stakeholders were therefore 
also all individuals who, where it was relevant, were in a position to determine, or at 
least significantly influence, policy and/or strategy associated with this issue within their 
own organisation or company.  
In the course of refining this definition it became evident that whilst this was a 
pragmatic approach to subject selection it still left a number of issues that had to be 
addressed before deciding upon an appropriate data gathering method, namely: 
 how to identify and achieve access to key stakeholders in the counterfeit 
pesticide problem; 
 what measures to put in place to negate the possibility of any external 
accusation of anti-competitive practice17; 
                                                          
17 In the UK anti-competition practices are prohibited under Chapters l and ll of the Competition 
Act 1998 (Office of Fair Trading, 2005). It became clear in the scoping stage of this study that 
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 how to accommodate a likely desire for anonymity on the part of participants18. 
 
With these issues informing the choice of sampling method a staged process of 
selection was undertaken as illustrated in Figure 4.1. At each stage of this process 
various options were considered, the most appropriate (or least problematic) being 




                                                          
avoiding any accusations of acting contrary to this legislation was a major concern for 
stakeholders and one that would have to be addressed to secure industry representative 
agreement to participate.  
18 The question of anonymity is dealt with in the ethics statement given at section 3.2 of the 
thesis. 
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Ultimately the most appropriate non-probability sampling technique was 
deemed to be a discriminative chain-referral method, an approach that met each of the 
selection step criteria whilst accommodating the previously stated practical concerns. 
Popularly described as ‘snowball sampling’ the practices adopted in this phase of the 
study were based upon the methods and guidance provided by Biernacki and Waldorf 
(1981). Beginning with a subject who was known to meet the expert criteria, the so 
called anchor-interview, this non-probability technique facilitated access to a population 
that would be difficult to access using a random sampling method. The sample was 
then progressed either by way of the participant nominated recruitment of individuals 
who met the eligibility criteria and who were willing to participate or, where no contact 
was provided but as a result of an interview a likely corporate or organisational source 
of an original perspective was highlighted, by way of a suitable interview candidate 
identified by the researcher. For this process to work in practice it was imperative that 
the anchor-interview subject had a suitable level of subject expertise and an extended 
peer contact group. At the same time it was deemed important to go ‘back to source’. 
That is to say to begin the research where the review of the literature suggested the 
primary source of the current narrative had its origins, this being the European Crop 
Protection Association (ECPA). In doing so it was acknowledged that whilst ECPA 
reporting may have been the best available source of information on the subject the 
review had been somewhat critical of this organisation’s reporting of the counterfeit 
pesticide problem. It therefore seemed only fair that their position should be understood 
before embarking on a fresh investigation. Moreover the undoubted subject knowledge 
and breadth of contacts held by the Association made it a natural anchor point to begin 
the snowball process. The ECPA was therefore used as the anchor point with the full 
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Figure 4.2: Progression of snowball sampling showing the organisations accessed 




In terms of the style of interview employed the primary influencing factor was 
that this was an exploratory phase of research with no certainty as to what themes may 
emerge. This naturally lent itself to the use of the semi-structured interview, that is to 
say one where the interviewer is guided by an interview schedule but has some latitude 
to vary questions to build rapport with the interviewee and explore areas of interest 
(Yates, 2004), or to ask additional questions in response to significant replies (Bryman, 
2001). The interview schedule used in this study followed the initiation questions, 
probes, and follow-up questions convention as described by (Yates, 2004) and may be 
found at Figure 4.319. This particular interview method carries distinct advantages over 
a more structured alternative if used in the right context. As Yates (2004) suggests the 
technique: 
 is flexible, in that questions may be tailored to address ongoing concerns and to 
consider issues that may not have been considered at the outset; 
 allows for the exploration of complexity, ambiguity, contradictions and process; 
 can explore the potential meanings of answers and the perspective of the 
respondent. 
The conduct of the interviews, in terms of style and question phraseology, owed 
much to the work of Merton et al. (1990). Their guidance on conducting the focused 
interview, and in particular an emphasis on the practice of “continuously assessing the 
interview as it is in process” (p.11), proved invaluable20. By carrying out these semi-
                                                          
19 There was one notable exception to general use of semi-structured interviews, this being the 
interview with a farmer victim of counterfeit pesticides. This, including the reason for an 
alternative interview method, is described at section 4.1.3 of the thesis. 
20 Many books have been written on interview technique since Robert Merton and his 
colleagues first published their guidance in 1956, a number of which were considered in the 
course of selecting a suitable research method for this study. It is the opinion of the author that 
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structured interviews on a one-to-one basis in a private setting the method overcame 
any issues of individual subject anonymity and minimised the risk of there being any 
external suggestion of industry collusion.  
This method of data collection made it possible to carry knowledge forward from 
participant to participant, allowing the scope and focus of individual interviews to be 
varied in response to recognised gaps in the data, thus building an ever richer picture 
of the subject. Moreover, and again adding to the richer picture, by gathering data 
using this expansive method the sample progressively diversified to include various 
associated interest groups and organisations across the three study subject categories, 
indicated by way of colour-coding in Figure 4.2. This diversification both diluted any 
inherent core industry bias that may have characterised the initial anchor-sample and 
gave the alternative perspective that the study sought across the majority of subject 
groups. However, it became apparent in the course of this phase of the study that the 
relationship between the core industry / associated bodies and some enforcement 
agencies, notably the police, was such that no appropriate expert contact would be 
forthcoming using the snowballing method employed. In figure 4.2 this is shown by a 
dashed rather than a solid link indicating that it was suggested by an interview subject 
that the police were stakeholders but that they could bot nominate a suitable contact. 
This was unsurprising given the findings of the scoping phase of the study where a 
disconnect between the police and this crime problem was observed. This necessitated 
a separate means of engaging with the police in order to determine their relationship 
with the counterfeit pesticide problem.  
 
                                                          
this ground-breaking work has not been bettered and that it remains the primary source for 






















Describe to me the counterfeit 
pesticide problem as you 
understand it? 
How does this crime work? 
How is it associated with the trade 
in parallel products? 
Is this consistent?  
Are there variations? 
How does this compare to 
Europe/rest of the world? 
What makes the UK ‘different’? 
Can you estimate the 
scale/economic cost of this crime 
in the UK? 
What process/system do you have 
in place to record incidence? 
What are the consequences to: 
 Your organisation? 
 To the wider 
community/public? 
Is incidence increasing/decreasing? 
How do you know? 
Are there any long term 
implications for your organisation? 
What is your response strategy? 
What formal sanctions are 
available to you?  
Do you use them? 
Are they effective? 
What other anti-counterfeiting 
measures do you employ? 
Which enforcement agencies do 
you liaise with? 
Do you liaise/share incidence 
intelligence or data with other 
companies or organisations? 
How responsive are they? 
What else could be done to tackle this problem? 
Why is this not currently happening? 




Dialogue was entered into with the Chief Constable’s office of a subject police 
force to identify those individuals occupying senior roles who were responsible for the 
setting of rural crime policy and strategy. As Hagan (2002) suggests occasionally it 
may be appropriate to select a sample on the basis of knowledge of the population and 
the nature of the research aims. Such purposive, or judgmental, sampling was entirely 
appropriate in this instance as it was the only practicable route to those at the heart of 
rural policing policy setting. It is worth noting that interviews with these subjects, being 
purposive, did not follow the schedule given in Figure 4.3. The interviews remained 
semi-structured in nature but the questions were specifically designed to address the 
matter of police policy setting. The relationship between the researcher and this subject 
police force is discussed at Appendix 1. 
Material was gathered by way of these in-depth interview methods until no new 
information of direct relevance was forthcoming from this cross-section of subject 
expertise. In total twenty two stakeholder opinions were documented, amounting to 
over forty five hours of face-to-face subject contact. In addition notes were taken during 
preliminary discussions, necessary in every case to reassure participants of the 
validity, purpose, and integrity of the study and to determine subject qualification and 
suitability. Follow-up questions were addressed by way of email and documented 
telephone conversation. With a few exceptions, where the subjects declined to be 
recorded and the detail of the interview was captured by way of contemporaneous 
notes, interviews were digitally recorded and then manually transcribed to qualitative 
data analysis software (QDAS) along with any contemporaneous notes, and any notes 
relating to subsequent conversation or written exchange.  
The importance of also capturing those elements of non-verbal communication 
which, as Onwuegbuzie et al. (2010, p.699) describe, “can be important for attaining a 
deeper shared meaning, in which both the interviewer and interviewee increase their 
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awareness of the contextual nature of the voice” was also recognised. However, the 
capacity to do so was somewhat limited by the recording system employed in 
interviews being audio rather than video. As a consequence any relevant gestures had 
to be captured in the form of contemporaneous notes. Moreover because the research 
did not stretch to having a second interviewer/note-taker present the chosen method 
had to allow the sole interviewer to carry out this process without unduly impinging 
upon the flow of the interview. In the circumstances the use of a comprehensive but 
complex matrix approach for capturing multiple elements of non-verbal communication, 
such as those described by Onwuegbuzie et al. (2010), was simply out of the question. 
Nonetheless the general principle was deemed appropriate and a simplified version 
was developed for the purposes of the study. The objective of the resulting matrix was 
to simultaneously capture in a simple and unobtrusive manner both facial expressions 
and symbolic gestures indicative of the range of emotions described by Cole (1971). 
The technique required the use of the matrix given at Table 4.2 as an integral part of 
the interview process21. The table was used in conjunction with the ‘T-mark’ facility on 
the proprietary digital recorder used for all sound recordings made in the course of the 
study22. At the point at which a facial expression or physical gesture was employed by 
the interviewee a T-mark was made on the recording and the sequential number 
indicated on the recorder was noted on the matrix table in the appropriate column/row. 
The completed matrix therefore provided a record of non-verbal communication which 
could then be related back to a specific time point in the interview and therefore noted 
in transcription. 
                                                          
21 The work of Onwuegbuzie et al. (2010) is acknowledged, the simple matrix used in this study 
drawing inspiration from the more comprehensive approaches they describe when considering 
innovative data collection strategies that may be applied in qualitative research. 
22 The digital recorder used throughout the study was a Sony ICD-PX312. 
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A number of practice interviews were conducted ahead of the research to test 
the efficacy of this method. This demonstrated that, with some practice, the technique 
could be used in the course of a normal conversation. The only addition to the original 
design that was found to be necessary was the addition of a simple + or – alongside 
the T-mark to indicate if the facial expression or physical gesture was affirmative or 
negative where, in the context of the conversation, this was possibly in doubt.  
 
Table 4.2: Matrix for recording non-verbal communication in in-depth interviews 
showing typical notation. 
 
Emotion Facial Expression (T-mark +/-)  Physical Gesture (T-mark +/-) 
Happy 4  
Sad   
Angry 1  
Fearful   
Disgusted  3- 
Surprised 2+, 5  
Otherª   
 
ªEmotions recorded as ‘other’ would include excitement or contempt.  
 
Whilst the data captured using the matrix table was rudimentary, only recording 
that non-verbal communication had occurred and what emotion it indicated rather than 
the specific detail of that communication, it still proved useful in the subsequent 
analysis of the data particularly where clarification of meaning or intent was needed. 




4.1.2 Freedom of Information Act requests 
The use of provisions contained within the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA)23 
as a means of acquiring materials held by public authorities for the purpose of research 
is a comparatively new tool available to researchers.  In this study these provisions 
were used to address three research questions; whether there was any indication of an 
occurrence pattern or trend for counterfeit pesticides in the UK marketplace (research 
Q.2), if this crime is recognised nationally in police rural crime policy or strategy 
(research Q.4), and lastly if the police have not engaged with this crime is it being dealt 
with elsewhere (research Q.8)?  
In the comparatively few years since the provisions of the FoIA became 
available in 2005 they have become recognised as powerful research instruments but 
ones that perhaps have yet to have their full research potential harnessed (Savage & 
Hyde, 2014). Understanding the powers that the FoIA extends to citizens, and the 
limitations in terms of the extent of disclosure and the use of materials that disclosing 
bodies may impose, is a discipline in its own right. This study is therefore indebted to 
the work of Brooke and Hislop (2006) for their general guidance on the Act and to 
Bourke et al. (2012) for their work on the use of FoIA by academic researchers. As a 
means of gathering data FoIA requests share some of the characteristics of online 
surveys, a method used elsewhere in this study. However, where they perhaps differ is 
in the degree of clarity and specificity required in the questions asked; a poorly worded  
                                                          
23  The Information Commissioner’s Office (2015)  describes the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 as one that provides public access to information held by public authorities in two ways: 
 public authorities are obliged to publish certain information about their activities; and 
 members of the public are entitled to request information from public authorities. 
This provision applies to public authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and by UK-
wide public authorities based in Scotland (The Information Commissioner’s Office, 2015). A 
similar provision exists in Scotland and is contained within The Freedom of Information Act 







Subject Agency Quantitative  
(research Q2 & 8) 
Qualitative 
(research Q.4) 
Request directed to: 
Police  Y s (all forces Y s (all forces) Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
   Bedfordshire Police 
   Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
   Cheshire Constabulary 
   City of London Police 
   Cleveland Police 
   Cumbria Constabulary 
   Derbyshire Constabulary 
   Devon and Cornwall Police 
   Dorset Police 
   Durham Constabulary 
   Essex Police 
   Gloucestershire Constabulary 
   Greater Manchester Police 
   Hampshire Constabulary 
   Hertfordshire Constabulary 
   Humberside Police 
   Kent Police 
   Lancashire Constabulary 
   Leicestershire Police 
   Lincolnshire Police 
   Merseyside Police 
   Metropolitan Police Service 
   Norfolk Constabulary 
   North Yorkshire Police 
   Northamptonshire Police 
   Northumbria Police 
   Nottinghamshire Police 
   South Yorkshire Police 
   Staffordshire Police 
Suffolk Constabulary    l l
   Surrey Police 
   Sussex Police 
   Thames Valley Police 
   Warwickshire Police 
   West Mercia Police 
   West Midlands Police 
   West Yorkshire Police 
   Wiltshire Police 
   Police Scotland 
   Dyfed-Powys Police 
   Gwent Police 
   North Wales Police 
   South Wales Police 
   PSNI 
Trading Standards Yes (all councils) No (all councils) Bracknell Forest Council 
   Buckinghamshire County Council 
   Milton Keynes Council 
   Oxfordshire County Council 
   Reading Borough Council 
   Royal Borough of Windsor & 
Maidenhead    Slough Borough Council 
   West Berkshire Council 
   Wokingham Borough Council 
CRD Yes No Health and Safety Executive 
Border Force Yes No Home Office 
 Table 4.3: Public authorities subject to FoIA requests indicating whether those 
requests related to the qualitative or quantitative strands of the research  
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survey question may illicit correspondingly poor data but a poorly worded FoIA request 
may simply be refused by the subject authority (Bourke et al., 2012). It is, in that sense, 
a highly focused mode of data gathering.  
In this study FoIA requests were used to support both the quantitative and qualitative 
strands of the research where the questions could be addressed using information held 
by public authorities that are covered by the legislation, as listed in Schedule 1 to the 
Act (The National Archives, 2015). The authorities that were subject to FoIA requests 
are shown in Table 4.3, along with an indication as to whether the information they 
provided was used in support of just the quantitative or both the quantitative and 
qualitative strands of the study (none being used exclusively for qualitative research). 
All FoIA requests were made in accordance with government process guidelines (HM 
Government, 2015).  
 FoIA requests within the qualitative strand of research were designed to 
examine the extent to which police forces have considered what constitutes ‘rural 
crime’ and whether any associated policy or strategy is sufficiently inclusive to 
accommodate the counterfeit pesticide problem (research Q.4). Given the focus of 
these questions these FoIA requests were sent to police forces only, as indicated in 
Table 4.3, who were asked the following: 
1. Does your police force have a definition of ‘rural crime’ that it works to? If yes 
what is that definition? 
2. Does your police force have a specific rural crime policy or strategy? If yes 
please provide me with a copy of that policy or strategy. If this is not possible 
please tell me why and indicate whether that policy or strategy makes specific 




The resulting data was extracted and coded for analysis using proprietary 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS). The method of analysis employed is 
discussed in section 4.2.1 of the thesis.  
In the quantitative strand of the research FoIA requests were used firstly to 
identify if the data held by the various enforcement agencies with an interest in 
counterfeit pesticides showed any trend in UK incidence over a specified time period 
(research Q.2). Secondly this element of the study also provided the opportunity to 
determine whether, if it transpires that this crime is not being addressed by the police, it 
is being dealt with elsewhere (research Q.8). To these ends the authorities indicated in 
Table 4.3 were asked to provide the following data: 
1. The number of separate incidents or suspected  incidents involving counterfeit 
pesticides which were investigated by [authority name] in each of the calendar 
years from 2010-2014 inclusive; 
2. The total quantity (by weight or volume) of counterfeit or suspected counterfeit 
pesticide seized by [authority name] in each of the calendar years 2010-2014 
inclusive. 
 
It is important to note that this was not an attempt to estimate what proportion of 
the pesticides sold in the UK are counterfeit, the problems of the quantitative ‘absolute 
percentage’ research route having already been noted in the review of the literature. 
Rather this ‘occurrence’ element of the study was intended to establish if any pattern of 
incidence over the period since 2010 could be established24.  
                                                          
24 The time period of the FoIA requests was not arbitrary rather it reflected what was likely to be 
the minimum length of time that the public bodies involved would have retained data. Principle 5 
of the Data Protection Act 1988 requires that those subject to the Act do not keep information 
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The various organisations approached with this FoIA request reflects the fact 
that this is a multi-faceted crime with different authorities carrying responsibility for 
separate aspects of illegality. Whilst this diversity of responsibility was acknowledged in 
the introduction to the thesis to better understand this element of the research it is 
worth further exploring how each agency fits into the enforcement jigsaw; 
 Police involvement recognises that besides anything else counterfeiting is an 
act of fraud often perpetrated by organised crime groups. Whilst the police 
engagement with counterfeiting is discussed in the literature review it is worth 
noting that there is seemingly a new found recognition of the policing 
significance of this crime, well-illustrated by the Intellectual Property Office 
funding of the City of London Police to bring their longstanding expertise in 
investigating fraud to bear on the problem25; 
 Trading Standards are probably the organisation that the general public most 
closely associate with tackling the problem of counterfeit goods, having as they 
do an eclectic mix of associated responsibilities primarily derived from 
consumer law. As the primary agency with responsibility for maintaining a fair 
and safe living and trading environment for consumers and businesses they 
                                                          
for any longer than is necessary. Whilst the police generally keep information for seven years 
(under the national guidance given in the Management of Police Information document) there is 
considerable variation amongst other public bodies. Had the time period selected exceeded 
their retention policy it would have given scope for the request to be refused and therefore a 
period of four years was chosen because this fell within all retention policies. 
25 The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) is a specialist unit dedicated to tackling 
“serious and organised intellectual property crime” (City of London Police, 2015). The unit’s 
primary focus is on counterfeiting offences committed using an online platform; this includes 
pirated DVDs, CDs and computer software. Whilst the ‘catch-all’ FoIA request to police forces 
included the City of London Police a separate request was made to this force requesting data 
concerning incidents of the counterfeiting of pesticides that had been dealt with by PIPCU since 
it became operational in September 2013. 
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both respond to complaints and actively seek out counterfeit items. Because of 
their close association with the counterfeiting problem Trading Standards were 
also included in the qualitative phase of the study as a significant stakeholder26; 
 The Health and Safety Executive, or more specifically the Chemicals Regulation 
Directorate (CRD – a subdivision of the former) is the body specifically charged 
with regulating plant protection products authorised for sale, supply, use and 
storage in the UK. All pesticides must be authorised by the Chemicals 
Regulation Directorate before they can be sold and supplied for use in the UK. 
CRD would therefore engage with the counterfeit pesticide problem because 
these are products that, by definition, are not approved and therefore contrary 
to regulation. As with Trading Standards because of their close association with 
the problem the Health and Safety Executive were also included in the in-depth 
interview phase of the study;  
 The UK Border Force is the law enforcement command within the Home Office 
and, amongst other things, is responsible for customs controls over goods 
entering the UK. Their relationship with counterfeit pesticides is less easy to 
define than the other key agencies but one of their priorities is to deter and 
prevent individuals and goods that would harm the national interest from 
entering the UK. The status of a counterfeit pesticide entering the UK is 
                                                          
26 In practice engagement with Trading Standards in the qualitative strand of the study preceded 
the quantitative FoIA request phase. In the course of the stakeholder interviews it became 
apparent that Trading Standards held no information on their national recording system with 
regards to counterfeit pesticides, essentially pre-empting any FoIA request. Given the disparate 
nature of Trading Standards, being located as separate units within numerous local authorities, 
undertaking a comprehensive FoIA request would have been a time consuming exercise which 
the qualitative phase of the research suggested would produce a nil return. For this reason this 
element of the study was treated as a dip-sample taking in all of all Trading Standards 
departments within the sample police force area with a view to expanding the survey if the 
results suggested that the indications of the quantitative data had been wrong. 
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problematic, at least until an attempt is made to place that product onto the 
market (particularly if that product is separated into its constituent parts such as 
active ingredient, packaging, and labelling when entering the UK). 
Nevertheless, given their customs and revenue related powers and the duty 
evading nature of counterfeit goods they frequently engage with such goods at 
their point of entry into the UK. 
 
It is also worth noting that there are various other peripheral offences relating to 
counterfeit pesticides, most notably amongst these being those associated with false 
declarations on shipping manifests27. A significant organisation in understanding the 
significance and scope of these misdemeanours, the ICC Counterfeiting Intelligence 
Bureau, was not subject to the FoIA request because it is not an authority listed in 
Schedule 1 of the Act but was included as part of the qualitative strand of the 
research28. 
 Returns from this quantitative strand of the research were almost universally nil, 
however, this in itself proved useful in research terms and is discussed further in 
section 4.2.2 which follows and in the relevant section of the results chapter. 
 
                                                          
27 The risks associated with falsely declared goods on ships manifests are well known; the low 
flashpoint of some chemicals makes them a serious hazard on board a container ship if they are 
not appropriately positioned for transit. The Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine 
Pollutants) Regulations 1990 make specific reference to such goods. 
28 The ICC Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau is a not for profit membership organisation formed 
in 1985 to undertake anti-counterfeiting activities in defence of industry interests. It has a 
particular interest in maritime crime which reflects the fact that it is run alongside an 
International Maritime Bureau which seeks out fraud and malpractice in international trade.  
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4.1.3 Counterfeit pesticide case study; an oral history interview 
The objective of this element of the qualitative strand of the research was firstly 
to address a significant gap in the literature, no incident involving a counterfeit pesticide 
and occurring on a UK farm having been described the extent that it could reasonably 
be described as a case study (research Q.3), and secondly to provide a source of 
example when interpreting the collective data. Without such a case to use as a point of 
reference this thesis could have been seen as merely a reflection on a theoretical risk 
rather than a study of a ‘real’ crime problem.  
The absence of a properly documented incident may be attributed to there 
having been, so far as it was possible to determine, no formal enforcement agency 
sponsored appeal for information. It also seemed likely that a degree of reticence on 
the part of victim farmers to come forward and discuss their experiences played a part, 
quite understandable given that there was a possibility that they may been seen as 
culpable. For these reasons it was agreed with the police force supporting the study 
that a public appeal would be made for intelligence relating to this crime, backed with 
an assurance of anonymity for any farmer victim that came forward, in the hope that 
out of this would emerge a usable case example. The appeal, which was managed 
under the title of Operation Silo (Thames Valley Police, 2014), received considerable 
media coverage (see for example Bucks Free Press, 2014; Farm Business, 2014; 
Garvey, 2014). In addition an appeal leaflet was distributed through the force 





Figure 4.4: Thames Valley Police Operation Silo leaflet appealing for intelligence 
relating to illegal pesticides. 
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As a result of the appeal, and more specifically linked presentations made to 
farmer groups by the author, a number of individuals who suspected they may have 
encountered a counterfeit pesticide came forward. One of these, an individual referred 
to throughout the study as subject #18, volunteered as being willing to tell his story in 
full and to be recorded doing so provided he could be guaranteed anonymity in any 
subsequent published material. The resulting interview would best be described as an 
oral history interview. As Bryman (2001, p.316) suggests such interviews are useful 
when asking a subject to reflect upon specific historical events or periods. The 
interview was unstructured in character, the interviewee simply being encouraged to 
talk freely about his experience and invited to expand upon specific points of interest as 
they arose. As Davies et al. (2010, p.104) point out in the context of crime related 
research such unstructured interviews can produce “rich grounded data”. For this 
reason as well as the results of the interview being coded along with other stakeholder 
derived data this interview was also treated as an eye-witness account to be 
summarised and presented without further analysis or comment. This was done in such 
a way that, as far as was possible, it captured the “qualitative detail and complexity of 
response” that Hagan (2002, p.174) described as characterising unstructured interview 
data whilst ensuring subject anonymity. This account is used as a point of reference 
and example later in the thesis. 
 
4.1.4 Awareness survey 
To determine the relative levels of awareness of the counterfeit pesticide 
problem amongst police officers and staff (research Q.7) data was gathered using a 
web-based, closed-question survey. This survey compared police cognisance of the 
problem to two other subject groups; professional users of pesticides and group 
consisting of individuals with no professional interest in the problem. The purpose of 
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this strand of the study was, as Davies et al. (2010, p.143) describe, to “generate 
statistics to describe the characteristics of a population”. In this case the characteristic 
to be described was awareness of a specific crime problem amongst police officers and 
police staff working within forces with a significant rural community.  
In seeking a representative sample for this population it was recognised that the 
extent to which the police have contact with a rural/farming community varies 
considerably between the forty-five forces in England and Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland; the extremes of a largely metropolitan force such as West Midlands 
Police compared to a largely rural force such as Devon and Cornwall being illustrative 
of this. Clearly there was little point in carrying out research into a predominantly rural 
problem within any force with a relatively small rural/farming population simply because 
a low level of awareness of that problem was not only very likely but also largely 
irrelevant. A qualifying criterion was therefore designed to discriminate in favour of 
forces with a significant rural/farming population.  
This criterion depended upon the fact that the farmed land contained with the 
boundaries of individual police force areas could be treated as a single farming unit. 
This process of consolidation was achieved by using statistics relating to agricultural 
land usage in the United Kingdom published by Defra29, broken down by county and 
                                                          
29 The Department or Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the UK government 
department responsible for policy and regulations on: 
 the natural environment, biodiversity, plants and animals 
 sustainable development and the green economy 
 food, farming and fisheries 
 animal health and welfare 
 environmental protection and pollution control 
 rural communities and issues 
The department publishes national and official statistics relating to the environment, rural 
communities, food and farming (Defra, 2015). For comparable data reference was also made to 
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unitary body (Defra, 2014), and allocating each to their respective police force areas. 
The total land used for (a) arable crops and (b) permanent/temporary grassland within 
each police force area was then determined and the respective percentage of the sum 
of the two farming types within each force area was then calculated (% cropping and % 
arable permanent and temporary grassland for each force area). This allowed the 
forces to be ranked; at one end those with extreme percentages of land use for arable 
cropping and at the other those with a similar extreme of permanent and temporary 
grassland. For example toward one extreme was Cambridgeshire Constabulary (88.3% 
arable cropping / 11.7% permanent and temporary grassland) and toward the other 
was Avon and Somerset Constabulary (16.2% arable cropping / 83.8% permanent and 
temporary grassland). Out of this was extracted those forces that fell within the middle 
quartile range, essentially a select group of police forces who exhibited neither farming 
type extreme and therefore could be described as ‘mixed farming’ in profile (Table 4.4). 
The significance of this group of forces was not recognised until the early 
phases of qualitative data gathering when it became apparent that counterfeit 
pesticides are not necessarily confined to one farming sector and, as importantly, they 
are not necessarily always present in the market place. These qualitative findings are 
discussed at length elsewhere sufficed to say at this point that one of the advantages 
of a mixed-method approach to research, that the results of one strand may guide the 
application of another, was of significant benefit here. The qualitative findings indicated 
that the chances of an individual force having experienced incidence of counterfeit 
pesticides, and by inference that they should be aware of this crime issue, was greater 
if their farming profile tended toward a mix of arable cropping and grassland based 
enterprise.  
                                                          




The natural extension of this premise was that the larger the total area of such 
mixed-farming within any given police force area then the greater the likelihood of the 
having being incidence and again by inference that there should be a measurable 
degree of awareness. A cursory examination of Table 4.4 showed that there was a 
great deal of variance in the total farmed area between those forces within the middle 
quartile range. Whilst all could reasonably be described as being mixed-farming in 
profile the total area of farmed land within some of the forces was such that it was 
rather unlikely that they would experience incidence (West Midlands Police and 
Metropolitan Police being prime examples).  
 
Table 4.4: Middle quartile range of police forces ranked by percentage mix of arable 
cropping and permanent/temporary grassland (based on Defra data). 
Police Force % Arable cropping % Permnt/temp 
grassland 
Hampshire Constabulary 61.3 38.7 
Warwickshire Police 60.0 40.0 
Kent Police 59.6 40.4 
Thames Valley Police 59.5 40.6 
Leicestershire Police 57.6 42.4 
Merseyside Police 56.4 43.6 
Wiltshire Police 53.3 46.7 
West Midlands Police 49.9 50.1 
North Yorkshire Police 47.2 52.8 
Gloucestershire Constabulary 46.8 53.2 
Metropolitan Police Service 45.5 54.5 
West Mercia Police 43.9 56.1 
Dorset Police 40.5 59.5 
Sussex Police 37.1 62.9 
 
 
A second qualifying criterion was therefore applied and forces falling within the 
middle quartile were ranked again, this time to reflect their relative total area of arable 
cropping and permanent/temporary grassland (Table 4.5). Those forces that fell within 
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the upper quartile range of this new ranking were deemed most appropriate potential 
research subject forces. These then were those forces that were mixed-farming in 
profile and sufficiently large that they are likely to have experienced incidence and 
should, therefore, be cognisant of the problem. 
In considering an appropriate subject force from within the upper quartile it is 
important to note that at the time of the study the author benefited from high level 
access to a large non-metropolitan police. This force met the qualifying criterion 
described above and, as a result of the existing relationship, was willing to support the 
study by facilitating access both to police officers and staff and to those charged with 
setting policing priorities. Whilst this force seemed an obvious candidate for research 
its choice did highlight an ethical dilemma; the question of being a researcher ‘in the 
middle’, the so called insider/outsider dichotomy (Breen, 2007; Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). 
Whilst this dichotomy is of greater significance in the context of the qualitative element 
of the study it is also relevant to the quantitative strand and is discussed in Appendix 1. 
In the light of this personal reflection it was concluded that although there were 
drawbacks to having a previous relationship these were outweighed by the advantages 





                                                          
30 The police force was Thames Valley Police, the largest non-metropolitan police force in terms 
of officers and staff in England and Wales with policing responsibilities for the counties of 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire and associated Unitary Authorities. 
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Table 4.5: Mixed-farm profile police forces rearranged to reflect total area of arable 
cropping and permanent/temporary grassland indicating quartile range boundaries 
(based on Defra data).  
Police Force Total area of  arable cropping and 
permanent/temporary grassland (hectares) 
West Mercia Police 542,792 
North Yorkshire Police 528,222 
Thames Valley Police 353,799 
Wiltshire Police 249,992 
Hampshire Constabulary 208,682 
Kent Police 196,768 




Dorset Police 188,093 
Leicestershire Police 180,406 
Warwickshire Police 139,713 
Merseyside Police 16,893 
West Midlands Police 13,567 
Metropolitan Police Service  9,994 
 
 
For the purpose of comparison the data derived from this police force was 
considered alongside that derived from two other sample groups: 
 professional pesticide users or those professionally engaged in the manufacture 
or distribution of pesticides; 
 individuals who had no professional interest in pesticide manufacture, 
distribution or use and were not employed by an agency that enforces pesticide 
regulation or the law. 
These two comparison groups were chosen because together they gave meaningful 
context to the results from the police sample; it would be reasonable to hypothesise 
that a sample of police officers and staff would be better informed about this crime 
problem than a group of what were essentially laypersons, but probably not as 
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informed as those with a professional interest in the subject. It was anticipated that the 
extent of police awareness when compared to these two groups would give a fair 
indication of relative subject cognisance.  
The chosen survey method was influenced by the relative inaccessibility of both 
police officers and staff and professional pesticide users, this by virtue of their 
distribution across a large police force area31. As a consequence the resources that 
would be required to conduct a meaningful number of face-to-face interviews 
essentially excluded this as viable survey mode. Similarly telephone interviews were 
also excluded because achieving an acceptable sample size by this method was 
prohibitively expensive. Moreover concerns on the part of the subject police force 
surrounding the potential security implications of disclosing the home or workplace 
addresses of a large number of police officers and staff rendered a postal survey 
untenable. This left a web-based survey as the only pragmatic mainstream survey 
mode available.  
This forced constraint on the available survey method did not necessarily 
disadvantage the research. The value of a survey when used in this context lies in its 
capacity to “gather large amounts of data to reveal the extent of a phenomena” (Davies 
et al., 2010 p.145). However, this is a research method with well recognised limitations; 
surveys, by their very nature, only record expressed or claimed behaviour (Hagan, 
2002) and in that sense they have no inherent truth. Nevertheless, in circumstances 
such as this where, by virtue of the question being asked there is an implied challenge 
to professional ability or knowledge, the anonymity provided by an impersonal survey 
can go some way to overcoming a desire on the part of a professional respondent to 
give the ‘right’ answer - what Bryman (2001, p.130) described as “social desirability 
                                                          
31 The subject force is responsible for the policing of a combined geographical area of 2,200 
square miles (5,700 km²) 
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bias”. This particular feature, when considered alongside the capacity to access a large 
respondent sample in a relatively short timeframe, made a web-based survey an 
obvious candidate to address this particular research question. Moreover given that 
this quantitative method was being used in parallel to a qualitative research strand any 
concerns that it “objectifies the respondent as data whilst their subjective experiences 
and personal meaning become lost in the process” (Davies et al., 2010, p.3) were 
mitigated. Furthermore the sometimes levelled complaint that web-based surveys are 
inherently biased toward internet users (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2010) was 
not considered to be significant. The internet is integral to the working practices of both 
police and professional pesticide users and, simply by virtue of their having accessed 
the survey, the third sample group must also have been internet-able. Given that this 
was a comparative exercise, and no subject group was disadvantaged by the use of a 
web-based survey, this potential flaw was not considered to be relevant.  
Turning to consider the development of survey questions this was influenced by 
one overarching consideration; that the questions would be included in a wider rural 
crime survey facilitated by the subject police force32. This rather constrained the 
number of specific counterfeit pesticide specific questions that could be included. 
However, whilst this was not an ideal situation the advantages this collaboration 
brought far outweighed the cost of having to be circumspect as to what the survey 
might achieve. This constraint also meant that there was no capacity in the survey to 
accommodate ‘flabby’ questions and so guidance on producing an effective web-based 
                                                          
32 This wider survey was designed and managed by the author in support of the subject police 
force’s rural crime initiative as a quid pro quo for cooperation with the study. Whilst there were a 
number of ‘shared’ questions those that related to counterfeit pesticides were used exclusively 
for the purposes of this study.  
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survey was taken from Couper (2008) and on specific question design from Fowler & 
Cosenza (2008).  
Prior to data collection a draft set of questions were field tested for reliability, the 
extent to which repeatedly measuring a single property produces the same result, and 
validity, the extent to which they measure the property they are supposed to measure. 
This testing was conducted in an entirely separate police force area and one that was 
geographically remote from the subject force (approximately 130 miles/208 km 
between their respective headquarters). This minimised the risk of the field test 
influencing live data gathering by virtue of prior knowledge. Twelve paper-copy surveys 
were completed by a mix of police officers (n=5), pesticide users (n=3) and members of 
the public with no vested interest in either (n=4). In addition participants were asked to 
complete a feedback form, a copy of which is shown at Appendix 2. The data produced 
by this trial survey was also transposed to a dummy table to ensure that analysis would 
not be problematic. As a result of this testing a number of changes were made before 
the question set was finalised, notably: 
 The order of questions was changed (the pesticide element being included later 
in the survey to minimise the possibility of respondents becoming overly 
focused on a specific crime at the risk of influencing the wider survey); 
 Several words and phrases were modified to remove jargon; 
 The response dimensions of a number of questions was changed to allow for 
more meaningful analysis. 
The data produced in the field trial was not incorporated in the final survey 
results, this being confined strictly to that generated in the live data gathering phase. 
The final set of survey questions, including that used to separate the respondent 
groups at the point of analysis, are reproduced in Appendix 3 wherein those questions 
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that were used for the purpose of this study are indicated by way of bold print33. Once 
finalised the survey was transposed to a web-based survey format and functionality 
was tested by the author before it was used in a live situation34.  
It has already been noted that this was a collaborative survey, and the 
consequential limitations have been acknowledged. However, this collaboration 
brought considerable advantage, not least in the access it gave to the most problematic 
sample groups and in the legitimacy and prestige that the involvement and 
endorsement of a police force carried. As Hagan (2002, p.160) recognised “the greater 
the public visibility and reputation of the organization sponsoring or conducting the 
survey the greater the potential for response”. The overall interest in and subject 
engagement with the survey was also enhanced by it being included as part of an 
ongoing campaign on the part of the subject force to heighten awareness of rural crime 
issues. This campaign was the predominating factor in terms of the timing of the 
survey, however, in consultation with an experienced agronomist it was suggested that 
avoiding peak pesticide spraying periods would probably result in increased 
professional pesticide user participation. This timing criterion was therefore also 
incorporated into the data collection plan, the pesticide user subject group being the 
first to be surveyed prior to the peak spring spraying period. 
                                                          
33 Besides those questions used in this study a number of other questions in the survey make 
reference to counterfeit pesticides, particularly in the context of where farmers obtain crime 
prevention advice and where they believe an incidence of counterfeit pesticide should be 
reported. These questions were included in the survey with a view to the future development of 
an awareness campaign, advantage being taken of the opportunity to gather data. 




This timing issue was indicative of the distinct nature of the three subject groups 
and the means by which they were accessed with the web-survey necessarily reflected 
this uniqueness: 
 Police officers and police staff were contacted by way of an ‘all-user’ email and 
a briefing on the force intranet system with a hyperlink to the web-based survey; 
 Professional pesticide users or those professionally engaged in the 
manufacture or distribution of pesticides were contacted by way of an email 
disseminated through the Thames Valley Rural Crime Partnership (TVRCP)35 
and with the assistance of the National Farmers Union (NFU)36 who facilitated 
the same email being forwarded to members within the force area. Again the 
email contained a hyperlink to the web-based survey; 
 Individuals who had no professional interest in pesticide manufacture, 
distribution or use and were not employed by an agency that enforces pesticide 
regulation or the law were contacted through a local newspaper campaign 
which promoted the force rural crime initiative and appealed for readers residing 
in a rural area to access the survey via the force public website37.  
                                                          
35 The TVRCP is an initiative designed to “bring together relevant individuals and organisations 
to provide coordination and strategic leadership in tackling rural crime issues across 
Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire and, together, contribute to reducing rural crime 
and the fear of rural crime in Thames Valley” (Thames Valley Police, 2015c) . 
36 The NFU estimates that more than 70 per cent of full time farmers are members (National 
Farmers Union, 2015). 
37 The appeal was published by five local newspapers which between them covered a large 
proportion but not all of the force area. These newspapers were: 
 Buckingham Today 
 Bucks Free Press 
 Oxfordshire Guardian 
 Newbury Today 
 Banbury Guardian 
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In all cases contact was prefaced with an explanation that the survey related to rural 
crime and policing and would be used for research purposes both by the force and a 
collaborating University. No specific mention was made of counterfeit pesticides in the 
briefing as it was considered that this might deter engagement on the part of those with 
no knowledge of the subject and therefore give an imbalanced result. 
A target sample size was decided upon before the survey was put to the three 
groups with a view to a follow-up process of either email or further press appeal being 
instigated if this target was not achieved within two-weeks of the survey being launched 
to each group. This target was the product of a desire to gather sufficient data for a 
meaningful inferential statistical analysis to be undertaken. Meaningful was deemed to 
be 95% confidence that the resulting figure for police and police staff awareness of the 
counterfeit pesticide problem is accurate to within a confidence interval of 10%. The 
sample size necessary to achieve this was established using the standard formula38: 
𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 =







Population Size = N  
Margin of error = e (0.10 for 10% margin of error) 
z-score = z (1.96 for 95% confidence) 
 
 
                                                          
No indication was given that response was sought from those without links to the professional 
use of pesticides or to policing. Responses were therefore sorted at analysis and non-qualifying 
ones (those that did have a link to either of these two groups) were discarded. 
38 Whilst various formulae are in common use for calculating required survey sample size for 
consistency the one utilised in the study was that recommended by the online survey 
application through which the survey was conducted. 
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For the purpose of the calculation population size (N) for each subject group was taken 
to be: 
 Police officers and police staff N≈7900 (Thames Valley Police, 2015b)39; 
 Professional pesticide users or those professionally engaged in the 
manufacture or distribution of pesticides N≈3600 (Defra, 2014; NAAC, 2015)40; 
 Individuals who had no professional interest in pesticide manufacture, 
distribution or use and were not employed by an agency that enforces pesticide 
regulation or the law N≈2.26 million (Thames Valley Police, 2015a)41. 
 
To achieve meaningful inferential statistics the required sample size for each 
group was, in the order given above: 95, 94, and 97. These were adopted as the 
targets for each sample group. These targets were achieved within the allotted two-
weeks and so there was no need for follow up activities. 
                                                          
39 It is acknowledged that not all of the police and police staff identified in the data provided by 
Thames Valley Police would be operational and of those that were not all would have contact 
with a rural community. Nevertheless the figure was used in in raw form because enquiries 
made with Thames valley Police did not produce a meaningful breakdown such that an 
operational/rural contact proportion could be established. If anything using this larger population 
figure overestimated the required sample size and could therefore be seen as erring on the side 
of caution. 
40 The given figure is composed of an extrapolation from Defra data for the structure of the 
agricultural industry of holdings within the counties and unitary bodies that collectively make up 
the Thames Valley Police area. This was combined with a figure for contactors who are based 
in the same area and undertake pesticide spraying on farms identified through the NAAC 
website. It was assumed that contractors were not also farmers on the basis that, given the size 
of the population, the potential extent of error would not make a statistically significant 
difference. 
41 No adjustment was made to remove those individuals contained within the other two subject 
groups because, given the very large size of the population, it made no statistical difference. 
115 
 
4.1.5 Word cluster analysis 
Given the relative newness of the problem it was perhaps to be expected that 
the literature review found a near absence of published research which addressed the 
counterfeit pesticide problem. However, what was surprising was that there was a 
similar lack of material relating to the wider police response to rural crime. In the 
context of the study this was a significant gap in the literature for in considering why 
there is a seeming lack of police engagement with the subject crime it was necessary 
to understand where the operational rural policing focus actually lay and whether this 
reflected the strategic and policy focus (research Q.6).  
In-depth interviews and the qualitative FoIA requests, discussed in section 4.1.1 
and 4.1.2, sought to identify the rural crime policies or strategies of police forces across 
the UK. However, in terms of understanding the extent of the police response to 
counterfeit pesticides these fell short of providing a complete picture because a lack of 
a specific strategy or policy is not necessarily indicative of a lack of ‘on-the-ground’ 
policing activity. However, operational engagement can be difficult to quantify 
particularly when, as is the case with rural crime, it is not a Home Office recognised 
recorded crime category (Home Office, 2015)42. This being the case the chosen 
solution was to look for a novel means of gathering data pertaining specifically to rural 
policing activity and one that overcame the constraints of police derived data not 
ordinarily being classified by any notion of ‘the rural’43.  
                                                          
42 Home Office counting rules are designed to assure accurate and consistent crime recording 
between police forces. The current offence classification index can be found at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counting-rules-for-recorded-crime 
43 Police crime recording systems, for example the widely used Niche system, categorise crimes 
by type such as theft or fraud without necessarily further categorising it by location type (albeit 
the actual crime location is recorded). Any attempt to extract rural crime data would necessitate 
a significant amount of supplementary analysis by the police which, because of the costs 
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Whilst published research was essentially absent there was, by contrast, no 
shortage of media reporting on the police response to rural crime. Indeed the large 
volume of accessible material presented a logistical challenge in itself. Nonetheless, 
and despite the practical issues involved, this largely unstructured content represented 
a potential source of usable and useful data concerning the police response to crime in 
the rural setting. However, there was a clear challenge in finding a pragmatic means of 
extracting the main themes contained within such a large body of media derived 
material. One potential approach would have been to apply an appropriate method of 
discourse analysis, such as one of the critical approaches summarised by Blommaert 
and Bulcaen (2000) and described in practice by Wodak and Meyer (2001). However, 
what was readily apparent from the methodological descriptions provided by these 
subject experts is that these are analytical techniques designed to study the finer detail 
of complex social phenomena (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Of course the extraction of 
such detail would not have disadvantaged the study, and the problem-orientated focus 
of such critical view of the data may well have furthered understanding of rural crime. 
Nonetheless the resources required to conduct any meaningful analysis of the large 
volume of available data using such methods could not be justified given that this 
review sought a comparatively rudimentary indication of the primary police rural crime 
focus. To that end an alternative review method was developed, and one that would 
give a simple but clear indication of the main themes contained within a large number 
of news media derived articles concerning the police and rural crime.  
A word-frequency analysis is a relatively new approach to the analysis of text 
data, its outstanding feature being is its capacity to exclude grammatical and non-
frequent words and to present the remainder in such a way that the more frequently a 
                                                          
incurred to meet the request, any associated Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) disclosure 
request would be very likely refused (Bourke et al., 2012, p.11). 
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word occurs in a sample then the more prominence it is given. From this word 
frequency a dendrogram, sometimes called a word cluster analysis, can be compiled 
which demonstrates the strength of association between the most commonly used 
words to more clearly show prominent content so that the reader might quickly perceive 
its relative significance. As Carroll and Roeloffs (1969) recognised at the very 
beginning of computer generated statistically based methods of word-frequency 
analysis such techniques can provide a more reliable way for researchers to identify 
and demonstrate key themes or trends than traditional manual indexing. They are a 
potentially powerful analytical tool particularly where there is a need to communicate 
the findings of mixed method research (Creswell, 2010) and, provided the limitations of 
such methods when compared to traditional content analysis are recognised 
(McNaught & Lam, 2010, p.630), they provide a readily accessible means of 
interpreting large quantities of text data. Used in this study it presented a means of 
analysing the pattern of content of a large sample of text data concerning the policing 
of rural crime to bring to the fore the key thematic focus of that sample. 
This method of text data analysis was used to review the content of on-line 
media reporting of rural crime over the twelve month period May 01 2013 to April 30 
2014. Given the rapid growth in both online news reporting, to the extent that the 
majority of news stories are replicated in digital format, and the proportion of the 
population now accessing news via digital platforms (Levy & Newman, 2014) 
constraining the sample to digital media was deemed an appropriate strategy. 
Moreover the use of online reporting as a data source readily lent itself to this form of 
analysis because the content is available in a digital form, a prerequisite for computer 
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based word-frequency analysis. Data was gathered by way of an online alert facility44 
using the search terms given in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6: Summary of the alert search criteria used to identify online articles relating 
to the policing of rural crime. 
 
Primary search term: Secondary search terms: 
Rural + crime 
 + criminal* 
 + offence 
 + offend* 
 
*The wildcard symbol was used to capture all words that began with either ‘criminal’ or 
‘offend’, for example criminals, criminality, offenders, offending. 
 
 
The algorithm employed allowed for the combination of a route word (rural) with 
various other words to capture multiple variations on the rural crime theme. The results 
were then filtered to exclude all content that did not relate to the UK and was then 
further filtered to exclude comment and reporting that did not have a recognisable link 
to the police and the policing of rural crime. By collecting data over a full twelve month 
period the sample took into account the cyclical nature of some rural offending such as 
hare-coursing and crop theft. The relevant content of these articles, that is to say the 
article itself rather than any extraneous web page content, was then captured into a 
                                                          
44 There are a number of online alert systems available including Google Alerts, which was the 
one used in the study. The application monitors the Web content as it is generated for the 
appearance of specified words and phrases and emails the results to a nominated account 
every time it encounters a new result.  
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usable format using NCapture45. Prior to the production of the cluster analysis a 
number of stop-words were then applied, these in addition to those included by default 
by the algorithm to minimise data clutter. These additional stop-words were those 
common to the majority of the articles by virtue of the original online alert search terms 
and which would inevitably dominate the cluster. These stop-words are given at Table 
4.7.  
 
Table 4.7: Non-default stop-words used in the word-frequency analysis 
Primary Stop-Word Variants 
Crime Crimes, Criminal, Criminals, Criminally 
Rural Rurally 





The default stop-word setting in the analysis software used included various 
conjunctions and pronouns and all words of less than four letters to give a more 
manageable and meaningful sample. In most instances these words would be 
regarded as ‘clutter’ in the results. However, an expanded search to include shorter 
words was undertaken and the resulting data reviewed to ensure that no words of 
significance were inadvertently excluded. The filtered data was then analysed using 
Jaccard’s coefficient. The use of this similarity metric as means of comparing the 
diversity of sample sets when considering keyword similarity has been well 
                                                          
45 NCapture is a web browser extension designed to quickly and easily capture content like web 
pages, online PDFs and social media for analysis in NVivo 10, the Qualitative Data Analysis 
system used throughout this study. 
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documented by Niwattanakul et al. (2013) and is defined as the size of the intersection 
divided by the size of the union of the sample sets expressed as: 
 





The outcome of this analysis are given as a tabular summary of word frequency, a 
word frequency cluster analysis, and an accompanying narrative synopsis of the results 
in the results chapter of the thesis.  
 
4.2 Data analysis methods 
4.2.1 Method of analysis for the qualitative data  
Unlike quantitative data the results of qualitative research are not given to 
analysis by mathematical techniques. Whilst the qualitative data gathered in the course 
of this study was the product of systematic methods the unrefined result of open-ended 
questioning remained essentially unstructured; that is to say it was not grouped 
according to any pre-defined categories. Data derived from in-depth interviews, 
qualitative Freedom of Information Act requests, and the oral history interview all fell 
within this category of data46. To bring meaning to such data required it to be exposed 
to a process of inductive reasoning, that is to say the process of deriving general 
principles from facts or instances observed in the data. In the same way that the study 
has thus far drawn on the systematic procedures inherent to a grounded approach to 
research the method used to analyse the qualitative data drew inspiration from the 
                                                          
46 For the purpose of managing the large quantity of material gathered in the course of carrying 
out a review of the literature this was also treated as qualitative data and exposed to the 
process described.  
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same approach, and specifically the analytical technique with which the theory is most 
closely associated; the constant comparative method.  
The constant comparative method of data analysis owes its origins to the 
milestone work of Glaser and Strauss (1967), the founders of the grounded approach 
to research. The method requires that the data be fragmented into discrete units which 
are then compared and coded to allow the researcher to develop concepts that seek to 
explain the social processes under investigation. This method of data analysis is often 
illustrated using the workflow described by Strauss & Corbin (1988)47, wherein the 
process is characterised by three major stages: 
i. Open coding, where the data is broken down into small discrete units and each 
unit is given a descriptor; 
ii. Axial coding, which involves assembling the coded units into categories which 
may reflect, for example, causal factors or other phenomena; 
iii. Selective coding, when themes that express the content of each of the 
categories are developed.   
These stages are not necessarily sequential. A degree of overlap is likely if not 
inevitable and increasingly so as additional data is gathered and the process is 
repeated to inform the next iteration of data collection. As the available data grows, and 
new categories emerge, concepts are regrouped thus further refining their meaning, 
                                                          
47 Constant comparative analysis has been variously modified since its inception and some 
examples considered in the course of developing and appropriate method of data analysis for 
this study bore only passing resemblance to the original. This is not meant as a criticism, rather 
it might be seen as evidence of the strength of this technique in that researchers have 
successfully adapted the process to fit the particular circumstances of their own work. For this 
reason it was deemed entirely appropriate to go ‘back to basics’ and to draw on the work of 
Strauss and Corbin (1998), who provided an early description of the fundamental principles of 
the method, as a guiding source as well as referring to later writers on the method.  
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identifying their properties, and exploring their relationship to one another. This 
continues until they can be integrated into a coherent model. It is in progressing 
through this process that an explanation for the social processes being studied should 
ultimately emerge (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The method of qualitative data analysis 
used in this study was rooted in this process of grouping and then regrouping concepts 
as a response to the addition of newly acquired data.  
Contemporary researchers are fortunate to have qualitative data analysis 
software (QDAS) available to them to ease the task of data coding, and proprietary 
QDAS was used throughout this study as a means of both managing data and 
developing themes48. That is not to suggest that the task of interpretation was 
surrendered to the logic of a computer; the software was utilised as a tool for efficiency, 
to “support analysis but leave the analyst firmly in charge” (Fielding & Lee, 1998, 
p.167). QDAS was therefore used to hold coded data in an accessible and modifiable 
form which could then be readily recoded in response to the addition of new data and 
as fresh themes emerged, the ‘constant comparative’ element of a grounded approach. 
A summary of the overall analysis method is given at Figure 4.5.  
 
4.2.2 Method of analysis for the quantitative data 
Quantitative data was generated from three distinct sources, the first of which 
was the web-based, closed-question survey described at section 4.1.4 of the thesis. 
The population characteristic to be described by this survey was the relative awareness 
of the counterfeit pesticide problem amongst police officers and police staff working 
within a force with a significant farming community. The choice of sample police force,  
 
                                                          
48 The QDAS software used in the study was NVivo v.10 and guidance as to its use was 






















1. Familiarisation with the data: 
Through transcription and repeated listening and/or reading (depending on the 
data source) a broad appreciation of the data is developed. That which clearly 
does not add value or meaning is rejected to minimise data clutter.  
 
2. Development of initial categories: 
A set of pre-set categories are defined. Based on familiarisation with the data 
and the literature review these categories reflect recognisable concepts or 
themes within the data. 
3. Development of a full category structure: 
The data is broken down into chunks (coded) in such a way that context 
is retained. These chunks of data are allocated to one or more categories 
to reflect the concept or theme they support or contradict. Additional 
categories are created as the data demands to produce a category 
structure that accommodates all of the existing data.  
4. Re-coding of data: 
Once a full category structure exists the data is reviewed in its 
entirety and allocated afresh. This takes account of the fact that early 
coded data will not have been considered in the context of the full 
category structure. 
5. Review of categories: 
The coded data is reviewed. If concepts or themes are not 
sufficiently evidenced, or other potential areas for investigation 
are suggested, then additional data gathering is undertaken. 
6. Addition of new data: 
The new data is coded, being added to the existing categories or 
to newly created categories derived from the additional data. 
Steps 5 and 6 are repeated until no concepts or themes are 
forthcoming. 




and the meaning of ‘significant farming community’ in the context of the use of 
pesticides, is also discussed in section 4.1.4 of the thesis. 
For the purpose of comparison observations were obtained from three subject 
groups; 
 Police officers and staff working for a police force with a significant farming 
community within its force area (n=289); 
 Professional pesticide users or those professionally engaged in the 
manufacture or distribution of pesticides (n=114); 
  A control group of individuals who had no professional interest in pesticide 
manufacture, distribution or use and were not employed by an agency that 
enforces pesticide regulation or the law (n=647). 
 Each subject group was separately compared to the two other groups, the null 
hypothesis in each case being that the two samples were identically distributed this 
being expressed as: 
𝐻0:  𝑢1  = 𝑢2 
The alternative hypothesis was therefore that the two samples were not identically 
distributed this being expressed as:  
𝐻0:  𝑢1  <> 𝑢2 
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 The choice of statistical test to be applied was made having established that the 
data was not normally distributed. This was achieved through the application of the 













This pointed toward the use of a nonparametric statistical analysis of the data and, 
given that this was ordinal data derived from Likert scale questions answered by 
independent groups (rather than paired samples), a choice between the Mann-Whitney 
U-test and the Kruskal-Wallis H test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). 
Kruskal-Wallis extends the Mann-Whitney U-test to more than two groups and 
would have allowed for a ‘one-step’ test of the three sample groups. However, it is not 
without its drawbacks, principally that the test does not identify where stochastic 
dominance occurs (Field, 2013, p.238). As a consequence, and assuming the test 
indicated that the three sample groups were not the same, it would not in itself have 
demonstrated where this ‘difference’ lay. It would only indicate that at least two groups 
are different and, to be of practical use to the study, a further ad hoc test would be 
required to overcome this shortcoming.  
In the context of this study this seemed an unnecessary encumbrance when the 
Mann-Whitney U-test provides an option that was equally robust, Siegel and Castellan 
                                                          
49 The Shapiro-Wilk test was deemed an appropriate test of normality given the favourable 




(1988) describing it as one of the most powerful nonparametric tests, and would not 
require further analysis50. Field (2013, p.221) gives the test statistic U as: 




In order to determine if the mean of two groups are different from each other 
Mann-Whitney requires that four conditions be met (Laerd Statistics, 2015): 
i. The independent variable must be at least ordinally scaled; 
ii. The independent variable has only two levels;  
iii. A between-subjects design is used; 
iv. The subjects are not matched across conditions. 
All conditions were met and so the Mann-Whitney U-test was used to compare the 
primary subject group (A) to the other two populations. Analysis was undertaken using 
a proprietary statistical analysis software with a social science leaning (being strong in 
nonparametric analysis) and with the capacity to generate the descriptive statistics, 
tabulated reports, and charts required for illustrating the results51. 
The second source of quantitative data was a series of Freedom of Information 
Act (FoIA) requests which are discussed in section 4.1.2 of the thesis. The intent 
behind this strand of the research was to produce longitudinal data which would 
demonstrate the pattern of occurrence of the counterfeit pesticide problem over time as 
observed by various enforcement bodies. However, with one notable exception all 
subject requests produced a nil return. Moreover the single positive data return was 
                                                          
50 The Wilcoxon rank-sum test provided an additional alternative to the Mann-Whitney test. Both 
tests being equivalent (Field, 2013) Mann-Whitney was chosen simply because of the favour it 
is afforded by the renowned statistician Sidney Siegel (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). 
51 The statistical analysis software used in the study was IBM Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) and guidance as to its use was primarily taken from Field (2013). 
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accompanied by a narrative which indicated that the results should not be afforded 
statistical significance. Nonetheless in terms of the overall study these results were 
notable in themselves and supported an important part of the discussion. That said, 
and for the reasons given, the results of this strand were not subjected to statistical 
analysis but are presented in the results by way of a narrative. The final quantitative 
strand of the study consisted of a word cluster analysis of rural crime specific online 
newspaper articles published over a twelve month period. The analysis of this data is 
















5.0 Results of the research 
The second step of the convergent parallel mixed method research design 
involved the data from each strand of research being independently analysed before 
being merged. To that end the results of the research are now presented such that they 
reflect the modular nature of the data gathering phase of the study. Beginning with the 
qualitative strand the results of both in-depth interviews, which explored the nature of 
the UK counterfeit pesticide problem (research Q.1) and the setting of rural policing 
strategy and policy within the subject police force (research Q.5), and qualitative FoIA 
requests, designed to determine the extent to which national police rural crime policy 
and strategy accommodates this crime (research Q.4), will be summarised. The 
qualitative research results conclude with the oral history interview, a narrative 
summary of an incident involving counterfeit pesticides which occurred on a UK farm.  
This is followed by an analysis of the quantitative data derived from an online 
survey, which explored the comparative levels of awareness of this crime amongst 
police officers and staff (research Q.7), and a word cluster analysis of on-line reporting 
of the policing of rural crime which examined where, in the operational setting, the 
police rural crime focus is truly located (research Q.6). Quantitative FoIA request, 
designed to produce quantitative data indicative of a counterfeit pesticide occurrence 
trends from enforcement agency data (research Q.2) and determine where this 
problem is being dealt with if not by the police (research Q.8), produced a largely 
negative return. However, these returns are of significance in themselves particularly if 






5.1 Analysis of the qualitative data  
 Analysis of qualitative data was undertaken using the method described in 
section 4.2.1 of this thesis. Having concluded the coding process the final data 
categories (Nodes), the key subject areas that emerged from the in-depth interviews 
(including the oral-history interview) and the qualitative FOIA requests, were as given in 
Table 5.1. For the purpose of recognising these categories as they appear in the 
narrative summary of the results that follows they are shown in bold in the text. In 
addition, in both Table 5.1 and the narrative summary, the number of sources (S) that 
contributed to each category and the total number of references (R) to the node subject 
made by those sources is also indicated. The intention here is to provide an indication 
of how often each category was the subject of discussion within stakeholder interviews 
or occurred within FoIA data. This should not necessarily be seen as an indication of 
significance because some of the most important findings of this strand of research 
were derived from points raised by one or two individuals or organisations. 
 
5.1.1 In-depth interviews 
 Intended to describe the nature of the counterfeit pesticide problem as it 
manifests itself in the UK setting twenty two stakeholder views, drawn from the sixteen 
organisations shown in Figure 4.2, and a farmer victim of a counterfeit pesticide 
incident were documented. For reference individual areas of knowledge and expertise 
are given in Table 5.2. To ensure anonymity neither individual job titles nor employers 
are given and all participants are all referred to as ‘he’ in the narrative. No gender bias 
is intended. Where a participant’s contribution is discussed they are referred to by their 
unique study reference number, for example #01. Direct quotes are only used where it 














Source of counterfeit 
products 
 9 18 
UK Modus Operandi  12 52 
 Organised crime link 7 15 
 Supply chain structure 8 29 
 Consumer motivation 10 21 
 Counterfeit quality 3 7 
 Consumer risk factors 7 17 
 Industry consequences 9 20 
 Public consequences 3 13 
 Deceptive counterfeit risk 2 3 
Defence of parallel 
imports 
 2 10 
Occurrence pattern  9 16 
 Able to recognise occurrence? 7 17 
 Response strategies 10 33 
Likely incidence  8 12 
 Significant under estimate 1 1 
Collection of  
occurrence data 
 5 12 
 Integrity of occurrence data 4 6 
Significance of 
amenity market 
 4 10 
 Characteristics of amenity 
market 
4 12 
 Product source 4 6 
Industry knowledge 
and intelligence 
 4 7 





 7 27 
 Definition of rural crime/policy 13 14 
 Police rural crime priorities 4 10 
 Refer to another agency 1 1 
 Need for greater awareness 2 4 
Rural crime/OCG link  7 13 
 Significance of hare coursing 5 5 
Table 5.1: NVivo data analysis nodes (categories) and the number of Sources (S) 






Participant Area of expertise 
#01 Pesticide manufacturer anti-counterfeiting strategy 
#02 Pesticide manufacturer representation 
#03 Farmer user representation 
#04 Agricultural merchant/distributor representation 
#05 Farmer buying groups  
#06 Pesticide manufacturer Intellectual Property (IP) protection  
#07 National agrochemical distribution  
#08 Pesticide regulation enforcement practice 
#09 EU pesticide parallel trading 
#10 Agronomist and Eastern European farm management 
#11 European pesticide manufacturer representation 
#12 Independent counterfeiting intelligence services 
#13 European pesticide manufacturer brand protection  
#14 Consumer protection (local) 
#15 Standard setting and auditing for pesticide use  
#16 Amenity pesticide use 
#17 Consumer protection activities (national) 
#18 Farmer counterfeit pesticide victim 
#19 Police strategy design 
#20 Police policy setting 
#21 Standard setting and auditing for pesticide use  
#22 Standard setting and auditing for pesticide use 




Initially looking to gain an overall impression of the problem as it manifests itself 
in the UK setting, and specifically the typical modus operandi (S=12, R=52) it would 
be fair to say that stakeholder opinion broadly reflected the industry narrative observed 
in the  literature review. Overwhelmingly opinion was that the problem is intrinsically 
associated with the trade in parallel products. That is not to say that the legitimate 
parallel trade in pesticides was universally condemned for robust support for system of 
trading that is designed to facilitate fair trade across the European Union was 
observed. As participant #03 pointed out parallel trading provisions provide balance to 
what he described as “a monopolised situation”. Nonetheless there was a majority view 
amongst both mainstream manufacturers and representative bodies that the current 
parallel trading rules as they relate to pesticides, and contained within the Plant 
Protection Products Regulations 2011, are regularly being abused and that it is this 
abuse that underpins the UK counterfeit pesticide problem.  
 Participant #08 described what the regulations require of a product before it can 
be imported under parallel trading rules; “it has to be exactly the same product, it 
cannot be similar, it cannot be basically the same, it has to be the same product which 
has been approved”. This contributor also pointed out that although repackaging and 
relabelling of the product is allowed it must comply with the conditions of the permit. It 
was generally agreed by participants that, on the face of it, both the packaging and 
labelling requirements were being met by those abusing the parallel trade system, but 
this was largely irrelevant because the product contained therein did not meet the 
‘exactly the same product’ criteria52.  
                                                          
52 A summary of how legitimate parallel trading operates, and the means by which the trading 
rules are abused to facilitate the import of counterfeit pesticides - dubbed the ‘Hornet’ model by 
the author, can be found at Appendix 5. The details of this illicit method of trading were derived 
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 As participant #11, an expert with an overview of the complex workings of the 
market, described a “near perfect clone” is brought into the European market by illicit 
traders, packaged in accordance with the associated parallel trading permit, and is then 
introduced into the legal market under the guise of a legitimate product. The extent to 
which manufacturers believe this practice dominates the illicit market was summed up 
by participant #06 who said “from our experience in the UK it’s almost exclusively 
illegal parallel trade”. Whilst some pointed out that the deceptive counterfeit risk 
(S=2, R=3) did exist, that is to say products designed to look like the original (including 
packaging), and such items may occasionally occur in the UK market for generic 
products53, this was seen as very much a lesser problem, the overwhelming focus 
being on parallel traded products.  
 When challenged to evidence this indictment of the trade in parallel product 
pesticides participant #01 drew on his experience of dubious product seized over a 
number of years; 
  
“We must have had four or five cases every year for several years now with a 
range of products and when we test them in our laboratories they don't meet 
our spec [specification]. They're to a spec, sometimes a little bit low on active 
                                                          
from the results of the study and is exampled in practice in the industry case study given at 
Appendix 4 which draws upon the experience of participant #08. 
53 A generic product is one for which the patent has expired and other companies, those that did 
not hold the original patent, are at liberty to produce their own version. Whilst these would not 
necessarily be described as identical to the original they will contain the same active ingredient. 
Such products are susceptible to the activities of the counterfeiter in the same way that the 
original patented product would have been. 
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[ingredient], sometimes different surfactant systems54, that kind of thing. So, 
there are genuine differences according to the parallel trade rules”.  
 
He continued “for the most part the ones we've had look okay in the bottle, but when 
you put it through the lab it's not correct”. However, whilst such examples were not 
uncommon many participants acknowledged that securing evidence of illicit practice is 
problematic, not least because the quality of such products when compared to the 
genuine item has risen over recent years. As was recognised in the literature review 
there is a general pattern of improving counterfeit quality (S=3, R=7) across all 
sectors, including pesticides, a factor acknowledged by several participants. Whilst 
participant #01 believed that “the criminals are learning to do it much better than they 
ever did before” participant #11 went further, suggesting that the counterfeit product 
appearing in the UK is as good a copy as would be found anywhere, indeed “near 
perfect”. As a consequence recognising a counterfeit is inherently difficult without a full 
laboratory analysis and, as participant #04 pointed out; 
 
“Short of actually dip sticking it or doing a test and sending it off for analysis 
which involves opening random cans to make sure you are not being duped by 
a sample which obviously then costs money. You can’t do it for every batch of 
product that you’ve sold”. 
 
 As has already been noted several participants pointed out the significance of 
current parallel trading rules which allow for the repackaging of product before it enters 
the supply chain and is sold into the farm market. As participant #02 described “once 
                                                          
54 A surfactant is an ingredient within the pesticide which lowers the surface tension and 
facilitates an even distribution of the product when it is mixed with water in a sprayer tank. 
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you have a permit you can buy a load of containers and pack product… label it, and 
say this is my parallel product”. There was then almost universal recognition of the 
incongruity of trying to identify a counterfeit product for testing where, by virtue of rules 
under which it is traded, it need not physically resemble the product it purports to be. It 
is then, to all intents and purposes, a deceptive counterfeit that exhibits the qualities of 
a non-deceptive product by deceiving without the need for an original manufacture 
brand or trademark. Indeed the product need not bear any resemblance to the product 
it purports to be. Importantly, and as participant #05 pointed out, the enforcement body 
responsible for product testing (the Chemicals Regulation Directorate, CRD, part of the 
Health and Safety Executive) are “rushed off their feet trying to do other things” and as 
a consequence there is no enforcement and therefore no proactive means of 
recognising these uniquely well-hidden counterfeits. 
 Whilst this lack of engagement on the part of the CRD might be as much a 
matter of perception as it is fact it does not negate a widespread participant belief that, 
regardless of the extent to which they try to tackle the problem, any CRD enforcement 
activity is quite easily sidestepped. It was certainly the view of participant #09 who, 
based on first-hand experience of the machinations of the parallel trade in pesticides, 
believed that those intent on illicit activity could easily avoid being caught. By applying 
for authorities for multiple Ministerially Approved Pesticide Product (MAPP) numbers55, 
and switching between them if suspicion was aroused about the provenance of one of 
their products, the illicit trader could stay one step ahead of the inspectorate. As he 
                                                          
55 A Ministerially Approved Pesticide Product (MAPP) number is the product registration number 
allocated by the Chemicals Regulation Directorate (CRD) upon issue of the first commercial 
level of authorisation for a product. The assigned number remains with the product provided no 
major change is made to its identity or formulation. Parallel trade permit applications are based 
on the MAPP number of a product rather than its commercial name, which may vary from 
country to country or over time. 
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explained “as soon as you get caught one MAPP number shuts down and you just 
move to the next”. That is, of course, assuming that the inspectorate actually finds any 
evidence of illegality because, as the same participant pointed out, “what they ask for is 
sample, and that sort of thing is easily sourced. Just go and buy a case in France”. 
Moreover he was of the opinion that even if those flouting the regulations are caught 
the penalties imposed are scarcely a disincentive;  
 
“if you have got a parallel registration and you put in generic material and CRD 
find it they will make you withdraw that product and take it off the market. And at 
the moment that is the main punishment that there is”.  
 
It may have been a somewhat tongue in cheek comment but he went as far as to 
suggest that “if I was entering the market now I would be illegal because there is no 
penalty”. It is a problem that plagues manufacturer attempts to protect their intellectual 
property (IP) rights through legal action, well described by #06 who was of the opinion 
that going to court could actually be detrimental to their position; 
 
“When you go to court with what you think is a very strong case and the 
punishment meted out is trivial the impact is actually negative because then 
other people will say ‘there's an opportunity for me here, I might get caught, but 
I've got a business model that's profitable, I'm not going receive any sort of 
punishment that's going to result in me going to jail or having, you know, my 
profits wiped out’. So it's actually saying to criminals, you know what? Come 




 It is because the trading of counterfeit pesticides carries such a low risk of being 
caught, or if caught that the consequences are not a disincentive to continue, that 
participant #08 suggested it now has a well-established organised crime link (S=7, 
R=15). Participant #08 further described the extent, complexity, and capacity to evade 
prosecution of OCGs involved in the trade; 
   
“Certainly this is organised crime, these are very clever people. They have a 
business model which if you look at appears to be everything you would expect 
it to be… genuine, above board. You scratch the surface you don’t find anything 
too much. You may find the odd irregularity but anybody looking at this would 
have no immediate grounds to suspect criminal activity taking place. It is only 
when you start to look much deeper, start doing market testing, start looking at 
the European network, how they have organised themselves, who is invoicing 
for what. This is a very, very clever business model that has been established. 
They pay custom duty, they pay VAT. They don’t pay the right custom duty and 
they don’t pay the right amount of VAT, but to all intents and purposes it looks 
genuine… it doesn’t attract attention”. 
 
 As was recognised in the literature review it is this low risk of prosecution, 
combined with the high profit margins afforded by the “mark-up of ten to 20 times cost” 
described by participant #08 that makes it such an attractive proposition to OCGs. 
There are, to quote participant #09, “huge, huge amounts of money to be made” 
describing the market as being like “Santa Clause come… it’s a gift to them”, their cash 
rich position giving OCGs the ability to “lock up CRD” through legal process if ever they 
suspect illegality. Participant #08 described a trade dominated by a relatively small 
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number of what are ostensibly legitimate companies who regularly trade in the rural 
setting. The activities of these companies might reasonably be described as organised 
criminality, spanning the interface between legitimate and illegitimate trade often 
stepping with ease between the two when circumstances favoured doing so. In the 
course of the interview this participant facilitated access to case data which illustrated 
several elements of the counterfeit pesticide trade including this interface56. This 
organised crime link was also well recognised across mainstream manufacturers all of 
whom had a similar view of how this had evolved of late, typified by participant #01 
when expressing the view that “we're dealing with a much more professional approach 
from the criminals, which suggests, as you know, we think within the industry that 
organised crime is behind this”. 
 Manufacturers also collectively recognised the primary source of counterfeit 
products (S=9, R=18) being traded as China. The multinational nature of mainstream 
pesticide manufacture being what it is manufacturers saw themselves as taking a 
double hit. As participant #01 pointed out when talking about illegal product “we have a 
mass of problems in China. Not just that they make it and export it but they sell it locally 
as well”. The manufacturer perception of China as the root of this transnational problem 
is supported by enforcement agency experience. Participant #08 said that, based on 
his knowledge of illegal product identified in bonded warehousing, over 95% of 
counterfeit pesticides that entered the UK originated in China. Participant #08 went on 
suggest that this should come as no surprise given the ease with which an individual or 
                                                          
56 The data provided by participant #08 was used as the basis of an enforcement case study 
which illustrates the process through which one particular illegal product being sold into the UK 
market was identified and the offending company prosecuted. The case study is given at 
Appendix 4. Evidence of other similar cases were provided by participant #08 but are not 




company could buy these products from China at a fraction of the price of the branded 
product within the EC.  
 The relative ease of access to the Chinese market was a common theme in the 
interviews, a number of participants describing the open trade in active ingredients that 
goes on at various specialist trade fairs across Europe. Indeed evidence was found of 
blatant and scarcely concealed illegal practice, participant #09 recounting from 
personal experience; 
 
“There is a conference, it was in Brighton or Glasgow and it is now in 
Amsterdam, and you meet these Chinese people who know the registration 
system. And they say ‘well look you go and get two pallets of the real stuff and 
we’ll bolster it out with two pallets of ours at 60% margin as opposed to 10%’. 
So, if you were greedy…” [participant stopped talking] 
 
Even for those not attending such events access to sources of pesticide manufactured 
to specification seemed relatively simple. As participant #09 described; 
 
“We get emails, probably 4 a week from China and India, saying we notice you 
have got these [parallel trade] registrations. We could supply you with product 
and you could make 80% more money…”57 
                                                          
57 It is interesting to note that in the course of the research the author had personal experience 
of Chinese manufacturers offering to supply pesticides to personal specification. Sporadically 
throughout the study such unsolicited emails arrived in the author’s University email inbox, 




In terms of the quality of these products, which is discussed elsewhere, this may well 
be closely linked to a problem experienced by mainstream manufacturers who have 
production capacity in China. As participant #01 described, in production plants outside 
of their home countries “there’s product leaking out of the back door or people are 
leaving with the technology in their minds”.  
 
 What was probably less well understood was how, once supply had been 
secured, these products find their way from source into the UK marketplace. 
Nonetheless there was general consensus that the majority of illegal consignments 
probably enter mainland Europe or the UK through the major ports, participant #08 
stating that;  
 
“There are certain ports across Europe which are targeted [by counterfeit 
importers]. Felixstowe is one of them. Hamburg, Antwerp, Rotterdam are the 
others but Felixstowe is certainly a port which is targeted. Has been 
Southampton occasionally but Felixstowe is the main port in the UK…there are 
known companies within the UK who use Felixstowe”. 
 
Participant #12 described how these products are generally brought in to the EU as 
constituent parts (chemicals in bulk, empty bottles, and labels), often in separate 
consignments, thus avoiding meeting the strict definition of a counterfeit in the eyes of 
customs staff. These constituent parts are then brought together once inside the EU. 
Participant #08 added to this explaining how chemical products also avoid Border 
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Agency suspicion because they are described as being destined for re-export out of the 
EU, a relatively common practice value having been added to the product because it 
carries the credence of being a product of UK origin. This practice is not illegal in itself, 
however, there is evidence that a significant proportion of these products do not leave 
the UK rather they find their way into the parallel trade market58. This practice also 
highlighted a separate issue, and whilst not necessarily of direct relevance to this study 
certainly one that is pertinent to the overall understanding of the risk. These products 
are often wrongly described on shipping manifests, again to avoid detection at the point 
of entry into the EU. This poses a severe risk in container shipping, particularly if the 
flash-point of the actual product is lower than that of the declared product. As 
participant #12 explained flash-point information often determines the positioning of a 
container when loaded onto a ship, inappropriate positioning posing a serious fire 
hazard. A number of on-board fires have been attributed to such misdeclaration of the 
contents of shipping containers. 
 Whilst there was general agreement that the direct port route for illegal product 
predominates it was also suggested that there may be a growing overland route for the 
entry of illegal product into the EU. As participant #10 explained his experience was 
that farming in Russia and the Ukraine is characterised by fraudulent practice. Patently 
this makes the periphery of Europe a prime target for the OCGs involved in the trade in 
illegal pesticides and #10 described how an illegal product had been substituted for the 
original at some point in the supply chain before it reached a farm he managed in the 
Ukraine. It was an experience that mainstream manufacturers would identify with for 
several described how porous borders makes the Eastern European land-borders an 
                                                          
58 This practice underpins the ‘Hornet Model’ of counterfeit pesticide import practice which the 
author of this thesis designed to illustrate the practice in presentations and articles and which is 
described in Appendix 5. 
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important secondary point of entry for illegal pesticides. Once in to the European 
Union, as participant #06 described, “it has the ability to flow between countries”. 
 This secondary route of entry dovetailed neatly with the typical occurrence 
pattern (S=9, R=16) across Europe observed by participants. There was a consensus 
across the sample that the counterfeit pesticide problem is greatest at the eastern 
periphery gradually becoming less prevalent the further one moves west across Europe 
toward the UK and Scandinavia. As participant #02 described “It will vary from country 
to country… the further East you go the higher proportion of the market is illegal 
product”. Interestingly the same participant, along with participant #05 who had 
practical experience of trading with European companies, believed that there was also 
a greater prevalence of what might be described as classic deceptive counterfeits, that 
is to say those designed to look like a mainstream manufacturer’s product rather than a 
parallel traded product, the further toward the eastern periphery of Europe one looked. 
 Whilst the ‘further east the greater the problem’ maxim generally held good 
there was also evidence of particular hotspots occurring within this general pattern. At 
the time of the research there was particular concerns amongst manufacturers about 
the market in Germany and Poland, participant #06 saying that his company’s 
experience was that; 
 
“Germany's the biggest one that we're aware of where there are several 
thousand parallel products registered… if you talk to them off the record they 
will say that they believe that 75-80% of the parallel products in the marketplace 
in Germany are illegal. Yeah, publicly they'll talk about 30%. There's similar 
comments or similar findings in Poland… much lower level, or much lower 
number of parallel products registered in Poland… but the authorities have 
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shown that the range of illegality for parallel products in Poland is again 35 or 
40%”. 
 
 It was perhaps also significant that, as participant #06 had recognised, 
‘hotspots’ were generally identified whenever local authorities made a concerted effort 
to address the counterfeit pesticide problem, possibly a case of the problem only being 
recognised and acknowledged when enforcement agencies chose to engage with it. 
This reinforced a point made by both industry and enforcement participants; that 
estimating the true extent of a counterfeiting problem is hugely problematic. As 
participant #06 said, with something of an air of desperation; 
 
“You know you can’t go out and do market research of any meaningful level… 
there is some… what I say trustworthy data from farmers… but trying to do a 
meaningful survey of an illegal activity is almost impossible”. 
 
This difficulty in obtaining anything approaching accurate occurrence data was 
a recurring theme when participants discussed the likely incidence (S8, R12) in the 
UK. Manufacturing participant #06 was prepared to put the proportion of their own 
market lost to illegal parallel products as somewhere between three and seven percent, 
reflecting the narrative that the UK problem was significantly less than mainland 
Europe, he also suggested that other manufacturers may be losing much more of their 
market to illegal product, perhaps as much as thirty percent. The truth of this ‘our 
problem’ and ‘their problem’ disparity was impossible to determine because, as 
participant #04 conceded “it is difficult to get hard facts”. Indeed when asked to 
consider the integrity of occurrence data (S=4, R=6) no participant was prepared to 
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call it anything other than an ‘estimate’. The reality of gauging the proportion of the UK 
market lost to counterfeits was probably best summed up by participant #01 who 
simply recognised that “it’s like measuring an iceberg. There’s a bit on top you can see 
but there’s a lot you probably can’t”.  
That there was no standardised method of collecting occurrence data (S=5, 
R=12), and the consequential inability to speak with any confidence about the true 
magnitude of the problem, was clearly an issue of concern for a number of participants. 
As participant #01 conceded they were “struggling to put any meaningful data to this… 
it is guesswork”, a view reflected by several participants who similarly recognised a 
lack of means of market monitoring to identify potential or emerging counterfeit issues. 
The weakness of the data relating to counterfeit pesticides was discussed in the 
literature review. However, what was not shown in the review, at least in the context of 
the UK pesticide market, but emerged out of the stakeholder interviews were the 
reasons why reliable counterfeiting data was so hard to come by.  
 Participants spoke of the three key stakeholder groups who are collectively 
responsible for pesticide manufacture, distribution and use, each having a different set 
of concerns which underpin their reluctance to report counterfeit incidence. 
Manufacturers clearly recognise the reputational damage that might result from any 
high profile counterfeiting incident. As participant #03 very honestly acknowledged 
“pesticides do not have the best reputation anyway… we don’t want to make the 
situation any worse with regards to people’s views on pesticides” and “it only takes one 
coming into the food chain to have a long lasting effect”. These industry concerns were 
well summarised by participant #12 who believed that incident reporting is suppressed 
by all pesticide manufacturers because of the damage to a high value brand image that 
a counterfeit version being identified in the marketplace might cause.  
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 This desire amongst manufacturers to protect brand reputation was noted in the 
literature review when observed in other industries. However, what was not apparent in 
the literature was a similarly heighted sense of self-preservation amongst product 
distributors and an awareness of the potential collective consequences of a serious 
counterfeit pesticide incident. Out of this stemmed a clear sense of cross-industry 
responsibility, as participant #04 described; 
 
“I think there is also the issue that if a particular distributor, particularly a major 
distributor, has a batch of counterfeit product that the whole industry will be 
tarnished with a bad image… if that got into the media, particularly the national 
media, then that would be a big issue for the industry”. 
 
This closely mirrored manufacturer concerns, and indeed this sense of collective 
responsibility extended further. As participant #04 described when an incident does 
occur; 
 
“You find that if you do try and ask for evidence, and you say ‘I need you to give 
me some hard facts and information on volume batch numbers etcetera’ that 
you never get that information. It tends to disappear, and I think to some extent 
there is a concern that if a distributor grasses up another distributor then there 
may be some sort of war start. People do try and avoid that… they are not out 




Amongst the study participants there was also a view that farmers who fell victim to a 
counterfeit product were, as participant #01 put it, “very reluctant to tell you where 
they’ve bought it because they’re sort of embarrassed”. This was slightly different, but 
not incompatible, with the view of participant #03 who felt any reticence was 
consequential more to concern about being drawn into legal cases rather than simple 
embarrassment. This alternative view was more closely akin to the experience of 
participant #18, a farmer victim of a counterfeit pesticide incident, whose decision not 
to report was largely out of fear of losing assurance status on crops and the possibility 
that his land may be barred from food production for some length of time rather than 
any sense of embarrassment59. 
 Whilst there were diverse views across the key stakeholders with regards as to 
the industry’s ability to recognise occurrence or likely occurrence it was generally 
deemed to be poor (S=7, R=17). Besides the problem caused by the increasing quality 
of counterfeit products, which has already been discussed, several additional reasons 
for this inability to spot incidence were proffered. The first of these was expressed by 
participant #01 who explained that “the regulatory schemes around our industry are 
focused on giving us approval to sell… market monitoring and market controls by 
regulatory authorities are not very significant”. In addition to a lack of regulatory ‘spot-
checks’ or other proactive activity participant #06 suggested that the problem may be 
exacerbated when farmers are under economic pressure, circumstances “that may 
push some of them to tread the wrong side of the line to buy some of their inputs”. He 
added that this may go unrecognised because the industry lacks a system of horizon 
scanning to identify when economic trends are conducive to the counterfeiter in that 
famers might be more inclined to seek out a ‘bargain’. 
                                                          
59 This reluctance on the part of a farmer victim to report an incident was a key feature of the 
oral history interview a narrative summary of which appears later this section of the thesis.  
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 The potential for a high impact incident to occur as a consequence of a lack of 
market monitoring or economic horizon scanning was clearly a concern. This fear was 
compounded by several aggravating factors, not least that farmers are often sceptical 
of manufacturer derived warnings about counterfeit products, leaving them vulnerable 
because they fail to take reasonable precautions. As participant #07succinctly put it 
when the industry approach farmers with cautionary advice they are often met with a 
blanket “you would say that wouldn’t you” response. Moreover the industry’s capacity 
to convince any farmer post the event that they have been sold and have used a 
counterfeit product is limited, crop growth being affected by so many other variables. 
As participant #05 put it “it is quite difficult to pick out a difference in the field unless it is 
something quite big”, not surprising given what has already been said about current 
counterfeit quality. 
  Assuming that there was a failure to recognise likely incidence and take pre-
emptive action participants saw the likely consequences of counterfeit pesticides 
reaching the marketplace as numerous and, in extremis, having potentially life-
threatening consequences. Beyond the reputational impact already discussed the 
industry consequences (S=9, R=20) most readily recognised were economic. Putting 
aside the obvious cost of a loss of business and sales revenue, and the additional 
costs associated with constantly having to advance physical product anti-counterfeiting 
technology and pursue legal recourse against those that abuse intellectual property 
rights which was described by participants #01 and #02, there was also the less 
obvious costs of having to ‘pick up the pieces’. This was an issue that caused tangible 
irritation and sometimes anger amongst some stakeholders. As participant #02 
explained when a counterfeit pesticide incident was suspected on farm it was invariably 
the manufacturer of the product that the counterfeit pertained to be that the farmer or 
distributor contacted. Here the previously discussed potential reputational damage is 
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pertinent because manufacturers would most likely make good and take responsibility 
for storage and destruction of any remaining illicit product as a means of minimising 
any stigma by association. This was invariably an exercise that participant #12 
described as carrying a “massive” cost. 
 Beyond the financial consequences their own businesses and to the wider 
distribution sector stakeholder participants were well attuned to consumer risk factors 
(S=7, R= 17) and to the potential public consequences (S=3, R=13) associated with 
counterfeit pesticides. The economic risks posed to farm enterprises were, as might be 
expected, perceived to be not dissimilar to the manufacturing and distribution 
industries, that is to say predominantly centred on reputational impact. Participant #03 
recognised that should an incident be identified on farm then in all likelihood there 
would a withdrawal of any assurance status that might be held with an inevitable 
impact on the crop value60 or at extreme, as participant #04 pointed out, the entire crop 
being destroyed. It was interesting that participant #18 confirmed this fear when talking 
about why he had not reported the counterfeit pesticide incident on his own farm. Most 
importantly the on-farm risk runs much deeper because spray operators may be 
exposed to products that participant #06 said “can contain impurities, harmful solvents, 
and a range of other ingredients that would not be there in a legitimate manufacturer’s 
product”. Interestingly this risk to operator health was deemed to be greater on those 
farms that participant #03 described as “occasional users” of pesticides, notably those 
                                                          
60 Farm assurance schemes are mainly voluntary arrangements that guarantee defined 
standards of food safety or animal welfare. Often involving an element of certification many 
buyers of farm produced products, such as supermarkets, will only deal with enterprises that 
have assured status. A loss of status would therefore greatly diminish the value of a crop. It 
would be fair to say that such schemes increasingly dominate farming practice in the UK, 
including pesticide use. 
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in the livestock sector, rather than those that are regular users of such pesticides who 
are likely to have more experience of safe operating practice. 
 Turning to consider the potential environmental consequences of counterfeit 
products the damage that can be caused on farms was graphically described by 
participant #01;  
 
“We have videos of guys walking through dead maize and who knows what the 
hell’s gone onto the soil. And there's a... I think he's a French farmer… with a 
dead potato crop. You can see this on YouTube, dead potato crop, and he's 
talking about the land being poisoned. So, it can get as bad as that”.  
 
Whilst this particular example may not have been in the UK the principle held good 
particularly given that an example of environmental damage being caused in the UK 
was described by participant #18 and detailed in section 5.1.3 of the thesis. As 
participant #08, who has considerable experience of the dubious chemistry of 
counterfeit products, confirmed the constituent parts of such products are untested and 
their persistency in the soil is not known. Moreover he confirmed that the risk lies not 
just in the field because this unknown persistency opens up the possibility of the 
product finding its way into a watercourse and ultimately affecting, for example, fish 
stocks. 
 Once the residues of such products find their way beyond the field, be that 
through watercourse or crop, it creates a tangible risk to the general public. Again 
drawing on the expertise of participant #08, and talking about some of the constituent 




“[Regulatory authorities] have done various analysis and these products were 
banned because they are either known or suspected to cause cancer in 
humans. Therefore there is no safe residue level… they are not permitted in the 
food chain whatsoever in any shape or form. So, for an approved pesticide part 
of the field trial and the testing regime would be to determine what is a safe 
maximum residue level left in the land or left in the crop. It can’t exist for a 
banned product, there are no safe residue levels there”.  
 
Perhaps of even greater concern participant #08 also said that one of the products 
tested; 
 
“…contains a banned product at such a level that it is classed as a carcinogen 
causing cancer in humans and a mutagen, which means it will change DNA… 
cross the placental barrier and change the DNA of an unborn baby. Also a 
teratogen which means it will affect the DNA of the unborn baby and its future 
offspring as well. So this is serious stuff”. 
 
Asked if there was evidence to indicate that this product had found its way into the UK 
market participant #08 then confirmed that it had, and that there was a genuine risk of 
residues in the food chain. The enforcement case study to be found at Appendix 4 
gives a more detailed description of this product, its source, and how it found its way 
into the market.  
 Whilst some of the characteristics of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem 
described thus far were recognised in the literature, albeit in unsubstantiated and scant 
industry or media reporting, there were a number of significant factors which emerged 
151 
 
out of the stakeholder interviews that had not been previously recognised and which 
contradicted commonly held perceptions of the problem. First amongst these was that 
occurrence rates for counterfeit pesticides in the UK was very low, at least when 
compared too much of Europe. The scale of UK incidence must now be reconsidered 
in light of evidence presented by participant #08 who had obtained Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) financial data relating to one company and its network 
of subsidiaries that was suspected of distributing counterfeit pesticides under the guise 
of parallel trading. Having considered the evidence his view was that such was the 
scale of the likely fraud in this single example was sufficient evidence in itself to 
demonstrate that there was a significant under estimate of the UK problem (S=1, 
R=1).  
 In the period from March 2012 to December 2012 (ten months) this company 
imported over 3 million kilogrammes of a product into the UK that was declared as 
being for re-export. This product was not authorised for sale in the UK but it was 
suspected that it was destined to be sold as a parallel product into the UK market. 
Follow-up enquiries showed that only 220 kilogrammes had left the UK, the rest could 
not be accounted for. It was the view of participant #08 that this ‘missing’ product had 
entered the UK legitimate marketplace using the previously described process and 
illustrated both in the industry case study at Appendix 4 and in the ‘hornet’ model to be 
found at Appendix 5. Based on this incident participant #08 had considered the low UK 
incidence figure published by the ECPA and concluded that “the evidence shows that 
that figure was a wild underestimate”. His own view was that “the UK figure is more 
than 10%... certainly” which reflected a more widespread abuse of the parallel trading 
system than had been previously suggested and indicates a problem more closely akin 
to the rest of Europe. 
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 As has already noted scepticism about the efficacy of parallel trading rules was 
predominant amongst stakeholders but it was not unanimous. An alternative, and 
previously undocumented, perspective of the system, and one which contained some 
serious criticism of mainstream manufacturers, was also recognised amongst the 
expert views gathered. This defence of parallel imports (S=2, R=10) in the face of 
manufacturing company hostility toward the system was based upon a belief that while 
manufacturers are critical of the parallel trading rules, because they provide an 
opportunity for counterfeiters to exploit the market, they are also manipulating the 
regulations to their own benefit. Participant #09 described how he had personal 
experience of some manufacturers employing a “pricing corridor”, essentially a 
structure of price differentials across Europe. This was not necessarily meant as a 
complaint, because such differentials are the bedrock of legitimate parallel trading and 
without them there would be no profit to be made by moving product across Europe, 
and therefore there would be no incentive to trade. As participant #09 pointed out if a 
parallel trader identifies an opportunity created by a manufacture’s differential pricing 
regime and they wish to take advantage of that differential then regulations require that 
they make a permit application for each country from which they wish to acquire 
product to import into the UK. However, in practice a parallel trader will very likely go 
much further by making multiple applications in an attempt to disguise from the product 
manufacturer where they are actually intending to acquire product from. This practice 
was deemed necessary by participant #09 because he believed that manufacturers 
make considerable effort to identify where parallel product is being sourced and, having 
done so, they often make subtle variations to product formulation within that country. It 




“A bit of a blunt instrument and they do risk the EU commission if there is 
enough complaints saying ‘hang on a minute’, because theoretically you are 
meant to have a technical reason for a difference between EU countries 
but…[participant stopped talking]” 
 
The net consequence of this practice to the legitimate parallel importer was that if they 
continued to import product once this subtle formulation change has been made then 
they would technically be in breach of the requirement for a product imported under 
parallel import rules to be identical. A very similar product, which is what minor 
modifications to the pesticide formula would produce, would be deemed unacceptable 
in the eyes of the regulator. It was the view of participant #09 that this was the source 
of the UK ‘counterfeit’ problem; an industry generated issue designed to counter the 
economic challenge of parallel products61. 
 This alleged practice was not the only incidence of mainstream manufacturers 
being accused of manipulating parallel trading rules. Participant #05 described a 
practice that he had been witness to involving mainstream manufacturers actively 
colluding with what he described as “tame” parallel traders. He suggested that at the 
time he was involved it was not uncommon for a named manufacturer to “cut a deal” 
with an importer whereby they were supplied with product directly from the UK rather 
than from Europe and where he or she would “collect it from the factory gate”. This 
relationship allowed the importer to supply agreed amounts of legitimate product to his 
                                                          
61 This alleged practice was put to a manufacturer representative with knowledge of European 
wide product sales. Whilst he was not prepared to formally participate in the study he was 
willing to be cited on this particular point. He acknowledged that there may be technical reasons 
for minor inter-country product formulation variations but insisted that the practice was not used 
as an anti-parallel trade practice as has been suggested. 
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customers, at a price below the local market rate but more profitable than importing, 
whilst the manufacturer continued to segment the market. Participant #05 described 
this practice as a “back-to-back” registration62. Again it was suggested that regardless 
of the legality this was a restrictive practice and contrary to the spirit if not the letter of 
free trading rules.  
 Whilst these alleged practices remain unproven what was apparent was that 
legitimate parallel traders had not been averse to selectively pointing them out to 
farmers and growers. In doing so it had, as participant #09 observed, heightening 
consumer mistrust in what mainstream manufacturers are telling them about the “evils 
of parallel products” and as such may have inadvertently stimulated demand for such 
products.  
 Paradoxically despite the preoccupation on the part of some stakeholders with 
cross-European price differentials there was evidence to suggest that this was not the 
only, and possibly not the key consumer motivation for farmers buying parallel 
products (S=10, R=21). Indeed manufacturers were very keen to point out that 
differential pricing is largely a thing of the past. Participant #08 suggested that; 
 
“There may be some examples where there's a product that could be very 
expensive in the UK on a certain crop that was perhaps offered in another 
European country at a much lower price. That would be relatively rare because 
companies, you know, since the advent of the European Union and the 
harmonized market companies have recognised that if you have big price 
differentials between countries then that can be exploited quite legitimately by 
                                                          
62 This practice was witnessed in approximately 1998. The participant believed it was still 
happening but did not provide a more recent example.   
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the parallel trade so it's tended to... I know we certainly have had price 
harmonization. There are always some differences caused by VAT, different 
VAT levels and so on but broadly speaking I would expect most companies to 
have price harmonization which means that there's less than ten percent price 
difference”. 
 
As participant #04 noted this move toward price harmonisation was a pattern 
recognised by distributors, but interestingly not by those representing end users. Here 
we see an interesting difference of opinion with participant #03 believing that there 
were; 
 
“Clear disparities across member states in terms of the cost of products so 
there are disparities and there are situations where products are brought in to 
the UK at a premium but they are already potentially available on Europe and 
so actually it is a lot cheaper to get the parallel traded products”. 
 
Participant #03 continued by explaining that “small margins on high volume activities 
can make quite a significant difference” and that large farm enterprises will be 
constantly looking to the market for potential savings. This reflected the view of 
participant #07 who, speaking as a sometime distributor of parallel traded product, 
believed that there were some who will always buy the cheapest product on offer and 
“they won’t ask questions, they’ll just accept what they’ve been told it is”. 
 What is observed then is two very different understandings of the market; one 
that claims there is widespread if not universal price harmonisation and an alternative 
that suggests there is not. The latter would imply that price is still the defining feature of 
the trade in parallel pesticides, the former requires an alternative consumer driver. 
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Whilst not dismissing the argument that price differentials still exist, albeit at a much 
reduced level than was previously the case, a potentially more important influence over 
parallel product demand was recognised, and one that is compatible with growing price 
harmonisation - supply shortfall. As participant #02 explained; 
 
“If, for example, we had a major problem with a particular pest in the UK one 
year, and there was a shortage of product available on the UK market, then 
some canny person might say that they would do some parallel importing from 
France or Germany, or wherever, to fill that gap in the market. So that can 
happen then, that’s not price driven, its availability driven…” 
 
Participant #04 added to this in describing how shortfalls can occur as a consequence 
of unpredicted or unexpected weather or problems with a manufacturing facility to the 
extent that less product of a particular type is produced. That such shortfalls cannot be 
readily met was, as participant #03 explained, the result of widespread consolidation 
across the EU based pesticide industry with some companies having only a half or a 
quarter of the production plant facilities they had twenty years ago. Explaining the 
consequential lack of EU based manufacturing flexibility he continued; 
 
“We have seen presentations from the major agchem companies showing that 
some products may cross the Atlantic Ocean 2 or 3 times in the mixing 
production process. And they are batched produced… so you get a batch of 
production and there won’t be another batch produced for 6 months. They get 
their orders in, they get their levels in… so what we are seeing increasingly 




 Participant #01 contributed to this strand in pointing out that China, the believed 
source of the majority of counterfeit products, had undergone rapid growth in its 
chemical manufacturing capacity (including pesticides) giving much greater capacity to 
respond to product shortfalls when they occur. When an unanticipated spike in demand 
for a particular product occurs, producing the “gaps” that participant #03 referred to, 
then an opportunity is created for the parallel product trader. However, what was 
questioned by several participants including #05 was, in the circumstances described, 
the extent to which the legitimate parallel trade could fill these gaps. Given that product 
shortfall is rarely a localised event, “pucker parallels” as he described them are only 
likely to be available in small volumes across Europe, and they are unlikely to be cheap 
enough to make importing, repacking, and distributing them commercially viable. 
However, it seemed that these shortfalls are regularly met by parallel traded product. 
This prompted participant #02 to ask “you know, can it really be a genuine parallel 
import? No-one’s going to do it at a loss?” Interestingly it was in exactly these 
circumstances that farmer participant #18 acquired a product that was very likely to 
have been a counterfeit. 
 In terms of defending the UK market from such products it was apparent from 
the stakeholder interviews that considerable faith was placed on the integrity of the UK 
supply chain structure (S=8, R=29) to prevent illegal pesticide from reaching farms. A 
correlation between the typical European mainland trading pattern where the purchase 
of farm inputs is dominated by buying groups, seen for example in France, Spain and 
Italy, and a higher incidence of illegal parallel product was suggested by participant 
#04. Extended supply chains, such as those observed by participant #05 in Germany 
where product may be traded through a network of wholesale distributors before 
reaching the end user, were also seen as creating an opportunity for illicit product to 
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enter the legitimate market. A simple case of the more people involved in the 
distribution process then the greater the risk of interface with organised criminality. In 
sharp contrast participant #05 described the condensed supply chain that is more 
commonly seen in the UK; typically manufacturer, to distributor, and then directly to 
farm. As importantly there was a strong sense across the sample group that the UK 
pesticide supply sector is one built on a trusting relationship between the distributor, 
the farmer, and his or her agronomist and that this significantly reduced the risk of a 
counterfeit finding its way on to farm. A business relationship of twenty or thirty years 
was, as participant #04 pointed out, not unusual and, as #03 described; 
 
“A lot of people have established relationships with their agronomists… long 
standing relationships. We often joke is that people talk to their agronomist 
more than they talk to their wife. But it is true the relationship with the 
agronomist is very often very long standing working relationship”. 
 
Interestingly it was to an agronomist that farmer victim #18 turned for advice, rather 
than a representative of any enforcement agency, when he suspected he had been 
sold, and had used, an illegal pesticide.  
Participant #05 contrasted this with other parts of Europe;   
 
“As I say a farmer here will really do what he is told… almost. Whereas if you 
go to Eastern Europe I think counterfeits are easier because the manufacturers 
create a demand for the brand and the farmer is probably making a decision on 
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what he is going to do based on what he has read in the paper or seen at the 
local agricultural show or something. More than he would over here”. 
 
 That said this somewhat rosy characterisation of the traditional UK agricultural 
distribution network was moderated by an alternative view that all may not be what it 
seems. Participant #02, whilst very supportive of the distribution trade, was of the view 
that some dealers may not fully understand what parallel trading rules require of the 
importer in terms of a product being identical and, less widely appreciated, that it has to 
have been on the market in the country of origin in its final form (rather than imported in 
bulk). Participant #02 was certainly somewhat sceptical about “what the distributor is 
doing to make sure that they have got a genuine product”. This potential supply chain 
weakness was also recognised by participant #06 in whose experience it was the 
smaller distributors, rather than what he described as the national distributors, that 
provided the most ready market for the importer of counterfeit parallel products. 
Without defending their position participant #05 pointed out that these smaller 
distributors had been forced down the parallel trade route as industry consolidation had 
essentially squeezed them out, mainstream pesticide manufacturers preferring to deal 
with the handful of national distributors. This potential market for illicit product was seen 
as further facilitated by a suspicion about the true independence of agronomists 
working alongside some distributors. As participant #07 pointed out; 
 
“Farmers are under the control of their agronomists. The farmer will take their 
recommended prescription and do what that agronomist suggests and the 




The implication here was that a farmer would not necessarily question the source or 
legitimacy of the product they were being recommended to use, leaving them 
vulnerable to a counterfeit if the supplier or agronomist were not entirely above 
reproach. 
 Partly in defence of the legitimate advice and supply sector participant #09 
suggested that whilst dubious practice could be found it was not an endemic problem. 
His experience was that a single company was trading a very significant proportion of 
the illegal product entering the UK market, and this seemingly unhindered by regulation 
or enforcement; 
 
“They set up a company called [name redacted] which was going to do 
everything over the internet, which subsequently became [second name 
redacted]. I would estimate probably 60% or more illegal material is handled by 
[name redacted]. Because they do it as a buying group they don’t care. And as 
far as I can tell their farmers get offered… this is one product, this is the proper 
product [indicating two alternatives]… you make your choice”.  
 
It was the view of participant #09 that farmers dealing with this company were probably 
fully aware of the status of the product being offered, as he said “there are farmers that 
buy products pounds below… well, you can’t say you don’t know its hooky”. This view 
of a section of the market operating with clear knowledge of illegality was one 




“If someone offers you a 50 inch plasma screen in a pub for £15 it cannot be 
genuine. There is a market range for these products in terms of the price. If 
somebody is selling a branded product as two thirds the price of the branded 
product then I would say to a merchant come on, you have to be suspicious of 
this. Where has this product come from if it is supposed to be the branded 
stuff?” 
 
 Whilst it was the majority view that it was a small minority of distribution 
companies that were knowingly dealing in counterfeit product it was the view of some, 
including participant #07 that the problem was still “wide scale”. This begged the 
obvious question as to how such criminality is going unnoticed. It was a point 
addressed by participant #08, considering the position of enforcement agencies, who 
suggested that when an end user becomes suspicious; 
 
“Their recourse would be to the merchant to say ‘this product you sold isn’t 
working’, and the merchant would then give them another product in good faith 
because they are anxious to protect their customer and their good name”. 
 
He continued by suggesting that enforcement agencies would rarely even hear about it, 
as was again the case with farmer victim #18 who made no contact with the police or 
regulators even when he was certain that the product he had been sold was illegal. 
 This industry ‘closed circle’ goes some way to explaining the apparent 
invisibility of counterfeit pesticides in the UK marketplace, however, other factors 
emerged from the interviews which may contribute to the problem being hidden in plain 
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sight. The first of these recognises that the agricultural sector is not the only significant 
market for pesticides in the UK. Several participants were keen to point out that the 
demand for pesticides by the amenity market rivals that of the agricultural industry 
(S=4, R=10). As participant #21 put it “the amenity sector is huge… it is massive”, 
albeit the product range is much narrower, predominantly herbicides, participant #15 
noting that “there are fewer products approved for use than there are in agriculture”. 
Participant #16 exampled the range of the amenity use of pesticides in the UK:  
 Highways (local authorities); 
 The railways (Network rail); 
 Sports (playing fields, golf course etc.); 
 Service Stations; 
 Supermarkets; 
 Car Parks; 
 Woodland Management. 
 
He acknowledged that this was probably not a comprehensive list, but was able to 
state with confidence that the biggest single amenity user of pesticides was Network 
Rail with local authorities collectively accounting for the greatest proportion at 
something over half. Participant #16 went on to say that the amenity market would 
probably account for something in the order of 8-9% of total UK pesticide usage in the 
UK in any given year. 
 Despite its widespread use of such products the characteristics of the 
amenity pesticide market (S=4, R=12) were recognised as being markedly different 
from the agricultural sector. However, understanding the true nature of this market was 
seen as inherently problematic because reliable data is hard to come by. Participant 
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#21 described how “we can’t quite get the information like we can with the agricultural 
side of things… because there are just so many of them [amenity sector pesticide 
users] out there doing it”. This absence of data was probably due, as participant #21 
described, to “the amenity sector has always been just below the parapet, they’ve 
always just kept their heads down”. By contrast the agricultural sector was seen as 
being comparatively open about its pesticide use, a consequence, participant #22 
suggested, of the need to satisfy crop and food assurance schemes and, as participant 
#21 noted, the resulting need for total input traceability. There is no such traceability 
imperative for inputs in the amenity sector. 
 Several other marked differences to the agricultural sector were also described, 
including the absence of an equivalent to the advisor (agronomist) and the agricultural 
supplier trust relationship previously discussed, a factor highlighted by participant #16. 
Similarly the lack of a structured system of pesticide store inspection, which is integral 
to the majority if not all agricultural crop assurance schemes, was also commented 
upon. This second difference was deemed particularly significant by participant #21 
who pointed out, in referring to pesticide stores in the agricultural industry, that; 
 
“Someone is usually going in to inspect them on an annual basis to look at what 
they're doing, what the products are, what they look like. The store keepers are 
trained to identify potential counterfeit products coming into their store. The 
amenity industry have not got that”. 
 
 In considering the significance of the amenity market in the context of the 
counterfeit pesticide problem the characteristic that was foremost in the interview data 
was that weed control work is predominantly contracted out by authorities and 
corporate bodies, and that price is the overwhelming consideration in the awarding of 
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such contracts. As participant #22 pointed out when considering the consequences of 
the contracting out of, for example, roadside weed control; 
 
“When you've had a spike of weed growth contractors who in nine months of 
the year don't need to employ say ten knapsack sprayer operators all of a 
sudden they've got a requirement for five or six more people. They just take five 
or six more people off the dole or wherever… and they’re not necessarily 
qualified”.  
 
This lack of qualification on the part of casual spray operators, despite the regulatory 
requirement for training, was seen as a common cost reduction practice on the part of 
contractors and one that carried little risk of penalty. As participant #15 commented “it’s 
not policed… there’s no one around saying have you got, can I see, your qualification”.  
 The experience of participant #16 of this market had led him to conclude that 
there had been a growth in the number of knapsack operators because this was the 
cheapest way to control weeds. Those authorities or corporate bodies awarding 
contracts generally did so to those tendering the lowest price, and naturally those 
offering the cheapest price were able to achieve this by minimising their own costs. Not 
only did this result in the use of untrained operators as described but, as participant 
#21 had observed, it led them to find the cheapest available product source (S=4, 
R=6). Participant #16 described how large contract companies’ sub-contract to “man in 
a van” operators, and that these small operations generally acquire pesticides on the 
open or spot market. This may bring them into contact with sources that are not averse 
to trading illegal product. There was a general view that these sources were likely to be 
internet based, participant #21 describing how “there are so many companies out there 
supplying this market, putting the processes in place… the market must be there for it”. 
The fact that, to comply with the prevailing regulations, a purchaser acquiring 
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professional pesticides through an internet source must still hold the appropriate 
qualification seemed to matter little because;  
 
“You could buy it now from [named several on-line trading sites]. All that comes 
up is a little warning that says this is a professional pesticide. But you can still 
buy it, whether you’re qualified or not”63.   
 
Those participants with experience and knowledge of the amenity market were all 
asked if they believed this pattern of trading could provide opportunity for the pesticide 
counterfeiter to access the UK market. Unanimously they believed it could, participant 
#22 being typical in responding; 
 
“I would say so. I would say there are some very professional companies 
working in the amenity industry and they're purchasing products from 
distributors who work in the agricultural sector, so there is one very professional 
end of it. But then you've got the numerous smaller people who are accessing 
or purchasing product from unregulated sources and that's a concern”. 
 
Crucially participant #08 was also able to confirm that, looking at the same issue from 
the standpoint of pesticide regulation enforcement, the final link in the counterfeit 
pesticide supply chain in the UK was very often a named retailer that specialises in 
sales into the amenity market and has a significant online presence.  
 This sub-group of participants were particularly interesting because they 
                                                          
63 In the interest of testing this claim the author accessed the named sites and would, as 
suggested, have been able to purchase large quantities of a professional pesticide without any 
check of professional status or qualification. 
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illustrated very well a point that recurred throughout this phase of the research; that 
across the industry there exists is a great depth of industry knowledge and 
intelligence on the subject (S=4, R=7). This is self-evident from the narrative 
presented thus far, but what was surprising was that there appeared to be little in the 
way of facility to make use of that intelligence as a means of mitigating the 
counterfeiting problem. This issue was highlighted by participant #01, whose 
experience was that “the difficulty for an agency is gathering the intelligence to actually 
take action”. The emphasis here was very much on the problem of gathering, rather 
than any suggestion that the intelligence did not exist.  
 There was some industry suggestion that efforts had been made to liaise with 
enforcement agencies, but this seemed to have been almost exclusively outside of the 
UK and predominantly in support of Europol64 and the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF)65 sponsored initiatives. OLAF in particular had been active in addressing the 
rapid growth in high-quality counterfeits appearing in Poland and, as participant #01 
explained, manufacturers had supported this initiative both financially and in terms of 
relevant market information. Whilst several participants were aware of industry 
collaboration with CRD to address specific regulatory offences there was no evidence 
to suggest that any similar collaboration had occurred to share intelligence with other 
UK enforcement agencies and, more specifically, the police. With his longstanding 
                                                          
64 Europol, an abbreviation for the European Police Office, is the law enforcement agency of the 
European Union and is tasked with combating serious organised crime. It collates criminal 
intelligence from European Union member states as part of its remit. Europol has publicly 
commented on the growth in the trade in counterfeit pesticides and organised crime (Europol, 
2012). 
65 OLAF, from the French Office Europeén de Lute Antifraude, is the European Ant-fraud Office 
and is an agency of the European Union. Its primary task is tackle fraud affecting the EU budget 
and its activities in relation to counterfeit pesticides recognises that this trade generates large 
illicit profits and significant losses of tax revenue. The initiative referred to by participants 
resulted in the seizure of 21 tonnes of counterfeit and illicit pesticides (OLAF, 2014).  
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experience of enforcement practices in the field of counterfeit pesticides participant #08 
was able to say with confidence that the police held primary responsibility for 
investigating the fraud element of this crime. This failure to properly engage with 
enforcement agencies was recognised as a shortcoming. As participant #05 
suggested;  
 
“It does need an enforcement agency. It doesn’t need to be a vast agency. It 
needs somebody who will take responsibility for picking up the intelligence, 
making the analysis, and then coming up with a case that will stick…” 
 
It was somewhat ironic then that participant #08 should point out that “the difficulty for 
an agency is gathering the intelligence to actually take action” despite the fact that the 
value of such intelligence was universally recognised. Participant #01 exampled the 
potential of intelligence as a preventative tool saying “the more intelligence we build the 
more we can indicate to markets that illegal product is on its way”. However, there was 
a strong sense that not only does intelligence not reach enforcement agencies but it is 
rarely discussed let alone shared within the industry.  
 Any notion that there might be industry collaboration to tackle this problem 
through the collective use of intelligence was effectively dismissed because of what 
might be described as constrained knowledge sharing (S=6, R=8). This was well 
summarised by participant #04 who, when talking about the problem, said “of course 
we never discuss it with the trade association because of anti-competitive laws”66. 
                                                          
66 United Kingdom statute concerning competitive practices is largely contained within the 
Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. In this case, because of the pan-European 
nature of the pesticides industry, there is a further European element and a number of Articles 
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Referring to legal constraints on any business practice that might restrict free trading 
participant #06 explained;  
 
“It's been problematic for us…we've tried to, we've tried to do some of this in the 
past but we've always... you know, we've always consulted with our legal teams 
who've said that we shouldn't share information as an industry directly with 
each other”.  
 
 This commonly held view overwhelmingly influenced the way intelligence concerning 
counterfeit products in the market place was managed by manufacturing companies 
and trade associations. However, it was not universally recognised as a complete 
barrier to cooperation. There was an alternative industry view, typified by participant 
#13, that the strict interpretation of the rules by commercial lawyers unnecessarily 
hindered “the exchange of operational information on crime”. Moreover participant #12, 
who had a great deal of experience in the handling of commercially derived 
intelligence, suggested that such concerns could be overcome by placing the collation 
of intelligence in the hands of a trusted independent third party. What was also clear 
was that despite the collective sense of impotency in relation to the use of intelligence 
the industry had made considerable efforts in other directions to reduce the risk posed 
by counterfeit products. 
 In terms of a response strategy (S=10, R=33) stakeholder focus was very 
much on regulatory and legislation change. There was substantial evidence of a 
growing anger with the prevailing regulatory framework and its inability to protect 
                                                          
within the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) deal specifically with unfair 
business practice.  
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legitimate manufacturers. Certainly some saw themselves as the victims rather than 
beneficiaries of rules designed to protect free trade within the EU. Regulations that 
allow products to be shipped in constituent parts relatively unhindered were recognised 
as a direct threat to legitimate manufacturers and were described by participant #01 
quite bluntly as “a stupid law”. It would be fair to say that across manufacturer 
stakeholders it was reform of the rules and regulations pertaining to parallel trading that 
overwhelmingly dominated thinking as to how the UK counterfeit pesticide problem 
should be tackled.  However, such reform was not seen as being a universally good 
thing. Participant #09, an experienced trader in parallel products, pointed out that this 
would certainly impact upon legitimate traders in parallel import pesticides, to the 
extent he suggested that some would cease to trade. However, such changes would 
not necessarily influence the counterfeiter because “if you are determined to act 
illegally none of this affects you in the slightest”. Understanding this potential impact on 
legitimate parallel traders was not raised as a concern by mainsteam manufacturers, 
who, as participant #09 also pointed out, see such traders as a commercial threat. 
 Whilst regulatory change dominated stakeholder attention other potential 
means of responding were recognised. This included raising end user awareness of 
the threat posed by counterfeit pesticides (S=10, R=33). Amongst the initiatives 
mentioned by participants, including #02, the most prominent was the Watch out! For 
illegal pesticides campaign lead by The Voluntary Initiative67.  Launched in January 
2014 the campaign, as participant #03 described, was intended to make end users 
aware of the threat to the extent that they might “push back if there were questions in 
                                                          
67 The Voluntary Initiative is an industry sponsored group which promotes the responsible use of 
pesticides. It has its origins in a proposal put to Government in 2001 by the farming and crop 
protection industry to minimise the environmental impacts from pesticides (The Voluntary 
Initiative, n.d.).  
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their minds”68. This industry backed campaign met with universal approval amongst 
those who were aware of it, however, some, including participant #06, believed that 
regulatory authorities should be similarly active saying that;  
 
“I think from a pesticide regulatory point of view the authorities can do a lot 
more to communicate to farmers and to the distribution channel about the risks 
of illegal and counterfeit pesticides…”  
 
 Other response strategies identified by participants included internal company 
initiatives, common to all the manufacturers in some shape or form. Broadly these were 
split into preventative measures, such as security features on packaging like the 
intaglio labels69 described by participant #01, and post event measures, typified by 
participant #06 who described how company expertise would be employed on a case 
by case basis to determine whether an incident of their product being counterfeited 
should attract further investigation and potentially legal action (assuming enough 
evidence could be found). However, there was a noticeable lack of emphasis on 
company sponsored initiatives to influence consumer motivation with regards to 
counterfeits. Manufacturers, and perhaps more commonly representative trade bodies, 
were actively campaigning for a change in the rules pertaining to parallel trading, and 
                                                          
68 At the point at which the interviews took place no follow-up research had been conducted by 
the Voluntary Initiative to ascertain the effectiveness of the campaign. 
69 Intaglio printing is a method that essentially embosses the surface of a pesticide container 
leaving a heavy ink deposit. It is a relatively expensive process because the etched impression 
cylinders cost tens of thousands of pounds to produce, but it is regarded as a sophisticated 
security technique. However, some have suggested that a similar effect which would deceive 




specifically as participant #02 noted for the rule allowing the re-packaging of pesticides 
on import to be removed. This was accompanied by a desire, typified by participant 
#06, for much greater penalties to be made available to prosecutors. Whilst it was 
suggested that this may act as a deterrent to would be counterfeiters this was 
tempered by an acknowledgement that higher penalties are largely irrelevant unless 
enforcement agencies actively engage with the problem, and the prevailing view was 
that they did not. With this in mind, and in addition to the need to share intelligence 
which has already been discussed, there was a belief amongst participants that there 
was an urgent need for greater enforcement agency awareness of the problem both 
at strategic and at operational levels (S=2, R=4). This was made clear by participant 
#06 when exclaiming that “there’s a hole in the ship and, you know, water is coming in. 
We have to do something about it”. He continued “we really need to step up the work 
with customs and police and, you know Trading Standards, whatever it may be to 
effectively act against illegal pesticides”. 
 In seeking evidence of any corresponding enforcement agency engagement 
with the counterfeit pesticide problem (S=7, R=27) it was apparent that industry 
participants had firm views as to what was required but could offer little evidence of any 
tangible response. Participant #06 summed up the prevailing industry sentiment when 
he described enforcement agencies as being largely naïve about this problem and 
certainly unclear as to their individual areas of responsibility. Whilst there was some 
evidence, such as that provided by participant #01, of industry cooperating with the 
Health and Safety Executive under the auspices of CRD this regulatory enforcement 
body was generally seen as being poor at conducting action against offenders. 
Participant #05 suggested that “CRD aren’t very good at bringing cases… most of them 
fail at some point or another”. Beyond this limited engagement participants were 
sceptical about the extent to which it is currently possible to work with any of the 
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relevant agencies. Participant #01 was of the opinion that Trading Standards were 
“used to wellies with holes in the bottom and cleaning products that don’t work” but 
were not used to this scale and complexity of offending. Interestingly the lack of 
Trading Standards operational appreciation of this issue was discussed by participants 
#14 and #17, who confirmed that they had no documented case of their having dealt 
with a counterfeit pesticides case. The police were also seen as being ignorant of the 
scale or potential impact of this crime. Participant #01 recognised a pressing need for 
operational police officers to be made aware of the threat posed by counterfeit 
pesticides to the general public because, as participant #06 put it, “there’s been a polite 
indifference, a lack of recognition of the scale of the problem… frankly really 
complacent”. 
 This seeming lack of police engagement was the subject of interviews with 
those responsible for the setting of the police rural crime priorities within the sample 
police force (S=4, R=10). Out of these interviews emerged evidence that this failure on 
the part of the police to even recognise the UK counterfeit pesticide problem may be a 
direct consequence of the very narrow scope of what they deem to be rural offending. 
Certainly within the sample force the strategic perception of what constitutes rural 
crime was very narrow. At least in part this may be attributed to the inherently 
problematic nature of defining what was meant by the very term. As participant #19 
acknowledged, when describing how the parameters of rural crime recording were set 
within this large non-metropolitan police force;  
 
“What it actually came down to was almost crimes against the farming 
community. CCMT [Chief Constable’s Management Team] did consider looking 
at a location base and defining a neighbourhood or a part of an LPA [Local 
Policing Area] as rural by definition. They chose not to go down that route... 
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because you bring in lots of stuff that's not peculiar to the rural community. It's 
terribly, terribly complex”.  
 
 
He went on to explain that with their own chosen definition “we basically ended up with 
crimes being committed in an agricultural environment”. More precisely; 
 
“By narrowing it down to looking at the farm and agricultural community you do 
get a sense of something that is peculiar to the rural location… so we ended up 
with something like farm machinery. Easy to define, easy to say, well, that was 
a deliberate act against specialist equipment which is peculiar to the rural 
community”.  
 
It was a conundrum recognised by participant #20 who, when asked to consider how 
inclusive the chosen definition really was, replied; 
 
“It's a very difficult question to answer. There was a particular sort that you 
could define as rural crime and it was the nicking of tractors and agricultural 
machinery, and hare coursing... which you could put firmly into the rural crime 
bracket. But the fact was it [rural crime] extended beyond that”.  
 
The inclusion of hare coursing was of considerable interest because, as participant #20 
explained, “things like hare coursing, which per se aren’t major crimes, very often are a 
precursor to more serious crime”. It was a feature that participant #19 explained had 
led to this crime being included in the force’s rural crime strategy specifically because 
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of its links to wider OCG activity. 
Having recognised the limited scope of their force’s definition of rural crime 
when asked to consider what had influenced it both participant #19 and #20 
acknowledged the influence of a third party organisation; the National Farmers Union 
(NFU), and more specifically its sister organisation responsible for insurance activities 
the NFU Mutual. Participant #20 described how using insurance company data 
concerning the theft of equipment from farms provided a pragmatic measure of 
‘success’ in terms of rural policing; 
 
“National Farmers Union Mutual insurance claims were down 19% in [name of 
police force] last year... they went up 5% nationally. So, rural crime has been 
reduced substantially in the [name of police force] because we've made an 
effort and we've joined it up... we made a huge effort to stop the theft of heavy 
plant and machinery”.  
 
 
Participant #19 was clear that this link between ‘rural crime’ and ‘farm theft’ would 
probably strengthen, to the extent that the NFU would become the de facto arbiter of 
rural policing performance, suggesting that; 
 
“For next year I’ve recommended to CCMT that to judge rural crime, and any 
changes in rural crime, we go to a partner agency, the NFU, and ask for their 
data because when they published their claims data this year 2014 it was a very 
positive picture”. 
 
Participant #19 continued by explaining that this approach was necessary “because 
they [senior management] all want data, they all want numbers” and “in terms of 
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churning over data that’s reliable the most reliable data is if NFU [Mutual] aren’t paying 
out then we’re making a difference”.  
 
 It seems then that, at least at a strategic policing level, there is a demonstrable 
link between an insurance company, with its focus on theft from farms, and the 
approach to rural policing adopted by at least one police force with a significant rural 
responsibility. The qualitative Freedom of Information Act request element of the study 
was designed to expand the data on the strategic police rural crime focus by examining 
the extent to which other police forces have considered what constitutes ‘rural crime’ 
and whether any associated policy or strategy is sufficiently inclusive to accommodate 
the counterfeit pesticide problem. Given the findings of the in-depth interviews the data 
was also examined for evidence of a similar focus on theft from farms. 
 
 
5.1.2 Qualitative Freedom of Information Act requests 
 Designed to determine the extent to which the trade in counterfeit pesticides is 
either recognised in police rural crime policy or can be readily accommodated by such 
policy Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) requests were sent to the forty five police 
forces in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Forty two forces 
responded, of which fourteen forces had a definition of rural crime and an associated 
policy/strategy. Of the remainder five forces had defined their understanding of what 
rural crime meant but did not have an associated policy/strategy, and four forces had a 
policy/strategy but lacked a clear definition of what constituted rural crime. Nineteen 
forces had neither definition nor policy/strategy70. A summary of these returns can be 
                                                          
70 It is worth noting that in the analysis of police forces undertaken to identify a suitable subject 
force for in-depth interviews, and described in the research methodology, a number of forces 
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found at Table 5.3. Where a response included an additional narrative this was also 
considered as part of the qualitative data71. As with the results of the in-depth 
interviews the data categories (nodes) that emerged from data coding are given in 
Table 5.1 and are shown in bold in the summary that follows along with the number of 
sources (S) and the total number of references (R) to the node subject. 
In seeking evidence of a national police definition of rural crime and associated 
policy (S=13, R=14) there was very little consistency across forces. Some, including 
Bedfordshire Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary, Northamptonshire Police, and 
Thames Valley Police, had adopted either in whole or in a personalised form a draft 
definition that the Association of Chief Police Officers had promulgated in 2014. The 
Northamptonshire Police version closely reflected the original, recognising a crime as 
being ‘rural; 
 If the offence occurred at a farm barn, farm shop, farm building, farm yard, farm 
house, farm field, fish farm, field, stable, barn or outbuilding; 
 Or the property involved is agricultural machinery, agricultural tools, fencing, 
hay/straw, heating oil and red diesel, horses and or tack, horse boxes or 
livestock;  
 And the offence is burglary, robbery, theft or criminal damage. In addition, 
wildlife offences, hare coursing and poaching offences are covered within this 
definition. 
                                                          
were identified that were almost entirely urban in character. Including the Metropolitan Police, 
Greater Manchester Police, West Midlands Police, Merseyside Police, and the City of London 
Police these forces, for obvious reasons, had neither definition nor policy associated with rural 
crime. 
71 FoIA requests to the police and their responses are made publicly available, generally on the 






Request directed to: Rural crime definition Assoc. policy/strategy 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary Y Y 
Bedfordshire Police Y Y 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary Y N 
Cheshire Constabulary Y Y 
City of London Police N N 
Cleveland Police N N 
Cumbria Constabulary Y Y 
Derbyshire Constabulary Y N 
Devon and Cornwall Police Y Y 
Dorset Police Y Y 
Durham Constabulary N N 
Essex Police Y Y 
Gloucestershire Constabulary N Y 
Greater Manchester Police N N 
Hampshire Constabulary Y Y 
Hertfordshire Constabulary N N 
Humberside Police N N 
Kent Police Y N 
Lancashire Constabulary N Y 
Leicestershire Police N Y 
Lincolnshire Police N N 
Merseyside Police N N 
Metropolitan Police Service N N 
Norfolk Constabulary Y Y 
North Yorkshire Police Y Y 
Northamptonshire Police Y N 
Northumbria Police N N 
Nottinghamshire Police Y Y 




Suffolk Constabulary N N 
Surrey Police N N 
Sussex Police No response  
Thames Valley Police Y Y 
Warwickshire Police Y Y 
West Mercia Police Y Y 
West Midlands Police N N 
West Yorkshire Police N N 
Wiltshire Police N N 
Police Scotland No response  
Dyfed-Powys Police N N 
Gwent Police N N 
North Wales Police N Y 
South Wales Police N N 
PSNI No response  
Table 5.3: Summary of responses to qualitative police FoIA requests (Y=yes, N=no). 
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This definition arguably prejudices any crime that takes place in the rural 
setting, and has a significant rural connotation, but does not occur on a farm or similar 
establishment. Moreover the focus is very much on property related crimes, with some 
degree of acknowledgement of wildlife crimes. Moreover where forces had chosen to 
create their own definition by and large they also reflected this bias toward property 
crime. This was epitomised by Dorset Police who stated that; 
 
“The working definition of rural crime operated by Dorset Police is any ‘non-dwelling 
burglaries’ and ‘theft other’ offences which occur within any of the 5 Dorset Police 
sections defined as rural”. 
 
A similar sentiment was to be found in the Kent, where the police had concluded that; 
 
“Rural Crime is a broad encompassing title that generally refers to the theft of 
farm equipment, destruction of property and harm or theft of livestock. It also 
includes wildlife crime, environmental crime and heritage crime and is defined 
for recording purposes by its geographical location”. 
 
Perhaps the narrowest focus on theft was to be found in Norfolk Constabulary where 
the Constabulary’s Joint Performance and Analysis Department had, for the purposes 
of crime recording, deemed rural crime to be the “theft of tools/farm 




 One notable exception to this pattern of narrow perception was observed in the 
Cheshire Constabulary definition which acknowledged that many of the crimes that 
occur in an urban setting will also occur in the rural setting but may be experienced 
differently by virtue of location. Nonetheless even the most encompassing definition of 
rural crime did not include any emerging technical crimes such as counterfeit 
pesticides. Indeed one force, Nottinghamshire Police, essentially dismissed the 
problem as being entirely outside of their remit suggesting that the issue should be 
referred to another agency (S=1, R=1) saying; 
 
“Counterfeit pesticides are unlikely to be treated as rural crime and such 
matters are dealt with by other enforcement/regulatory bodies, much the same 
as counterfeiting of other goods”. 
 
 Nevertheless, and despite this apparent dismissal of the problem as anything to 
do with the police, there was some evidence of the rural crime/organised crime link 
(R=7, S=13) being recognised and the consequential need for intelligence gathering. 
As Hampshire Constabulary state; 
 
“Organised crime is not just an urban phenomenon. The potentially high 
financial rewards, combined with the general remoteness of rural locations, 





Perhaps understandably (for reasons of not wishing to disclose police tactics) very little 
was found in the responses to suggest how the police would respond to the OCG link. 
However, Lancashire Constabulary had published an overall strategy which was that; 
 
“Organised crime groups will be mapped and monitored by both Force and local 
intelligence units. Actions will be tasked to the most appropriate resource for 
disruption and investigation into their criminal activity. This will incorporate the 
use of specialist departments such as Ports Unit and the Serious and 
Organised Crime Unit”.  
 
 Aside from this recognition there was also some evidence of police forces being 
willing to step beyond the core policing function when a particularly insidious and 
specifically rural crime was identified. Hare coursing (S=5, R=5) is a practice outlawed 
under The Hunting Act 2004 and crucially it is an activity where forces have forged a 
link between it and more serious offending. In those forces with a significant rural area 
it is a crime that attracts considerable attention despite it being an offence that, more 
often than not, is investigated by a non-police prosecuting agency72. Moreover, the 
same force that dismissed counterfeit pesticides as not being a police problem, 
Nottinghamshire Police, saw fit to encompass hare coursing in its definition of rural 
crime. Given the seemingly narrow property crime focus of rural policing this may be 
significant for the future policing of the counterfeit pesticide problem if it is indicative of 
                                                          
72 Hare coursing is an offence that is regularly investigated by the RSPCA who have pursued 




a widespread police willingness to engage with non-core policing matter, at least where 
it can be shown that there is the potential to impact upon organised criminality. 
 
5.1.3 Oral history interview 
 This phase of the research was designed to address an obvious gap in the 
literature; there was no documented case study of a counterfeit pesticide being sold to 
and subsequently used on a UK farm (research Q.3). To address this gap an interview 
was conducted with a farmer victim who agreed to share his experience. The results of 
this interview were both coded and formed part of the stakeholder interview data, and 
will be used as a source of example in the discussion chapter of the thesis. It is 
presented here as a narrative summary without further comment: 
Study participant #18 farms in the subject police force area, his enterprise 
consisting predominantly of combinable crops (in the order of 200 hectares). His crop 
rotation includes spring oil seed rape (SOSR) for which his planned pesticide spray 
regime includes the use of a pre-emergence herbicide for broad-leaved weed control. 
He has a favoured product for this purpose but at the time of the incident now 
described, which occurred the year prior to the start of this study, climatic conditions 
over the autumn and winter had led to a significant increase in the amount of SOSR 
being planted. This had generated a high demand for this particular product and it was 
in short supply. 
Participant #18 is a member of a buying group, through which he normally 
purchases crop inputs including pesticides73. Responding to the lack of product 
                                                          
73 Farmer buying groups tend to be farmer owned and controlled and may operate as a mutual 
co-operative and be non-profit making. They are sometimes known as supply co-operatives 
where their function is solely to aggregate purchases, store, and distribute farm inputs.  
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availability the buying group sourced and offered what they described as the same 
product acquired through the parallel trade, which had originally been offered for sale 
elsewhere within the European Union. The product carried an alternative name given 
by the importer, as is common practice and allowed under parallel trading rules. 
The product was used in the normal course of events ostensibly without 
incident. However, participant #18 became suspicious that something was amiss when 
a noticeable amount of vegetation some distance beyond the boundaries of the 
sprayed area became bleached. This included a number of well-established trees. He 
was also concerned that the product had not worked as well as he would have 
expected; there had, for instance, been some noticeable crop damage. However, 
because he had no practical means of benchmarking its efficacy he had no way of 
knowing if this was actually the case. 
His suspicions were further heightened when a neighbour to the farm 
complained that, following application of the product on nearby fields, a number of 
shrubs in his garden had suffered similar bleaching damage. Ordinarily this might have 
been attributed to spray drift, but on inspection the pattern of damage indicated that 
this was unlikely, the seemingly random pattern being entirely atypical. Coincidentally 
at about the same time participant #18 also attended a farm walk on another farm in 
the area where the host made comment that he had also used this alternative product, 
sourced from the same buying group, and that he had experienced considerable 
blocking of the nozzles on his sprayer74. Whilst talking to this farmer participant #18 
looked beyond the boundaries of the fields where this product had been used and he 
                                                          
74 Industry and media coverage of the potential consequences of using a counterfeit pesticide 
often contains a warning that such products are prone to blocking sprayer nozzles and are 
therefore less effective and can result in costly repairs. See for example Garvey (2014). 
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noticed similar plant damage to that he had experienced on his own farm, again this 
included some mature trees which were noticeably bleached down one side. 
This particular herbicide’s mode of action is through the inhibition of the 
biosynthesis of photosynthetic pigments leading to leaf bleaching on susceptible weed 
species within the sprayed area. The damage could therefore be reasonably attributed 
to the active ingredient in the herbicide. Importantly this particular ingredient is known 
for its volatility. However, in order to reduce the possibility of evaporates drifting beyond 
the target area and causing the type of damage described above this active ingredient 
is microencapsulated75. This particular product was described by the manufacturer in 
their product literature as incorporating ‘advanced microencapsulated technology’, this 
being one of its key selling points. 
Participant #18 is a very experienced user of commercial pesticides, being 
BASIS trained and registered76, and he suspected that the prevailing weather 
conditions may have been significant. At the time of the product being used there had 
been a series of very warm, still days with a significant drop in the overnight 
temperature. The land he farms is susceptible to localised temperature differences – 
there are often noticeable warm and cold spots when walking across fields at night, 
particularly during periods of marked day/night temperature contrast. Participant #18 
suspected that the consequential advection of air, containing the product evaporates, 
was most likely to have been responsible for the seemingly random pattern of non-
target plant damage. Naturally he complained to the manufacturer, acknowledging that 
                                                          
75 Microencapsulation is a technique used in numerous manufacturing processes, including 
some pesticides. It involves particles or droplets being surrounded by a coating to prevent the 
degradation, or in this case the volatilization, of the active ingredient. 




this had been a parallel traded product but pointing out that this was still their product 
albeit repackaged and rebranded by the importer. He suggested that the 
microencapsulation process had failed and as a consequence volatilization had 
occurred and that this was responsible for the observed non-target plant damage.  
The company was sympathetic but explained that, despite this being sold as a 
parallel product, they had experience of the parallel trader responsible for the import 
(which was not the farmer buying group from which the product was purchased) and 
that this was probably not a genuine product. They further suggested that it was likely 
to be a copy product that did not have the microencapsulation technology. 
Subsequently a representative of the manufacturer of the genuine product visited the 
farm and inspected the damage stating that it was, as far as he was concerned, “a 
classic case”. Following this conversation participant #18 was obviously alarmed 
because it appeared that he had been supplied with and had used a counterfeit 
product. In an attempt to try and either confirm or dismiss this possibility he laboriously 
went through his accumulated waste product packaging and found the cardboard 
containers within which the herbicide bottles had originally been delivered. He then 
peeled back the English printed label on the box to reveal a smaller label underneath. 
He describes this label as being printed in what he believed to be Russian or a similar 
Slavic language.  
In subsequent conversations with the genuine product manufacturing company 
participant #18 gathered that they had tried to do something about this counterfeit 
product, having gone as far as taking legal proceedings against the importer. 
Unfortunately, and despite a lengthy and expensive legal process, at court the Judge 
had failed to recognise the distinction between a ‘counterfeit’ and a ‘parallel’ product 
and the action had been unsuccessful. The third party company had therefore 
continued to trade. 
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When questioned about his actions on discovering what appeared to be a case 
of counterfeit pesticide on his farm participant #18 conceded that he consciously chose 
not to escalate the matter to the police or any other enforcement body. His rationale 
was simple; having talked to his agronomist in confidence he had concluded that if it 
proved to be a fake product there was no way of knowing what the personal 
consequences of “making a fuss” might be. Moreover he suggested that his fears, 
which included potential crop destruction, a loss of assurance scheme status and, at 
worst, his land being condemned for food crop production for some considerable period 
of time, were ones that would be shared by many if not all farmers. To use his own 
words in these circumstances “no-one is going to put their head above the parapet” 
and “I certainly don’t want to be the one carrying the can with no idea of the eventual 
outcome”.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the quantitative data  
5.2.1 Awareness survey 
  This element of the research was designed to ascertain the extent to which 
operational police officers and staff working in a police force with a significant rural area 
and farming population were cognisant of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem 
(research Q.7). To that end the survey compared police awareness to two other subject 
groups; professional users of pesticides and a group consisting of individuals with no 
professional interest in the problem. Analysis of the resulting data tested two 
hypothesise; 
 That police officers and staff awareness of counterfeit pesticides would not be 
as good as those who work with pesticides in a professional capacity but would 
be better than the general public (control group); 
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 That of those police officers and staff who were aware of counterfeit pesticides 
their self-declared knowledge of the problem would not be as good as those 
who work with pesticides in a professional capacity but would be better than the 
general public (control group). 
 
 The first of these hypothesise was tested by way of Q.9 of the survey to be 
found at Appendix 3 which asked participants for a simple Yes/No response to the 
question: Are you aware that pesticides made by legitimate manufacturers are 
sometimes illegally copied and sold? The results, by participant group, are shown at 
Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Response to survey question: Are you aware that pesticides made by 
legitimate manufacturers are sometimes illegally copied and sold? Results shown by % 
Yes/No for each subject group. 
Subject group n= No  Yes  
Control group 290 67.54 32.46 
Police staff 115 62.28 31.72 
Pesticide users 647 42.61 57.39 
 
 
Using the method of analysis described in section 4.2.2 of the thesis the police officers 
and staff group was compared separately to the other two subject groups to test if they 
were identically distributed. A screen capture of the SPSS output for the Mann-Whitney 
tests (test rank and test statistics) for the two comparisons is given at Appendix 6. 
Comparing the police staff awareness to that of professional pesticide users at a 
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significance level of 0.05 as hypothesised there was a difference between these two 
groups (two sided Mann-Whitney u test, p<0.05). Referring to Table 5.4 this difference 
was in favour of the pesticide user group having the higher level of awareness. 
However, when comparing the police awareness to the control group, again at a 
significance level of 0.05, contrary to the hypothesis there was no difference (two sided 
Mann-Whitney u test, p>0.05).  
 The results of the survey demonstrated that in the sample area awareness of 
the counterfeit pesticide problem amongst police officers and staff was lower than that 
of professional pesticide users and in fact was no better than that of a control group 
representing the general public. These results are presented graphically in Figure 5.1 
which clearly shows these results.  
 Turning to consider the self-declared knowledge amongst those who were 
aware of the counterfeit pesticide problem this was tested by way of Q.11 of the survey 
to be found at Appendix 3. This question asked participants: How would you describe 
your personal knowledge of the threat posed to UK agriculture by counterfeit 
pesticides? Participant response was constrained using a Likert response scale with 
the options:  Poor or none, fair, good, or very good. The results, shown by participant 






Figure 5.1: Response to survey question: Are you aware that pesticides made by 
legitimate manufacturers are sometimes illegally copied and sold? Graphical 







Table 5.5: Response to survey question: How would you describe your personal 
knowledge of the threat posed to UK agriculture by counterfeit pesticides? Results 
shown by % response for each Likert scale option by subject group. 
Subject group n= Poor/None Fair Good Very 
good 
Control group 211 52.13 37.91 6.64 3.32 
Police Staff 91 57.14 32.97 7.69 2.26 
Pesticide users 67 61.19 34.33 1.49 2.99 
 
  
 Again the police staff group were compared separately to the other two subject 
groups to test if they were identically distributed. A screen capture of the SPSS output 
for the Mann-Whitney tests (test rank and test statistics) for the two comparisons is 
given at Appendix 6. Comparing the police staff awareness to that of the pesticide 
users group and the control group at a significance level of 0.05 contrary to the 
hypothesis there was no difference to either (two sided Mann-Whitney u test, p>0.05).  
 The results of the survey, which are well illustrated in graphical form at Figure 
5.2, demonstrate that in the sample area the self-declared knowledge of the counterfeit 
pesticide problem, amongst police staff who had previously declared that they were 
aware of the problem, was the same as those who were aware of the problem in both 
the professional pesticide users group and the control group representing the general 
public. The true significance of this result only becomes apparent when considering at 
what level this homogeneity of awareness lies; the bias is firmly toward all those who 
were aware of the problem, including professional users of pesticides, declaring that 






Figure 5.2: Response to survey question: How would you describe your personal 
knowledge of the threat posed to UK agriculture by counterfeit pesticides? Graphical 








 In summary then the results of the survey demonstrated that awareness of the 
UK counterfeit pesticide problem amongst police officers and staff is no better than the 
general public and, as impotantly, despite industry campaigns and widespread media 
coverage well over half of all of those who are aware of the problem, including 
professional pesticide users, believe their knowledge of the problem to be poor or 
none. 
 
5.2.2 Word cluster analysis 
 Having considered by way of stakeholder interviews and FoIA requests whether 
the UK counterfeit pesticide problem is addressed at a strategic and policy level the 
word cluster analysis was designed to seek evidence of it being responded to at an 
operational level (research Q.6). To that end the content of 332 rural crime specific 
online newspaper articles published over a twelve month period were analysed.  
 As a precursor to any other analysis the content of these articles was examined 
for evidence of media coverage of the police responding to an incidence of counterfeit 
pesticide; none was found. Moving then to consider what was the predominant theme 
of these articles in terms of simple word frequency the words that occurred most often 
are shown in Table 5.6. The results were interesting in so much that they illustrate the 
predominance of theft as a subject in rural crime reporting. However, the data only 
became meaningful once a word cluster analysis had been carried out to produce the 
dendrogram given at Figure 5.3. This process grouped the words shown in Table 5.6 
such that it reflected how closely they were associated with each other across the 
entire sample.  
 The value of this method of content analysis, as it was utilised in this study, lay 
in its capacity to reveal the structure and content of an ‘average’ rural crime article. 
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When considered alongside the articles themselves, which were used as a point of 
reference to aid understanding of how the various words were associated within the 
clusters, it gave a valuable insight into as to how rural crime was typically portrayed. 
More importantly given that what was being considered was overwhelmingly police 
generated content, it was deemed to be a de facto indication of the operational police 
rural crime focus. In the following synopsis of the articles extracts of the narrative part 
of those articles used to illustrate specific points are reproduced at Appendix 7. 
In the context of newly appointed Police and Crime Commissioners in England 
and Wales, many of whom in forces with a substantial rural population had included the 
prioritisation of rural crime in their policy agenda, it is probably not surprising that a 
sustained strand of promised engagement between police and local rural communities 
was observed (see for example Appendix 7.1). However, whilst the headline intent was 
tackling ‘rural crime’ the analysis suggested that this maxim may be somewhat 
misleading. The police perception of what constitutes rural crime appeared to be 
constrained, for overwhelmingly dominant was theft, or more precisely theft from farms 
(see for example Appendix 7.2)77. Such offences were described as being on the 
increase, at least so far as reported incidence is concerned, and this was framed as 
being the outstanding rural crime problem. Whilst there was some limited variation in 
this pattern of reporting, notably seasonal articles that linked travelling offenders and 
suspicious activity to police initiatives to counter hare coursing (see for example 
Appendix 7.3), overall it was remarkably consistent in its property crime focus.  
                                                          
77 In the qualitative phase of the study the link between the strategic police focus on theft from 
farms and NFU Mutual insurance was noted. For the sake of completeness, and because three 
letter words were excluded by default, NFU was added as an included word in the analysis. It 
appeared regularly in the reporting but did not achieve the weighted percentage required for it to 
be included in the cluster analysis. 
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Closely associated with this was a parallel and equally consistent strand which 
emphasised the need for potential victims to engage with security and crime prevention 
measures to protect rural property. This narrative did not commit to the deployment of 
more police resources rather it promoted self-help activities. Foremost amongst these 
were Watch schemes, police sponsored initiatives the purpose of which was described 
as promoting vigilance amongst rural communities and stimulating communication with 
the police (see for example Appendix 7.4). It was the reporting of suspicious activity, 
and most notably suspicious ‘outsiders’, and the ability of the police to respond to this 
in the form of targeted operations and patrols, that was frequently described as being 
the key to tackling rural crime (see for example Appendix 7.5).  
Whilst this may seem to be a rudimentary, arguably simplistic, measure of 
operational police focus this novel approach did produce clear data that lent itself to 
relatively simple interpretation. It would be presumptuous to take these results alone as 
being evidence of a bias in rural policing but in the context of this study it might 
reasonably be seen as indicative of the national focus of operational rural policing 












                                                          
78 Following the initial run of the cluster analysis is was apparent that certain words similar to the 
primary had been included but were not necessarily related. For example the word ‘report’ had 
the word ‘reporter’ included in its count. The analysis was therefore re-run with the non-related 
words excluded to give a more accurate result. The similar words given in the table were those 
that were both similar and used in the same context as the primary and were therefore not 
excluded.  





Theft 386 0.64 thefts 
operations 355 0.59 operation, 
operational, 
operations’ 
Areas 350 350 area, areas’ 
criminals 293 0.48 criminal, 
criminality, 
criminals’ 




vehicles 285 0.47 vehicle, 
vehicles’ Watch 282 0.47 - 
Locals 272 0.45 local, localities, 
locality, locally Target 263 0.43 targeted, 
targeting, 
targets, targets’ 
Force 261 0.43 forces, forces’ 
Tackle 249 0.41 tackled, 
tackles, 
tackling 
scheme 245 0.40 schemes, 
schemes’ Farms 237 0.39 farms’, farming 
commissioners 224 0.37 commissioner, 




members 200 0.33 member, 




number 191 0.32 numbers 
Activity 189 0.31 activities, 









property 155 0.26 properties 
Stolen 153 0.25 - 
suspicious 152 0.25 Suspiciously, 
suspicion, 
suspicions 
Thieves 150 0.25 thief, thieves’, 
thieving 
Table 5.6: Online local reporting of rural crime from May 2013 to April 2014: 


































Figure 5.3: Online local reporting of rural crime from May 2013 to April 2014: word 




5.2.3 Quantitative Freedom of Information requests 
To obtain quantitative data that may be indicative of counterfeit pesticide 
occurrence pattern or trend within the UK (research Q.2) Freedom of information Act 
(FoIA) requests were sent to those public authorities detailed in Table 4.3. Of the forty 
three police forces to which requests were sent thirty five responded, and of the nine 
Trading Standards department to which requests were sent eight responded. Both the 
Home Office (Border Force) and the Health and Safety Executive (CRD) also 
responded. 
All participants, with the exception of the Health and Safety Executive (CRD), 
gave a nil return. That is to say that they had no record of their having dealt with a 
counterfeit pesticide incident over the given time period. Interestingly a large proportion 
of those police forces that responded, eight out of the thirty five (23%), declined to 
answer the questions posed. The narrative response provided by Gloucestershire 
Constabulary was typical, indicating that an exemption under the Act was claimed 
because: 
 
“Section 12(1) – Fee Regulations states: Section 1(1) of the Act does not oblige 
a public authority to comply with a request for information if the authority 
estimates that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the 
appropriate limit”. 
 
It would seem then that a significant number of forces do not have the capacity within 
their crime and incident recording systems to easily carry out free text searches to 
identify offending that does not reflect Home Office crime recording rules. Tellingly the 
Home Office themselves, on behalf of the Border Agency, indicated that whilst their 
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system did record the seizure of counterfeit items “there is no search criteria on the 
database to identify what the counterfeit item is” and they claimed the same exemption.  
 It was also interesting to note that several police forces, including Kent Police, 
Hertfordshire Constabulary, and West Yorkshire Police were of the opinion that this 
crime would be recorded by Trading Standards rather than themselves. However, all 
Trading Standards returns were nil, that is to say they had not recorded any incidence. 
Taking a slightly different approach Dorset Police suggested that this type of crime 
would be dealt with by the City of London police under the guise of either Action Fraud 
or the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU). Both of these initiatives were 
discussed in the review of the literature in the context of there being a precedent for the 
police engaging with fraud consequential to intellectual property (IP) offences. Whilst a 
FoIA request was sent to the City of London Police as part of this quantitative strand of 
the study in light of the Dorset Police suggestion a repeat request was sent specifying 
that data was requested in relation to the enforcement activities of Action Fraud and/or 
PIPCU. Again a nil return was received, neither having any record of having dealt with 
any counterfeit pesticide incidents.  
This left the Home Office (CRD) as the only response that indicated that they 
had dealt with counterfeit pesticide cases over the specified time period. The data they 
provided in response to the first question asked is shown at Table 5.7. The response 
suggested a relatively stable, and arguably rather modest, number of complaints in 
each of the data years. Year 2011 appeared to be anomalous, having twice as many 
incidents as the previous or following years. This prompted a supplementary request to 
CRD for any further data or information which might help to explain this pattern. 
Participant #24, a member of staff within the Compliance Branch, replied expressing a 
view that, given the relatively small number of recorded incidents for each year, it is not 
possible to say if there was any particular reason for the 2011 figure being higher. 
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Participant #24 further stated that there appeared to be no obvious trend. However, the 
apparently low occurrence rate may be misleading. The response also contained a 
narrative explanation which placed the data in context and went some considerable 
way to explaining the CRD position with regard to counterfeit pesticides. This also 
prompted further direct engagement between the author and CRD (participants #23 
and #24) to clarify a number of interesting and potentially significant points. Whilst the 
narrative and subsequent exchange might not be strictly within the parameters of 
quantitative data they are presented here because they contextualise the incidence 
figures given in Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: Health and Safety Executive (CRD) response to FoIA question requesting 
data showing – The number of separate incidents or suspected incidents involving 
counterfeit pesticides which were investigated by CRD in each of the calendar years 









 CRD do not routinely scrutinise imported plant protection products and for them 
to intercept an imported product which is counterfeit would be very unusual. Most of the 
cases they deal with are reactive, arising out of complaints by agrochemical companies 
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that the formulation of a parallel traded product they have identified is not consistent 
with its authorisation79. Occasionally they may receive a complaint about generic, ‘me-
too’ products where the complainant has a legitimate business arrangement supplying 
the authorisation holder with an active substance but believes the active ingredient is 
being sourced (illegally) from elsewhere80. During the specified time period CRD did 
not encounter any products labelled or packaged in a way which purports them to be 
another company’s branded product (a deceptive counterfeit in the classic sense). 
 The alleged formulation differences identified varied from product to product but 
generally did not relate to the active substance(s) rather they involved either impurities 
or co-formulants. Subtle differences in the impurity profile of a product may suggest a 
manufacturing process which was not consistent with that employed by the genuine 
authorisation holder. Alleged differences in co-formulants can involve qualitative or 
quantitative variations from the authorised formula. 
 Complainants usually base their referral to CRD on an initial analysis carried 
out in their own laboratory facilities. There is often somewhat of a delay before CRD 
receives the complaint meaning it is not always possible, due to the seasonal nature of 
the supply chain, to independently obtain samples and confirm (or otherwise) the 
complainants findings. As participant #23 suggested this, taken alongside the other 
constraining factors, meant that the disclosed data was not a fair reflection of the 
probable incidence of counterfeit pesticides in the UK market in any given year.  
                                                          
79 As the body that authorises pesticides to enter the market their primary enforcement concern 
is whether the product being investigated meets their authorised specification. 
80 A ‘me-too’ product is one introduced by a company after it has seen that other companies are 
successful with the same type of product. The suggestion here is that the manufacturer of the 
original product is also supplying the ‘me-too’ company.  
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 The second part of the FoIA request to CRD requested that they disclose; the 
total quantity (by weight or volume) of counterfeit or suspected counterfeit pesticide 
seized by CRD in each of the calendar years from 2010 – 2014 inclusive. CRD gave a 
nil response to this question. As has been previously noted most of the cases CRD 
receive are reactive and arise from complaints from agrochemical companies. 
Generally CRD only take possession of a sample of the alleged counterfeit product. 
Moreover the powers that HSE, of which CRD is a division, hold to seize illegal plant 
protection products are only available to them under certain restricted circumstances 
and it is not a commonly employed enforcement tool. 
It is clear that CRD are carrying out a very specific enforcement function within 
the market place; ensuring that pesticide formulation conforms to that which is 
registered. Their enforcement activities do not extend to proactively pursuing 
perpetrators, rather they provide an evidential means by which manufacturers of 
genuine product might take civil action against an alleged importer of counterfeit 
product. The data they provided is certainly a reflection of that referred to them but it 
cannot be considered to be in any way a reflection of any incidence trend. Nonetheless 
the supplementary narrative and engagement with CRD proved most useful in 
establishing that the physical characteristics of the seized illegal product is entirely 









6.0 Merging the data and revisiting the study objectives 
 The third step in the convergent parallel mixed method required that the 
analysed data from the qualitative and quantitative strands of the research be merged 
before interpretation. One benefit of the chosen research design was that it gave an 
innate means by which this merger could be achieved. Each of the data gathering 
methods employed in the study was chosen with a view to answering a specific 
research question. At the same time these questions were framed, and the data 
collecting method applied, such that they were mutually supportive; each had the 
potential to contribute toward other study objectives. On completion of the data 
analysis it was therefore possible to consider each of the objectives in light of the data 
produced by all strands of the research. In doing so a fresh narrative emerged that 
described the UK counterfeit pesticide problem and the police response to it. The 
thesis continues by summarising that narrative, recognising where it is appropriate 
those instances where the data strands were mutually supportive. 
 
6.1 First study objective – looking for evidence of counterfeit pesticides in the 
UK marketplace  
The first study objective was to find if there is evidence of counterfeit pesticides 
being prevalent in the UK agricultural marketplace. By and large the research broadly 
supported the narrative to be found in the literature. It confirmed that the problem was 
‘real’ and characterised by the suspected modus operandi, and it reinforced the likely 
economic, environmental, and potential human costs of this crime. However, the data 
did not entirely endorse the popular narrative for there were specific points which were 
contradicted and other factors that had simply not been recognised. When considering 
the likely incidence of counterfeit products in the UK marketplace the literature, notably 
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in the form of industry representative body reports, suggested that it may amount to 2% 
of the total market. However, the data indicates that this figure may be very much 
higher, and possibly in excess of 10%. Moreover the same literature source implied 
that some 75% of such products had their origin in China. The research indicates that 
this may be a significant underestimate and that the true figure may be as high as 
95%.It is interesting that the literature also contained evidence of the pesticide 
regulatory authority being of the opinion that counterfeit pesticides were not at all 
common in the UK. The results of this research may go some way to explaining why 
they believe this to be the case for it might be presumed that a lack of proactive 
engagement, and a seeming lack of confidence on the part of manufacturers in this 
authority’s capacity to pursue offenders, would leave them somewhat isolated from the 
problem. It is somewhat ironic then that where industry representative body reports 
claim that they are in close contact and collaboration with enforcement agencies, and 
there is evidence of this being the case in relation to specific incidents occurring in 
mainland Europe, there was nothing in the data to suggest that this was generally true 
for the UK at least so far as anti-counterfeiting initiatives are concerned. Nonetheless, 
and despite contradictions such as those exampled above, it would still be fair to say 
that in broad terms the industry narrative and associated media discourse is still a 
reasonable reflection of the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. However, the results of 
the research also show that it is a far from complete picture.  
 The predominant view amongst interview participants was that this is a crime 
that is intrinsically linked to the trade in parallel traded products, albeit there was a 
previously undocumented dissenting view that suggested that whilst this is the case it 
is a problem that was largely of legitimate manufacturers own making. Product 
analysis, carried out by the responsible enforcement agency and derived from 
Quantitative FoIA data, supported the link citing incidence of formulation irregularity in 
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seized parallel products. What was not clear from this data, or indeed from elsewhere 
in the study, was the extent to which these were ‘technical’ breaches of the regulations 
consequential to manufacturer variations in formulation or whether these were 
‘genuine’ counterfeits. That said there was a considerable amount of other evidence, 
notably from interviews with both mainstream manufacturers and regulatory 
enforcement stakeholders, to be confident that there are products entering the 
legitimate UK market which are not identical to the registered UK formulation and which 
do not have their origins with legitimate manufacturers. These were described as being 
near perfect clones, to the extent that in practice they are able to bypass what some 
considered to be a weak regulatory framework which allowed illicit parallel traders to 
constantly stay one step ahead of the inspectorate. 
 In direct contradiction to one expert opinion noted in the literature review 
stakeholders recognised a persistent link between this trade and what they considered 
to be, and what the definition given in the literature would confirm suggest certainly is, 
organised crime. In this case ‘organised’ was most certainly the operative word for it 
was suggested that those who are largely responsible carry out this trade do so under 
the pretext of seemingly legitimate enterprises operating in the rural environment. 
Whilst China was recognised as the primary source of illicit product, and abuse of 
parallel trading regulations facilitated their distribution, what was less clear was the 
means by which OCG counterfeiters facilitate their reaching the UK marketplace (the 
transnational element of the crime). Unfortunately, and as was demonstrated by 
Quantitative FoIA data, Border Control data collection methods do not allow for the 
differentiation of counterfeit pesticides from other seized counterfeit products. 
Assuming of course this is a genuine inability to isolate the relevant data then it 
negates a potentially useful means of identifying predominant points of illicit product 
entry. In the circumstances the study turned to the experience of stakeholders who 
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recognised major Northern European ports as being the primary point of entry into the 
European Union, with free movement of goods rules facilitating the onward movement 
into the UK. However, what was much less clear was the extent to which what was 
variously described as a porous Eastern EU boundary facilitates the overland entry of 
such goods from a part of the world where the counterfeit pesticide problem is more 
firmly entrenched. Certainly the experience of one farmer, described in the Oral History 
interview, suggested that at least some of these products are transiting through Russia 
or its environs. Interestingly then, and despite the apparent OCG link, Qualitative FoIA 
data suggested that none of the respondent police forces had seen fit to include it in 
their rural crime strategies, even where those strategies made specific mention of 
organised criminality in the rural setting.  
 Identifying the extent to which OCG groups have penetrated the UK pesticide 
market remains highly problematic. Indeed in the narrative explanation of CRD 
incidence data CRD themselves acknowledged that it was not a fair reflection of 
incidence rate. Despite the apparent weakness of this data the comments of 
manufacturing company stakeholders suggests that a relatively modest proportion of 
the UK market is lost to illicit products. However, there was an entirely contrary and 
very robust non-manufacturing view that the UK problem has been grossly 
underestimated and that it more closely resembles other parts of Europe. It was 
interesting then that the case study farmer victim had acquired a counterfeit product 
through a buying group, prompting an obvious comparison with the wider European 
problem where stakeholder evidence suggests the primary route for the distribution of 
illicit product is through such cooperative arrangements.  
Where there was more of a consensus was in recognising that an accurate 
estimate is, and will probably remain, elusory so long as there is an absence of a 
robust means of monitoring the marketplace for incidence or recognising the indicators 
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of a potential counterfeit problem. Stakeholders saw the current monitoring system, 
such as it is, as being overly focused on ‘approval to sell’ rather than defending 
legitimate manufacturers and consumers from unapproved products entering the 
marketplace. Data derived from a Quantitative FoIA request to the regulatory authority 
did little to negate this view, suggesting that proactive regulatory agency activity in this 
area is negligible. As importantly the Oral History suggested a fear driven reluctance on 
the part of farmers to report to the authorities when they suspect that they have been 
the victim of a counterfeit product. This being the case it naturally followed that no 
investigation would be carried out even when a problem was recognised on farm. It is a 
pattern reinforced when enforcement agencies were asked for incidence data. With 
one exception, CRD, these requests all produced a nil return. 
 The consequences of this unknown quantity of counterfeit product reaching the 
marketplace is equally difficult to gauge.  Nonetheless in the absence of any reliable 
measure of an economic cost to manufacturers and famer users, which is probably 
self-evident if difficult to quantify, the study found good evidence of both potential 
human and actual environmental impact. Sample evidence proffered in interview by a 
stakeholder with responsibility for regulatory enforcement confirmed that seized 
product contained carcinogenic material and that the persistency of this carcinogen in 
the food chain was not appreciated. In addition the Oral History contained good 
evidence of damage caused to trees and other vegetation caused by what was almost 
certainly an illicit parallel traded product. These two cases certainly add weight to the 
argument that these products are of illicit origin rather than the result of legitimate 
manufacturer formulation variation. However, determining the potential threat to human 
health and the environment from such products remains difficult because farmer 
victims currently choose not to report incidence. 
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 Much of the research data discussed thus far in the context of the first study 
objective has provided evidence to support and expand upon the previously 
unsubstantiated narrative that appeared in industry and media accounts of the UK 
counterfeit pesticide problem. Whilst in itself this was undoubtedly a useful contribution 
to the subject, and showed that the problem is similar to the wider European problem in 
many respects, this was not the full extent of the findings. A number of previously 
unrecognised characteristics of this crime also emerged from the data which suggest 
that in other respects it may be a markedly different problem in the UK context.  
 By and large the EU trade in parallel products of all types relies on price 
differentials across EU member states to provide opportunity for a trader to make a 
profit. However, whilst accepting that price differentials may still have influence, in 
direct contradiction to opinion identified in the literature review the evidence of this 
study suggests that there has been a general harmonisation of EU pesticide prices this 
to the extent that product shortfall may now be the predominant market driver. 
Unanticipated demand for a product that the nature of crop production necessitates 
must be acquired and used within a tight timeframe tends to distort both demand and 
consumer perception of the risk of acquiring an ‘alternative’ product. Moreover the 
unusual if not unique relationship of trust between farmer, agronomist, and agricultural 
merchant may exacerbate the problem by virtue of that risk not necessarily being fully 
appreciated by the end user. The Oral History data evidences this very well in that 
these were exactly the circumstances that prompted the case study farmer victim to 
step outside of their normal buying pattern. It is a threat that is seemingly ever present, 
not least because illicit traders have a foothold in the UK pesticide market by virtue of 
there being an underlying and persistent trade in illicit products to an amenity market 
where, unlike the core agricultural industry, there is no quality imperative reinforced by 
crop and food assurance schemes. The problem therefore persists in the amenity 
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sector, even when the agricultural demand for pesticides is being met from legitimate 
sources. The companies and individuals involved in this illicit trade are well placed to 
capitalise on unexpected demand in the agricultural sector, using established links to 
acquire unapproved product from a Chinese market with over capacity when a 
rationalised European manufacturing sector is unable to meet demand. 
 In terms of addressing these issues crucially there is no evidence of a unified or 
coordinated industry or enforcement effort to address the UK counterfeit pesticide 
problem. Indeed Quantitative FoIA data suggests considerable uncertainty as to which 
agency is responsible for response. Any industry willingness to consolidate knowledge 
or intelligence to prompt an enforcement agency response is stifled by the fear of 
breaching fair trading regulation. Moreover, and as was demonstrated by the 
Awareness Survey, any attempt to gather primary evidence by agencies, that is to say 
farmer or sprayer operator victim derived intelligence, is bound to difficult when 
knowledge of the problem is woeful even amongst professional users of pesticides. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the industry, and associated stakeholders, see little or no 
evidence of enforcement agency activity in relation to the problem; the police do not 
perceive this to be a rural crime, CRD do not regularly scrutinise imported product or 
proactively seek out breaches of regulation, and this crime is not a Trading Standards 
priority or even subject of intelligence gathering. It is likely that Border Force are 
similarly disengaged, having no means of isolating incidence of seizure. 
 In terms the first study objective whilst these findings perhaps prompt as many 
questions as they do provide answers what can now be said with reasonable certainty 
is that counterfeit pesticides are indeed prevalent in the UK marketplace. The second 




6.2 Second study objective – considering whether this crime is being addressed 
by the police 
 Given this seeming lack of engagement by any other agency the second study 
objective considered whether this was a crime that was being addressed by the police. 
In simple terms the data suggests that it is not, this despite the evidence of stakeholder 
interviews that this is demonstrably a crime with OCG links and an industry victim 
perception that it should be a police matter. That is not to say that police forces have 
singularly failed to recognise OCG activity in the rural setting, police interview subjects 
describing how their force had acknowledged a link between hare coursing and OCG 
activity. Qualitative FoIA data showed that some other forces have forged that same 
link, however, apparently none had appreciated OCG association with counterfeit 
pesticides. Quantitative FoIA data suggested that, at least amongst those forces that 
were able to access their crime recording systems in any meaningful fashion, there 
was not a single record of the police taking action against a counterfeit pesticide trader. 
Moreover this lack of legal engagement was reflected in poor operational awareness. 
The awareness survey showed that appreciation of this problem amongst those 
working within a police force with a significant area of farmed land was no better than 
the general public, and amongst the relatively small number that were aware of this 
crime their knowledge of the subject was generally poor or none. 
 
6.3 Third study objective – looking at what lies behind the lack of police 
engagement 
 The third study objective looked at what might lie behind this lack of police 
engagement. Crucial to understanding this is the police perception of what constitutes 
rural crime which is very narrow at a strategic and policy setting level. Admittedly ‘rural 
209 
 
crime’ is difficult to define, but within the sample police force there had been what 
amounted to an opt-out from addressing this question. Rather than seek a police-
centric definition which might include a diversity of offending the force had chosen to 
follow the focus of an insurance company with a significant interest in farm business, 
and to benchmark success in tackling rural crime against their published data. This was 
acknowledged as having the result of constraining the definition of ‘rural crime’ to 
simply meaning ‘theft from farms’, with an open acknowledgement that “we end up with 
crimes being committed in an agricultural environment…the nicking of tractors and 
agricultural machinery”. Qualitative FoIA data showed that this property bias is 
recognisable across the majority of forces that have a specific rural crime policy. 
Overwhelmingly ‘rural crime’ is intrinsically associated with property crime and in the 
majority of cases this is further refined, as it was in the sample police force, to mean 
theft from farms. Moreover the Word Cluster Analysis reinforced this finding, showing 
that at an operational level this bias is equally recognisable, with theft from farm being 
dominant. 
 
6.4 Summary of the merged data 
 Collectively considering the data generated for all of the research objectives 
what is observed is a UK crime issue that, in many of its key characteristics, has much 
in common with the problem as it is observed across Europe and as it is described in 
the literature. For example it has a strong association with the trade in parallel products 
and it is linked to the activities of organised crime groups. However, in some key 
respects it is markedly different, notably in that its occurrence in the market place is 
largely dependent upon the availability of legitimate product rather than price 
differentials, and that there is an underlying trade in illicit product that lies outside of the 
core agricultural industry. This crime problem is currently not addressed by the police 
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to any meaningful extent despite their having recognised the significance of OCG 
activity in the rural setting. This lack of engagement may be due to an overt focus on 
theft from farms as the benchmark rural crime, seemingly at the expense of less 




















7.0 An interpretation of the results; recognising an underlying market dynamic 
The fourth and final step in the convergent parallel mixed method requires that, 
having merged the results, the data be interpreted. Creswell and Clark (2011) offer 
various means by which this might be achieved including, as is the case here, a 
discussion of the ways that the results produce a more complete understanding of the 
research problem. Anticipating that such a discussion would benefit from the influence 
of an established explanatory theory, and given that the review of the literature failed to 
identify an obvious candidate, it was deemed appropriate to return to the literature in 
light of the research findings. This amounted to a supplementary review of the literature 
which may be found at Appendix 8.  
An appropriate explanatory model was identified in Bernard Harcourt’s criticism 
of the growing reliance on predictive methods, actuarialism, in criminal justice practice 
(Harcourt, 2006). Harcourt’s assertion that such methods are distorting the 
understanding of criminal justice priorities may help to explain the police response, or 
rather lack thereof, to the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. This model is therefore 
used as an aid to interpreting this particular element of the merged research results. 
 From the outset this study has had one overarching concern, that being to 
determine if counterfeit pesticides pose a substantive threat to the UK agricultural 
industry. A review of the literature sought evidence of this question having been 
previously addressed. It would be fair to say that it had, at least in so far as there had 
been a significant amount of media and industry discussion of the subject. The 
literature recognised China as being the primary source of counterfeit goods, pesticides 
included, that the trade is dominated by the activities of OCGs, and that the counterfeit 
pesticide problem is at its most serious at the Eastern periphery of Europe. The 
literature also repeated a consistent, if evidentially lacking, message; that it is the 
abuse of parallel trading rules that underpins the UK counterfeit pesticide problem.  
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These characteristics of the problem were reiterated in the research, however, 
whilst these are important features collectively they amount to what this discussion 
would argue is the most important feature of the literature; whilst it captures the 
mechanics of the crime it fails to appreciate the dynamics of the problem. Crucially it is 
the dynamic that makes the mechanics of the crime a worthwhile undertaking for the 
OCG counterfeiter. It is therefore suggested that where this study makes a substantial 
contribution to the subject is that it recognises and describes elements of this dynamic, 
and specifically three distinct but interacting sources of influence which significantly 
contribute toward shaping the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. These are; 
 The diverse nature of the UK pesticide marketplace; 
 The operating practices of the legitimate manufacturing industry; 
 The narrow focus of rural policing. 
 
7.1 The diverse nature of the UK pesticide market 
This study set out to consider a specific crime and how it impacts upon one 
particular industry sector. Unwittingly this initially resulted in something of an isolationist 
approach to the problem, considering only how the crime manifests itself in the 
agricultural context whilst failing to appreciate the relevance of the diverse nature of the 
UK pesticide marketplace. In fairness this narrow perspective, that is to say one that 
fails to recognise that the agricultural sector does not exist or operate in isolation, was 
also typical of the literature. This may go some way toward explaining its inherent 
weakness.  
The use of pesticides in the UK is far from limited to farmers and growers. It is 
in this sense, rather than in the range of products used, that the UK pesticide market is 
described here as diverse. Crucially with this diversity comes opportunity for OCG 
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counterfeiters. It was the blended approach to the subject, and the use of a snowball 
sampling method to identify a broad range of stakeholder opinion and experience, that 
allowed a baseline level of counterfeit pesticide activity residing outside of the 
agricultural sector to be recognised and described. The seemingly unpoliced amenity 
sector market for pesticides is sufficiently large and has sufficient value for OCGs to 
maintain a constant and active counterfeiting presence. Moreover the relatively 
disparate nature of pesticide supply into the sector means that illicit product entering 
the market is unlikely to be recognised let alone challenged. The size of this market is a 
matter of speculation. Nonetheless the possibility that the conservative end of the 
overall counterfeit pesticide problem estimate, at some 2% of the market, may be a 
reflection of ‘business as usual’ OCG activity within the amenity sector cannot be 
dismissed. Regardless of the size of this underlying problem the probable significance 
of this baseline counterfeiting activity only becomes clear when considered in the 
context of the way that the counterfeiting problem manifests itself in the agricultural 
sector which is very different.  
At this point in the discussion it is worth considering the experience of the case 
study participant in the study, a farmer victim of a counterfeit pesticide. Climatic 
conditions had resulted in an unusually large amount of a particular spring planted crop 
being grown and there was a shortage of a particular herbicide associated with that 
crop. Because the legitimate pesticide manufacturing industry could not respond 
quickly farmer and growers were forced to consider an alternative source. Whilst in 
normal circumstances many would be overtly resistant to buying anything other than 
branded product from a trusted source because of the imperative of acquiring and 
using a product within a very narrow timeframe a product acquired through the parallel 
market might have seemed a relatively ‘safe’ alternative. Were the legitimate parallel 
trade able to meet such a demand spike there would probably be little of interest to the 
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counterfeiter. However, the results of the study would suggest that this is not the case, 
for it would be unusual for such a shortfall of a particular product in the UK to coincide 
with a significant over-supply in another EU country. It is at this point then the two 
separate markets converge and the significance of ‘baseline’ activity becomes 
apparent; there is an established illicit trade centred on the amenity market that is well 
placed to step in and take advantage of any difference between demand and the 
availability of legitimate parallel traded product in the agricultural market.  
The case study demonstrates very well how an experienced farmer and user of 
pesticides can find him or herself the victim of a counterfeit product. Moreover 
participant #18 could not conceivably have been alone in this situation, indeed a near 
neighbour had also purchased the same illicit product with the same environmentally 
damaging result, and this incident further illustrates very well how an occasional market 
for counterfeit pesticides can evolve very rapidly allowing comparatively large volumes 
of illegal product to enter the market over a relatively short timeframe. In the 
circumstances described, where market demand for a product in short supply is 
seemingly sated despite there being insufficient legitimate product, it seems likely that 
this is consequential to the activity of counterfeiting OCGs; that is to say a criminal 
organisations that have both links to highly responsive manufacturing facilities in the 
Far East and established and seemingly legitimate access to the UK pesticide market. 
Such groups are able to respond to periods of unusually high product demand and 
meet the shortfall with unapproved products.  
If the extent to which this happens is a matter of speculation it is worth 
considering that if the underlying market for counterfeit pesticides explains the 2% end 
of the estimate range then availability driven spikes within the agricultural sector may 
equally well explain the 10% or more estimates that some believe to be nearer the true 
extent of the market lost to counterfeit goods. Paradoxically then both occurrence 
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estimates may be correct; it depends on where, and when, you happen to look. In 
periods of ‘normal’ activity there may be an underlying level of activity that, in practice, 
is so low that it fails to attract significant enforcement attention. However, when a spike 
in demand occurs the proportion of the market lost to the counterfeiter may climb 
rapidly and, most significantly, dissipate just as quickly. Given what was learnt in the 
study about the time lag between an emerging spike being recognised and product 
being analysed by a CRD laboratory it is hardly surprising that prosecutions are highly 
unusual; the problem, and the evidence, has essentially disappeared - a problem 
compounded by a reluctance on the part of farmer victims, as was observed in the 
case study, to report an incidence as soon as it is suspected.   
This pattern of incidence is a credible explanation for the wide ranging 
occurrence estimates observed both in the literature review and the research results. 
Moreover it reflects the typical OCG business model that was discussed at the very 
outset of this study; an ability to recognise an illicit trading opportunity which can be 
quickly exploited at a profit and with a low risk of being caught or prosecuted. It is the 
low risk characteristic that this discussion will now turn to consider, for it is only in 
understanding this side of the equation that the true threat that counterfeit pesticides 
present to the UK agricultural industry can be truly appreciated.  
 
7.2 The anti-counterfeiting activities of the legitimate manufacturing industry 
In the same way that it has been demonstrated that the creation of opportunity 
may be consequential to the diverse profile of the UK pesticide industry the seemingly 
benign trading environment for the counterfeiter is likely to be consequential to two 
further key influences, the first of these being the anti-counterfeiting activities of the 
legitimate manufacturing industry. Industry reports and associated media articles 
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invariably describe the trade in parallel products as being at the heart of the UK 
counterfeit pesticide problem, and again the experience of the case study subject 
confirms and illustrates this. The same narrative was documented in the in-depth 
interviews, particularly from those speaking from a manufacturing industry standpoint. It 
is a narrative that may sound familiar to those who recognise the work of the 
sociologist Stanley Cohen. Albeit his original study exampled a somewhat different set 
of circumstances Cohen’s description of the creation ‘folk devils’ has a certain 
resonance with the pesticide industry portrayal of those who trade in parallel 
products81. This was certainly seen in the case study where the manufacturer of the 
genuine product labelled the ‘parallel trader’, rather than an individual, as being 
deviant. As was suggested by an informed study participant with personal experience 
of the relationship between parallel traders and mainstream pesticide manufacturers 
this may serve a greater purpose than simply highlighting a potential source of 
illegality. Nonetheless the collective industry might argue that casting the trade in 
parallel products in this light is entirely reasonable; there is little to suggest that illicit 
product reaching the UK market does so in circumstances other than through an abuse 
of parallel trading rules. However, the industry response to the problem also reflects 
this bias for it overwhelmingly focuses on the trade in parallel products, primarily in the 
lobbying of legislators to change the rules to further restrict this mode of trading.  
No doubt there is scope to make the market less benign for counterfeiters who, 
under current rules, are able to trade a deceptive counterfeit that does not need to 
physically resemble the product it purports to be. This is a most unusual, if not a 
                                                          
81 The concept of the ‘folk devil’ is most closely associated with Cohen's (1973) work which 
described confrontations between Mods and Rockers at an English holiday resort. Cohen 
describe the important role played by the media in the distortion of events which may produce 
an extreme societal reaction to the stigmatized group(s). 
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unique, crime opportunity. In the context of the circumstances previously described, 
where any resistance to alternative products on the part of a conservative end user 
market is lowered by an imperative to acquire and use a specific pesticide in a short 
time frame, this presents a significant additional risk. Without understanding the 
mechanism by which pesticide authorisation and the associated unique reference 
system works an end user would have no reason to be suspicious when a product 
delivered bears no resemblance to the ‘same’ one he or she has previously used. This 
lowers the risk to the perpetrator of being caught, and no doubt makes the illicit 
pesticide market an attractive proposition for the criminal. Removing the ability to 
repackage product would probably make it less so, however, it may not be the panacea 
that the industry focus implies for it overlooks the entrepreneurial nature of the OCG 
perpetrators. Provided the risk of arrest and prosecution continues to be low it seems 
unlikely that a regulatory change would encourage the counterfeiter to do anything 
other than adapt. Reiterating what was suggested at the beginning of this discussion it 
seems then that the default industry response is to address the mechanics whilst 
ignoring the dynamics of the problem. Regulatory change does little to raise the risk to 
the counterfeiter of trading in illicit pesticides besides the prospect of a more punitive 
fine, which of course is irrelevant if the likelihood of being arrested and successfully 
prosecuted remains low. It is therefore a response that is unlikely to have the desired 
effect unless it is pursued with an associated strategy to simultaneously raise the risk 
to the counterfeiter. Most importantly this research suggests that the industry does 
have the means at his disposal to do just that, but it is not utilised or perhaps even 
appreciated. The pesticide industry is failing to capitalise on what may well prove to be 




Throughout the research phase of this study it was manifestly clear that the 
companies and organisations that participated held a great deal of collective 
knowledge not only about the individuals and illicit groups that are actively involved in 
the importing and distribution of counterfeit pesticides in the UK but also of patterns of 
incidence. However, what was also plain was that this knowledge is relatively thinly 
distributed and that it is held in what can only be described as corporate silos. Two 
reasons might be suggested for this phenomena, the first already having been 
recognised in the literature review; a concern that any acknowledgement outside of the 
victim company of a counterfeit incident might cause damage to the image of a 
valuable product brand. The fear is genuine and readily understood for any public 
acknowledgment that a particular pesticide is being targeted by counterfeiters will 
create a consumer perception that this is a ‘risky’ product and may prompt a switch to a 
competitor’s alternative. In a highly competitive market it would be perfectly 
understandable that a victim company would not wish to expose such a problem to 
public gaze. The second reason is less obvious; a widespread unwillingness to share 
information for fear of falling foul of what the industry widely refers to as ‘anti-trust rules’ 
but is perhaps more properly described as competition law.  
The constraints of legislation that is designed to prohibit practices that restrict 
free trade and to prevent a company abusing a market by virtue of its dominant position 
was a mantra that manufacturing based study participants universally espoused as a 
reason for not having collaborated to share intelligence concerning the counterfeit 
pesticide market. Again this is an understandable position for the penalties for falling 
foul of the legislation are significant and corporate legal departments are highly 
sensitive to the possibility of engaging in any collaborative process that might be seen 
as indicative of cartel like activity. Moreover, given that this is a highly competitive 
market, it would be surprising if there was not a degree of reticence on the part of 
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individual companies to make their own knowledge and intelligence available for fear it 
may be used for commercial advantage by others.  However, there was indication from 
a number of industry experts who believed that anti-trust fears are over-played and that 
creative but perfectly legal means of sharing information for the common good have not 
been properly explored. It was interesting that this should come from a participant with 
considerable experience of the wider European problem who had been involved in 
collaborative initiatives which utilised a third party with intelligence analysis expertise to 
facilitate information sharing. As was noted in the research results this consolidated 
intelligence was then used to considerable effect to support anti-counterfeiting 
enforcement activity, most notably in Poland. 
Whilst it was widely acknowledged by participants that more needed to be done 
by the industry to engage with enforcement agencies there was little evidence to 
suggest that any progress was being made to this end. Whilst there was evidence of 
engagement with CRD, specifically in relation to the testing of alleged illegal product 
and addressing the technical offences associated with placing unauthorised products 
onto the market, this engagement did not extend to other agencies. This may, at least 
in part, be the consequence of a lack of appreciation on the part of manufacturers of 
the demarcation of investigation and prosecution responsibilities across agencies (a 
feature of the complex mix of offences associated with this crime that was discussed in 
the introduction to this study). However, it is equally likely that it is because the 
information is not held in a form where it can be readily ‘pushed’ to enforcement 
agencies to encourage them to take action. Of course the opposite side to this 
particular coin is that, for exactly the same reason, there did not seem to be any ‘pull’ 
from enforcement agencies for intelligence, perhaps indicative of a widespread 
enforcement failure to appreciate the OCG link to counterfeit pesticides. This failure to 
engage may also have been aggravated by a lack of appreciation as to what would be 
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an appropriate level for engagement with enforcement agencies. This was typified by a 
participant who, when discussing the lack of Trading Standards engagement, 
described them as being used to dealing with wellies with holes in them. Of course this 
singularly fails to recognise that this is an enforcement body with a substantial 
intelligence gathering capacity besides its front line activities, and one with established 
links to other agencies who invariably have a similar intelligence gathering function. It 
may well be that victim companies, or for that matter end user farmers, interpret a lack 
of local front-line interest on the part of enforcement agencies as a disinterest in the 
problem when in fact it may be more indicative of engagement being at the wrong level 
within the overall enforcement network. This seeming absence of local enforcement 
engagement with the problem, and the need to reconsider the level of contact between 
victim and agency, is epitomised by the police response to counterfeit pesticides. The 
results of the study indicate that it would be unfair to entirely blame the pesticide 
industry for a lack of collaboration when the strategic and operational focus of local 
rural policing is so narrow that police forces would be unlikely to lend an enthusiastic 
ear to information concerning counterfeit pesticide activity even if it were offered. 
 
7.3 The narrow focus of rural policing 
The results of the study suggest that the narrow focus of rural policing is the 
consequence of a strong actuarial influence and that the consequence of this is that 
some types of rural offending, the selling of counterfeit pesticides included, are 
essentially excluded. The priorities and concerns of the insurance industry have, by 
virtue of their inherent measurability, also become the priorities and concerns of those 
policing in the rural environment. The research data shows this influence very clearly, 
both in the setting of rural policing policy/strategy and when this is put into practice. 
Within the sample police force there was an open acknowledgement that there already 
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was, and would be an increasing tendency toward, aligning measures of rural policing 
success to NFU Mutual rural crime data which, crucially, does not include incidence of 
counterfeit pesticide being sold to farmers. Moreover more generally across those 
forces with a significant rural policing responsibility the FoIA request data and the word 
frequency analysis showed a very definite emphasis on the management of theft from 
farms over and above any other form of rural offending. This characteristic has not 
been adequately described in the literature and yet it may well be the defining feature 
of contemporary rural policing, at least in terms of its response to emerging technical 
crime the subject of this study included. It is at this point then that this discussion turns 
to the theorising of Bernard Harcourt to consider what the consequences of this 
tendency may be.  
Harcourt’s paradigm would presume that those criminals who are largely 
responsible for stealing from farms are not the same ones who are behind the 
counterfeit pesticide problem. Whilst it is perfectly possible, and indeed almost certainly 
the case, that both types of offending are underpinned by OCG activity the results of 
the research would suggest that they are unlikely to be the same groups. As has 
already been noted both in the results and in this discussion the trade in illicit 
pesticides is concentrated on a relatively small group of highly specialised criminals. It 
seems unlikely then that the ostensibly legitimate companies under the guise of which 
they operate would be sufficiently diverse to also be involved in stealing high value 
plant and machinery.  
The paradigm further presumes that there is a difference in the relative elasticity 
of offending between these two groups; that is to say that one group is relatively less 
responsive to policing crime reduction initiatives than the other. In terms of the 
responsiveness of these particular groups data published by NFU Mutual themselves 
would suggest that the response of the first group, those that steal from farms, to the 
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sustained police focus on their activities is not what might be expected. The NFU Rural 
Crime Survey (NFU Mutual, 2015) indicates that theft of some items, notably 
machinery and quad bikes, has remained static over the preceding twelve month 
period whilst other theft, including tractors and trailers, has increased. It seems then 
that this group, at least on the evidence provided by NFU Mutual, have a relatively low 
elasticity of offending.  
Of course determining the relative elasticity, that is to say comparing this first 
group to those responsible for the UK counterfeit pesticide problem, is not 
straightforward. As has been discussed at length throughout this study reliable 
quantitative data on pesticide counterfeiting activity is illusory. Nonetheless this 
discussion may make some reasonable assumptions based on what was found both in 
the literature review and the results of the research. The literature suggests that 
contemporary OCGs are entrepreneurial in nature and quick to recognise and respond 
to a profit making opportunity if they can do so at low risk of being caught. Moreover, 
and as has already been discussed in this review, they are likely to be doing so in the 
UK pesticide market particularly when there are product shortfalls. This would suggest 
a relatively high elasticity at least when compared to the first group (those upon whom 
the contemporary rural policing is focused). The implication of the relative difference in 
the elasticity of offending between these two groups of criminals is relatively simple but 
of great consequence; those that steal from farms have not been deterred by targeted 
police activity but at the same time those that deal in counterfeit pesticides have 
recognised the opportunity presented as a consequence of the police rural crime focus 
being other than on themselves. Harcourt’s paradigm would imply that the 
predominance of theft from farms in rural policing policy and practice may, at the very 
least, have unduly exposed the UK farming industry to the threat posed by counterfeit 
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pesticides and may, given that this almost certainly not the only rural crime that would 
be overlooked, have led to an overall increase in rural crime.  
Harcourt’s paradigm is undoubtedly useful in this context, to the extent that 
even though it presumes that it is two entirely separate crime groups that are 
responsible for stealing from farms and selling counterfeit pesticides it could be argued 
that, in the circumstances being considered here, this is not an imperative. Whilst it has 
not been proposed as an alternative theory in the context of entrepreneurial OCGs it 
could be argued that any crime group engaged in diverse illegal activities are, to all 
intents and purposes, operating as multiple entities. That is to say that an OCG could, 
at one at the same time, be both elastic an inelastic. For example in this particular set 
of circumstances if it happened to be the same crime group stealing high value farm 
machinery and dealing in counterfeit pesticides they may be inelastic to the police 
response to their stealing, because they do not perceive the risk to themselves as 
having been significantly raised, yet elastic to the opportunity presented by police 
attention being focused on a particular crime by exploiting counterfeit pesticide 
opportunities – simultaneously elastic and inelastic by virtue of their diverse illicit 
activity. In practical terms be it one or separate OCGs involved in these rural crimes 
matters very little for the implications of Harcourt’s paradigm for corporate and farmer 
victims of counterfeit pesticides are disconcerting; it implies that, provided the rural 
policing environment stays as it is, this is a crime that will continue to go unchallenged. 
It is a gloomy prospect for those who have to deal with the consequences, however, 
within the research results there are features that seemingly defy Harcourt, that are 
outside of the ‘normal’ pattern, and which give some prospect for police engagement 
with the problem.  
The results of the research, specifically the qualitative FoIA request and the 
word frequency analysis data, suggest widespread and consistently high levels of 
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police engagement with one particular rural crime that is seemingly unconnected with 
theft from farms; hare coursing. This is a crime that, as was recognised in the results, 
would be considered to be outside of the typical police rural crime remit. However, 
because it is associated with more serious crime it is very actively policed. Seemingly 
this is a tenuous thread upon which to hold out hope for police engagement with the 
counterfeit pesticide problem, yet it may be an important one. Whilst acknowledging the 
obvious cruelty associated with this illegal hunting activity it would not be considered to 
be a major crime in policing terms. Nonetheless because it is framed as a precursor to 
other illegal activity, rather than an animal welfare problem, it attracts significant rural 
policing attention. Importantly this pattern of actively policing hare coursing was widely 
observed, there being police engagement with this crime across England and Wales 
often the reporting linking the perpetrators with OCGs and wider offending in the 
countryside. As this study moves toward drawing conclusions it is important to 
recognise the significance of this crime in the context of the UK counterfeit pesticide 
problem; because hare coursing is framed as an OCG indicator rather than a wildlife 
crime it attracts far more rural policing attention that it otherwise would. 
 
7.4 A summary of the interpretation and its resonance with critical criminological 
thinking 
 The literature concerning the UK counterfeit pesticide problem is not 
academically robust. Contained primarily within industry generated reports and media 
coverage it lacks clear methodology and the claims made are not verifiable. 
Nonetheless it does contain a number of themes which, collectively, describe the 
mechanics of this crime. The consequence of this is that the industry response is 
similarly mechanical, focusing as it does on bolstering the legislative framework. It is 
important to understand the limitations of such a response; understanding and 
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changing the mechanics of the problem may well make life more difficult for the 
counterfeiter but it does not necessarily raise the risk to them. In considering the 
merged research results it became clear that appreciating the mechanics alone was 
insufficient to fully understanding the problem for it is shaped by a number of influences 
which together form create a unique market dynamic. Firstly understanding the nature 
of the market, and more specifically the fact that there is a substantial market for 
pesticides outside of core agriculture which is relatively unregulated, is important in 
appreciating that there is an underlying level of counterfeit pesticide activity within the 
UK. This can, and does, expand to meet opportunities in the agricultural sector as and 
when they arise. Secondly recognising that the pesticide industry itself is failing to 
make use of intelligence relating to incidence and perpetrators partly explains why this 
is a low risk enterprise for OCGs. Finally understanding the significance of a strong 
actuarial influence over rural policing in the UK goes some considerable way to 
explaining why the police have singularly failed to engage with the UK counterfeit 
pesticide problem.  
 This results of this study and the preceding interpretation have a strong 
resonance with contemporary critical thinking on rural crime which was discussed in 
the review of the literature. Specifically the influence of power and knowledge is 
observed both in the emergence of an industry generated discourse and its prevalence 
in the drive for reformed legislation and regulation, and in the formation of rural policing 
policy and practice.  
The industry generated discourse has had a distinct influence over attempts to 
have European rules pertaining to the trade in parallel products reinforced. Of course 
this would make the abusive use of parallel trading rules a less attractive proposition. 
However, it would also make legitimate parallel trading a more difficult occupation to 
the obvious commercial benefit of mainstream pesticide manufacturers.   
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At the same time it would be fair to say that the interests of one particular 
section of rural society has been disproportionately represented in rural policing policy 
and practice. Whilst it could be argued that an insurance company is professionally 
detached from its customer base it is clear that the biggest provider of UK farm 
insurance is closely associated with the farming community and with their primary 
representative body. It is equally clear that the risk focus of that insurance company is 
driving contemporary rural policing. 
Having recognised these influences and their consequence the thesis will now 
proceed to draw conclusions about this crime and to make recommendations that may 















8.0 Conclusion and addressing the study aim 
The selling of counterfeit pesticides is a crime that has been the regular subject 
of both industry reports and media comment. There are numerous examples of such 
non-academic sources describing a crime that, when it occurs in the UK, is often 
associated with the trade in parallel products. Such publications describe untested and 
unapproved chemical formulations being sold to unwitting farmers by way of an abuse 
of legitimate European trading provisions. They also frequently warn that such illicit 
products have the potential to cause economic loss, environmental damage, and harm 
to spray operators or even members of the public. However, whilst there is consistency 
in the reporting of this crime the content could not be verified. Until this study there had 
been no academic research to support the industry derived information that is at the 
heart of this widely promulgated narrative.  
The study identified a means of addressing this shortcoming, the chosen 
research design drawing on an IPO examination of the current state of counterfeiting 
research which recommended a multi-strand ‘blended’ approach to data gathering. The 
IPO concluded such research had the potential to produce a richer picture of any given 
counterfeiting problem when compared to a single strand study. Using a convergent 
parallel mixed-method design data was gathered from a cross-section of key 
stakeholders and those at the periphery of the problem who were, or at least should 
have been, concerned with its impact.  When analysed this data went some way to 
confirming the core elements of the industry narrative. However, and perhaps more 
importantly, it also revealed a number of characteristics that had not previously been 
described.   
By way of interpretation the analysed data also revealed an underlying market 
dynamic that serves to create a benign operating environment for those who choose to 
engage in this crime. The word dynamic, in this context, simply means a collection of 
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influencing factors that overlap to create a set of circumstances that would not 
otherwise exist. In this case it is the overlap of a market for illegal products that resides 
outside of core agriculture, a predominantly legalistic response from the pesticide 
manufacturing industry and their representative bodies, and a rural police service that 
is preoccupied with reducing theft from farms which together generate this dynamic. 
The significance of this is profound; it means that counterfeiting OCGs have a 
persistent foothold in the wider UK pesticide marketplace and are well place to exploit 
opportunity in the agricultural sector at comparatively low risk to themselves whenever, 
and wherever, that opportunity arises. It is a finding that sits comfortably with the wider 
organised crime literature wherein the profit against risk equation is often described as 
being fundamental to the OCG business model.  
This final section of the thesis will now return to the overall aim of the study by 
drawing a conclusion as to whether counterfeit pesticides represent a substantive 
threat to the UK agricultural industry. It will do so by way of recapping and considering 
the original aims of the study each of which represented a significant gap in the 
literature. These were: 
 To determine if there is evidence of counterfeit pesticides being prevalent in the 
UK marketplace;  
 Assuming there is evidence of a UK counterfeit pesticide problem to ascertain if 
this is being addressed through police engagement, and; 
 If the police are not engaged with the problem to further consider why this might 
be the case. 
  
Considering the first of these objectives the research suggests that counterfeit 
products are indeed a prevalent feature of the UK pesticide marketplace. However, the 
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extent to which they are present in any quantity may vary considerably over time, this 
in response to the market influences which have been previously described. 
Nonetheless, and despite the significant fluctuation in occurrence rate, it would be fair 
to say that these products have a potential to cause economic, environmental and 
human harm which cannot be ignored. Indeed this study demonstrated actual impact 
through a case study of an incident which occurred on a UK farm the result of which 
was economic loss and notable environmental damage. Whilst such harms are, and 
will probably continue to be, difficult to properly quantify the review of the literature 
demonstrated how even a single incident such as this could, if it became public 
knowledge, have considerable and potentially long-lasting consequences for an entire 
industry sector. This study found nothing to assuage this fear. These findings go some 
way toward filling a significant gap in the literature with respect to the understanding of 
the nature of this crime, at least in so far as it occurs in the UK. Moreover they may be 
of interest to those industries who are similarly exposed to counterfeiting particularly 
where there is a link to the trade in parallel products. 
Turning to consider the second study objective it would seem that this is a crime 
that has, thus far, failed to register on the rural policing agenda. The study found 
nothing that would suggest any policing activity related to this issue outside of that 
which came about as a direct consequence of data gathering activities connected with 
this study. By contrast the research has shown that theft, and more specifically theft 
from farms, is consistently at the centre of rural policing policy. Moreover this policy 
bias was shown to also be reflected in rural policing practice where operational policing 
is also demonstrably theft-centric. It appears then that the police, the primary agency 
responsible for tackling OCG activity, have singularly failed to engage with this problem 
and as a consequence the agricultural industry is unduly exposed to the repeated 
incursion of OCG counterfeiters. This finding reinforces previous literature which 
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describes theft-centric policing and will be of interest to those concerned with wider 
police policy setting. 
This leads us to the third objective, for in considering why there is such an overt 
focus on dealing with theft from farms it appears that there is a pervasive actuarial 
influence over rural policing policy and strategy. This influence was to the extent that in 
reality, without some form of external intervention, the subject of this thesis is not, and 
is unlikely to become, a local rural policing priority. Of course this conclusion has a 
much wider implication; if the rural policing focus is, by virtue of external influence, 
destined to overlook this form of offending then it seems very likely that it will overlook 
other similar emerging rural crimes. It is quite possible then that the prevailing rural 
policing focus on theft from farms driven by a pervasive actuarial influence is the 
defining characteristic of contemporary UK rural policing. If this proves to be the case 
then this is a significant finding, and potentially the main contribution of this thesis 
toward the collective rural criminology and criminal justice body of knowledge. 
Returning to consider the potential impact of this crime on the UK agricultural 
industry the pesticide industry has made significant and praiseworthy efforts to 
moderate the threat. However, these efforts have been predominantly focused on the 
mechanics of the problem. In the absence of any concerted and continuing 
enforcement agency support it seems likely that such a mechanical approach to 
tackling this crime, predominantly lobbying for legislative change, will only succeed in 
making it a more complex enterprise for OCG counterfeiters. Whilst this may well 
discourage some criminal activity without a concurrent enforcement agency response 
this strategy will not unduly raise the risk to the counterfeiter and so it is unlikely to 
dissuade all. Indeed in the absence of enforcement engagement such an approach, 
should it serve to instil confidence amongst consumers that all is well because 
legislation has been tightened, may actually make pesticides a more attractive OCG 
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proposition. This is not to dismiss a mechanical response. It is a crucial part of the anti-
counterfeiting mix, but surely it is much less likely to be affective if it is implemented 
without giving consideration to the three strands of influence which together form the 
dynamic which shapes and drives the UK counterfeit pesticide problem.  
In the light of the evidence presented it is difficult to conclude anything other 
than that the UK agricultural industry is vulnerable to the threat posed by counterfeit 
pesticides. It was the final objective of the study that, should it be shown that this is the 
case, recommendation be made to mitigate that threat and thus reduce the risks posed 
to the industry. This thesis will therefore draw on the evidence of the study in its 
entirety to highlight five areas within the market dynamic that provide scope for 
intervention. Each of these areas will be the subject of a recommendation which 
collectively amount to a nexus of initiatives which may disrupt the dynamic to the extent 
that it would render the UK pesticide market a less benign operating environment for 
the OCG counterfeiter. 
 
8.1 Recommendations 
It is a synergistic truism of intelligence that its whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts. Indeed it could be argued that the disparate pockets of corporate knowledge 
pertaining to counterfeit pesticides held across the industry are insufficiently linked for 
them to be reasonably described as intelligence. Nonetheless the evidence suggests 
that these various pieces of the counterfeit pesticide jigsaw are an invaluable source of 
information about the crime and its perpetrators. However, there is currently no 
recognisable means of bringing this knowledge together into a usable form. Moreover 
the widespread and firmly entrenched fear of breaching competition law probably 
means that the consolidation of this information will not, and arguably cannot, happen 
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within the confines of the industry. What is required then is independence, both in 
terms of knowledge consolidation and interpretation, so that it becomes usable 
intelligence.  
The need for independent intelligence expertise is equally true for the early 
identification of those factors that precipitate a spike in demand for a particular 
pesticide, particularly when it is likely that this cannot not be met by legitimate 
manufacturers. As was described these are the circumstances that give rise to an 
increased risk of counterfeit products being introduced in the agricultural pesticide 
market. At the point of increased risk indicative information will exist, but again this is 
effectively locked within individual companies and organisations and making no 
contribution toward any form of collective horizon scanning. It is the contention of this 
thesis that such information, commercially sensitive as it might be, could be shared for 
the greater good of the industry were it possible to do so through the auspices of a 
trusted independent third party. It is this need for both intelligence consolidation and 
horizon scanning that is the subject of the first recommendation: 
 
Recommendation 1 
That an independent industry information hub be created that would: 
 gather, collate, and disseminate as appropriate industry generated ‘real-time’ 
intelligence concerning counterfeit pesticides in the UK; 
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 conduct ongoing horizon scanning to identify emerging crop production trends 
or crop influencing factors which would indicate that there is an increased risk of 
counterfeit pesticides entering the UK market82. 
 
Having recognised the importance of consolidating intelligence concerning the 
UK counterfeit pesticide problem it naturally follows that consideration be given as to 
how that intelligence would be used most effectively. At the outset it is as well to accept 
that, given the prevailing rural policing focus and current level of engagement identified 
in the research and considered in the interpretation of the results, it seems unlikely that 
approaching the police at a local level with intelligence pertaining to counterfeit 
pesticide would be particularly fruitful. Indeed whilst the problem carries its current label 
it is ever likely to be seen as a civil problem, a simple breach of intellectual property 
rights, rather than a crime problem necessitating a police response. It is suggested 
then that the UK counterfeit pesticide problem needs to be, for want of a better 
description, rebranded.  
By presenting the problem not as a rural crime or a counterfeit problem but 
rather as a manifestation of OCG activity it opens up a potentially more effective 
channel to direct the accumulated intelligence. As was recognised in the review of the 
literature addressing OCG offending and the growing threat it poses to the UK is 
considered so serious that it is now addressed at a national level through the National 
Crime Agency (NCA). Moreover, and as was similarly recognised in the review, the 
                                                          
82 Whilst this study has been concerned with the counterfeit pesticide problem as it manifests 
itself in the UK context it is recognised that an intelligence hub of the type described would be a 
more economic and practical proposition were it to have a European wide remit. Such a pan-
European hub would recognise the transnational nature of the crime and would likely receive 
greater support from an industry that is similarly multinational. 
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NCA has, as part of its overall approach to the OCG problem, a policy of engaging with 
industry for the purpose of intelligence sharing (sharing, rather than gathering, being an 
important distinction). Clearly the same principle applies as was noted in the first 
recommendation for in intelligence terms the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; 
a more effective response to a specific OCG crime problem is likely if it is understood in 
the context of the wider OCG picture. There is, therefore, a mutual benefit to this 
relationship. 
Whilst focusing on the potential for industry engagement with the NCA it should 
not be overlooked that other relevant bodies, notably Trading Standards, also have a 
national intelligence function. By engaging with these enforcement agencies that are 
actively addressing the threat posed by OCGs, rather than with local police forces who 
do not perceive the counterfeit pesticide problem as being their concern, both the 
actual and perceived risk to the counterfeiter would be raised. If, as was suggested in 
the interpretation of results, OCGs have a relatively high elasticity of offending then 
their perception of the risk of being caught and prosecuted may, in terms of their 
propensity to enter this market, be as important as the reality. It is then the potential 




That a formal link be created between an independent industry intelligence hub and 
national strategic policing bodies, for example the NCA, and other appropriate 




Adopting a strategy of engagement at a national level, at least in the context of 
intelligence sharing, does not negate the need for local activity particularly for the 
purpose of raising awareness of the problem. Awareness raising serves several 
important functions:  
 amongst operational rural police it means that any local initiative or operation 
that may result from the activities of the NCA or other intelligence led agency 
will find an informed audience and is therefore more likely to be acted upon; 
 ‘grass roots’ intelligence, vital to fuel the strategy being proposed, will only be 
generated if those exposed to the counterfeit pesticide problem understand the 
threat and the long term benefits to be derived from the reporting of incidence 
or suspicion. 
 
There is a fine line between judicious awareness raising and scaremongering. 
Any such awareness raising needs to be done with a great deal of care to avoid 
creating unnecessary concern amongst a public audience that may already be over-
sensitised to media driven health scares linked to pesticide use. Nonetheless the 
continuation, and indeed expansion, of an educational function has an important role in 




That the pesticide industry should support the continuation and expansion of initiatives 
to raise awareness of the counterfeit pesticide problem amongst the farming and 
supply sector communities and that further work be undertaken to: 
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 raise and maintain awareness amongst operational police officers and 
Trading Standards staff in those areas with a significant farming community; 
 have awareness of the counterfeit pesticide problem included in relevant 
further/higher education and industry study and training programmes where 
it is not already. 
 
Having expounded the need for appropriate engagement with enforcement 
agencies it is worth tempering any enthusiasm for such an approach by acknowledging 
that an over-reliance on agency intervention is probably unwise. As this study has 
recognised enforcement agencies, and specifically the police, are subject to many 
persuasive external influences and demands.  
The use of pesticides by the UK agricultural industry is highly professionalised 
and this has made a considerable contribution to ensuring that the counterfeit problem 
has remained relatively small compared to some other parts of Europe. Unfortunately 
this degree of professionalism does not extend across all UK pesticide use and as was 
recognised in the study this has given rise to an important source of vulnerability. 
Moreover, because of its very low profile, it is a vulnerability that is even less likely to 
make the enforcement agenda than the agricultural industry counterfeit problem. The 
study recognised that the amenity sector use of pesticides does not have the same 
imperative to ensure the provenance of inputs that crop assurance schemes instil in the 
agricultural sector. However, given that this sector may be the safe harbour in the UK 
for counterfeit pesticides there is a vested interest in the wider pesticide industry 
promoting and supporting the development of a more professional status for amenity 
pesticide use. Because doing so may reduce the scope for illicit products to enter the 





That the pesticide industry, through the auspices of representative and professional 
practice bodies, should support the professional development of amenity sector 
pesticide use and seek to raise awareness within the sector of the risks associated with 
counterfeit pesticides. 
 
   All of the recommendations made thus far have collectively formed what is 
essentially a strategic response, each intended to disrupt the dynamic that shapes and 
drives the UK counterfeit pesticide problem. Whilst these are important in terms of 
reducing the overall risk they do not address one issue that emerged from the 
research; how to respond to a counterfeit pesticide incident at the point at which it 
occurs. 
In the absence of recognised best practice or protocol individual pesticide 
companies, the corporate victim of the crime, are invariably left to deal with the 
aftermath and make good with the end user victim. Worse still, and as was observed in 
the case study, an incident may not be reported to any enforcement agency because of 
the uncertainty a farmer victim faces concerning what the eventual outcome might be. 
There is then a pressing need for an industry wide incidence protocol which engages 
all appropriate agencies and, as importantly, instils confidence to report because it 
removes uncertainty as what will happen and what the likely outcome will be. This need 







That an evidence based immediate response strategy for any counterfeit pesticide 
incident be developed that is acceptable for dissemination by professional bodies and 
enforcement agencies as best practice. 
 
 This thesis began by stating its aim of determining whether counterfeit 
pesticides represent a threat to the UK agricultural industry. Given that a threat is 
anything that can exploit vulnerability, and that this study has demonstrated that the 
industry certainly is vulnerable, it was difficult to draw any other conclusion than that 
this intersection of threat and vulnerability does give rise to a substantive risk. 
However, the extent of that risk, that is the potential for loss as a consequence of the 
threat exploiting the vulnerability, is less certain. Nonetheless the lesson that can be 
drawn from the wider European experience of counterfeit pesticides is that it brings 
risks that are both varied and potentially highly impactive. However, in terms of 
mitigating the threat this study has also demonstrated that it exploits a vulnerability that 
can be explained and understood, and with that understanding comes a means to 
respond.  
Taken together the recommendations detailed above, and summarised in 
Appendix 9, amount to a strategy which has the potential to disrupt the dynamic that 
currently makes the UK pesticide market an attractive proposition to the counterfeiter. 
Better management of intelligence, if carried out in conjunction with horizon scanning, 
would enable valuable information concerning this crime to be relayed to intelligence 
agencies in a usable format. Provided these agencies are made sufficiently aware of 
the problem through education initiatives then there is a real possibility that the industry 
would witness a useful enforcement response. Moreover the capacity of the 
counterfeiter to respond to opportunity in the agricultural market would be reduced if 
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the amenity market were more counterfeit aware and if the post-incident response were 
better organised and used as an opportunity to gather intelligence and usable criminal 
prosecution evidence. If implemented alongside the mechanical measures currently 
favoured by the pesticide industry they would together make counterfeiting pesticides a 
more expensive and at the same time riskier enterprise for those OCGs involved in this 
illicit trade. Of course the threat would not be entirely removed, for the counterfeiter will 
always be ready to exploit an opportunity. Nevertheless the more industry vulnerability 
can be reduced then the more the threat posed by counterfeit pesticides will be 
diminished. 
 
8.2 A consideration of the wider significance of the study and thesis 
This thesis has considered the threat posed to the UK agricultural industry by 
counterfeit pesticides, a question that had not previously been addressed by academic 
study. To do so necessitated an approach to data gathering that had a number of novel 
elements and one which overcame the shortcomings in counterfeit research that had 
previously been identified. The results of that research, once analysed, exposed 
several previously unrecognised characteristics of this illicit trade. Moreover following 
interpretation a dynamic that underpins the UK pesticide marketplace was recognised 
and described.  
Whilst this approach to the subject may not have broken the mould of ‘traditional’ 
counterfeiting research it does at least provide an alternative to single strand studies, 
and one which advances the IPO recommendations into a practical and repeatable 
research design. Indeed there seems to be no reason why this should not be a 
transferable approach; conducting research to understand if there is a market dynamic 
underpinning the problem may be a logical starting point in understanding 
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counterfeiting in other market sectors. This has much wider implications in terms of 
tackling transnational organised crime. If counterfeiting is a significant funding source 
for other OCG activity then a better understanding of what makes it an attractive 
proposition may provide a means by which it may be better tackled. 
Having expounded the virtues of this approach to counterfeiting research it is 
acknowledged that this study has been a first step toward fully understanding this 
particular iteration of the problem. Undoubtedly the study design could be further 
refined to identify if there are other more subtle sources of influence over the dynamic 
that creates the benign environment within which the UK counterfeit pesticide problem 
exists. That said, and even without refinement, given what has already been achieved 
this approach could also prove itself to be a useful means of exploring counterfeit 
pesticide incidence outside of the UK. Certainly it offers an alternative to those charged 
with addressing the problem in those parts of the world where counterfeit pesticides are 
endemic and where the current response strategies are seemingly not having an 
impact on the problem. At the same time the principles of the design could equally well 
be used as the basis for reviewing anti-counterfeit strategy and practice within 
individual manufacturing companies, particularly where a mechanical, perhaps 
legalistic, response has been favoured and has been found wanting.  
Counterfeiting, in its multifarious guises, is a particularly insidious crime. This 
thesis has shed light one example of the problem, and has proffered means by which 
the threat it carries may be alleviated. In the course of doing so the thesis has 
addressed a number of significant gaps in the literature. This in itself is a useful 
contribution to knowledge, however, it is suggested that this study and thesis has 
served a further but equally important function. By seeking and making use of non-
mainstream theory it has gone some way toward addressing a shortcoming in the study 
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of rural crime and policing, specifically the narrow theoretical focus which was 
described in the review of the literature.  
The significance of critical thinking in understanding rural crime was recognised 
early in this thesis. By drawing on the theorising of Bernard Harcourt this study has 
added an extra dimension to this approach. It is hoped that this may help researchers 
to better appreciate the significance of power and knowledge in the creation of an 
environment within which a crime can emerge and thrive. In doing so it is further hoped 
that it has enhanced this criminological theory and may prompt and assist much 

















Appendix 1: A personal reflection on the insider/outsider dichotomy  
It is not unusual for a researcher to study a group or organisation to which they 
belong, essentially positioning his or herself as an ‘insider’ to their research domain. 
This compares to research ‘outsiders’; those that do not belong to the group they are 
studying. There are considerable research advantages to be derived from insider 
status in terms of understanding a group’s culture, an ability to interact naturally with 
group members, and a greater relational intimacy (Breen, 2007). At the same time it 
has been recognised that being an insider may disadvantage a study in terms of 
objectivity because an investigator may struggle to reconcile their insider role with the 
role of researcher (Kanuha, 2000). This paradox was succinctly described by Kanuha; 
 
For each of the ways that being an insider researcher enhances the depth and 
breadth of understanding a population that may not be accessible to a non-
native scientist, questions about objectivity, reflexivity, and authenticity of a 
research project are raised because perhaps one knows too much or is too 
close to the project and may be too similar to those being studied. (Kanuha, 
2000, p.444). 
 
This paradox has been variously labelled but is probably most easily 
understood as the insider/outsider dichotomy (Breen, 2007). However, some have 
argued that the construct of a dichotomy is too simplistic because fails to capture the 
role of all researchers and in particular those that do not see themselves as naturally 
falling into either category. Alternative concepts are offered; that the role is better 
conceptualised on a continuum, where a researcher may occupy as position of neither 
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insider or outsider, or that researchers are perfectly capable of occupying ‘the space 
between’, allowing one to simultaneously occupy the position of both insider and 
outsider (Breen, 2007; Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). Whilst these alternatives are seemingly 
diametrically opposed they are unified by an underlying principle; that holding 
membership of a group does not denote complete sameness and that not being a 
member is not indicative of complete difference (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). 
The issues raised by this question of insider/outsider status was pertinent to this 
study because, at the time of research being undertaken, the researcher had an 
employer/employee relationship with a large UK non-metropolitan police force. Clearly, 
given that the study focused on the police response to a crime problem, this apparent 
insider position carried the risk of being accused of being too close to the research to 
be truly objective. This could not be simply dismissed as irrelevant, perhaps relying on 
the strength of the review process to underwrite complete impartiality, not least 
because it remained a genuine concern to the researcher. As a consequence it 
prompted a period of self-reflection on the implications of holding a position as a police 
employee vis-à-vis this particular piece of research. What follows is the author’s first-
person narrative summarising that reflection: 
 
This study was result of a chance encounter with an online newspaper article 
which highlighted the growing counterfeit pesticide problem across Europe. The article 
was somewhat thin on detail but it rang a personal chord; my own professional 
background, prior to working within a police intelligence and specialist operations 
department, had been in the agricultural supply industry. I was then in an unusual 
position of being a criminologist with an agricultural background. 
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The key element of this crime, counterfeiting, was outside of my day-to-day 
remit. Of course this meant that undertaking any research into this area would 
necessitate ‘starting from scratch’, with no prior knowledge of the subject beyond a 
broad understanding of police policy setting and procedures. On the other hand it did 
mean freedom from any preconceived ideas about the cause or consequence of the 
crime and no established subject specific relationship with those responsible for its 
policing.  
At the same time what this employer/employee relationship did bring was trust. 
Policing has a long standing reputation for having its own unique and somewhat 
impenetrable culture. My own experience over a 25 year relationship with the police 
service has done little, at a personal level, to dispel this reputation. Getting access to 
large numbers of police officers and staff for quantitative study, or high level access to 
policy setters for qualitative interviews, would be difficult for an ‘outsider’, particularly 
one lacking a reputation for work in this field. Holding a relatively senior position within 
the force, and having studied for some years with the support of the organisation, 
brought an invaluable reputation for integrity and academic ability. This gave a degree 
of access to and support from a police force that would otherwise have been very 
difficult to achieve. 
 Without dismissing the concerns of those that might point to this insider status 
as a barrier to effective research on reflection it seemed that, in the circumstances, 
having a professional detachment from the immediate problem was most significant. It 
allowed me to step away from the position of simply being an obvious insider to occupy 
the ‘space between’; to simultaneously be an insider, enjoying the benefit of being able 
to understand and negotiate the cultural barriers to interact naturally with group 
members, and an outsider, sufficiently detached from the core subject to retain 
professional and research objectivity. It therefore also seemed reasonable, provided it 
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could be demonstrated that this police force was an appropriate sample, to take 
advantage of a degree of access that this relationship afforded and which would be 





















Appendix 2: Survey feedback form 
 




I own or work for an organisation or business that uses pesticides in 
the course of its normal activities 
 
 
I own or work for an organisation or business that supplies and/or 
distributes pesticides but does not manufacture them 
 
 
I own or work for a business that manufacturers pesticides 
 
 
I work for an agency that enforces pesticide regulations (e.g. HSE) 
 
 
I work for an agency that enforces the law but is not directly 
concerned with pesticide regulation (e.g. police or trading standards) 
 
 
I work for an organisation that represents businesses that use, 
distribute or manufacture pesticides (e.g. NFU or AIC) 
  
 



































































































Thank you for participating in this feedback exercise. Your comments will be 
used to refine the survey before it is used in the study. 
 
I would be grateful if you would email your completed feedback form directly 
to: 
 




Appendix 3: Survey questionnaire  
 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  
 
The information gathered will be used as part of a rural crime study being supported by 
Thames Valley Police. Your contribution will be entirely anonymous. The results of the 
survey may be used to support police and industry rural crime prevention initiatives. 
 
If you have any questions or wish to discuss the survey the lead researcher can be 













Gone down  
Stayed about the same  
Gone up  
I don’t know  
 
 




Gone down  
Stayed about the same  
Gone up  





3. In the past 12 months do you think that the amount of attention the police give to rural 




Gone down  
Stayed about the same  
Gone up  
I don’t know  
 
 
4. Which of the following have you ever accessed as a source of crime prevention advice: 
 
X 
Home Office or other GOV.UK website  
Police website or other police information source  
NFU website or other NFU information source  
Product manufacturer’s website or other 
manufacturer’s information source  
 
TV/radio  
Specialist media (e.g. trade or occupation related 
press) 
 
Independent security company or advisor  













Home Office or other GOV.UK website  
Police website or other police information source  
NFU website or other NFU information source  
Product manufacturer’s website or other 
manufacturer’s information source 
 
TV/radio  
Specialist media (e.g. trade or occupation related 
press) 
 
Independent security company or advisor  
Other (please detail below): 
 
 
I have not accessed any crime prevention advice in 





6. On a scale of 0 - 5, where 0= never and 5= very often, compare the following rural 
crimes in terms of how often you think they occur: 
 
0-5 
Farm plant/machinery theft  
Illegal dumping of waste  
Metal theft  
Hare coursing  
Farm input theft (fertilizer/seed etc.) excluding fuel  
Counterfeit pesticides  
Fuel theft  
Poaching  




7. Considering the same list of rural crimes how would you rate the amount of attention 
the police give to each: 
 
Not enough About 
right 
Too much 
Farm plant/machinery theft    
Illegal dumping of waste    
Metal theft    
Hare coursing    
Farm input theft (fertilizer/seed etc.) 
excluding fuel 
   
Counterfeit pesticides    
Fuel theft    
Poaching    






8. In terms of the likely financial or resource impact they might have on your own 
business or organisation if you had to pick a ‘top three’ of these rural crimes which 
would they be? [If only one or two are relevant just indicate these] 
  
X 
Farm plant/machinery theft  
Illegal dumping of waste  
Hare coursing  
Farm input theft (fertilizer/seed etc.) excluding fuel  
Counterfeit pesticides  
Fuel theft  
Poaching  




9. Are you aware that pesticides made by legitimate manufacturers are sometimes 










10. Which of the following would best describe your occupation: 
X 
 
I own or work for an organisation or business that uses pesticides in 
the course of its normal activities (e.g. farmer or grower) 
 
 
I own or work for an organisation or business that supplies and/or 
distributes pesticides but does not manufacture them 
 
 
I own or work for a business that manufacturers pesticides 
 
 
I work for an agency that enforces pesticide regulations (e.g. HSE) 
 
 
I work for an agency that enforces the law but is not directly 
concerned with pesticide regulation (e.g. police or trading standards) 
 
 
I work for an organisation that represents businesses that use, 
distribute or manufacture pesticides (e.g. NFU or AIC) 
  
 




 [If none of the above go to Q15] 
 
 
11. How would you describe your personal knowledge of the threat posed to UK 
agriculture by counterfeit pesticides? 
 
X 
Poor or none  
Fair  
Good  




12. Thinking again about the crime prevention advice you have seen or heard over the past 












13. Where did you hear or see the advice relating to counterfeit pesticides? [please say if 












14. Which organisation was the source of the advice relating to counterfeit pesticides? 





















15. If a pesticide user became suspicious that a product delivered to them might be 
counterfeit which of the following organisations do you think they should contact first? 








The supplier of the product  
 
 













National Farmers Union (NFU) 
 
 








16. Thank you for participating in this survey. Is there any other information or comments 



















Appendix 4: Enforcement case study  
The following enforcement case study, which is summarised in Figure 9.1, is 
based on an investigation conducted in 2009 the case papers relating to which study 
participant #08 gave the author controlled access. This incident closely reflects the 
‘Hornet’ model of counterfeit pesticide distribution which is described in Appendix 5. 
 The manufacturer victim in this case (Manufacturer A) was a multi-national 
company and the product being counterfeited was one of their most valuable branded 
products, a fungicide designed for use on cereal crops (Product X). 
 The alleged offender in this case was a parallel importing company (Importer B) 
who was known to have applied for parallel import licenses to bring Product X into the 
UK from Ireland. Product X was to be repackaged and sold as a parallel traded product 
but under a new name, Product Y, given by Importer B. 
 A sample of Product Y was obtained by the enforcement authority having been 
voluntarily surrendered by an agricultural merchant pesticide distributor who was 
suspicious of the authenticity of the product. This sample was tested in the authority 
laboratory and the active ingredient identified as Tebuconazole, a fungicide widely 
used to combat plant pathogenic fungi. This was consistent with the genuine product. 
However a full analysis showed that the profile of other constituent parts did not match 
the genuine product. The original was known to contain dimethyldecanamide, a 
commonly used surfactant, whereas the seized product contained the solvent 
dimethylformamide at a level in the order of 8% of the total volume. Participant #08 
described this substitute solvent as being a known carcinogen that is prohibited for use 
in UK pesticides. It was his opinion that it would be sufficiently persistent to get into the 
food chain. 























Figure 9.1: Enforcement case study flow diagram 
 
Importer B 
Applies for parallel import permit 
to import Manufacturer A UK 
approved Product X* (active 
ingredient Tebuconazole) from 
Ireland (a ‘ghost’ application). 
*Product X is a multi-purpose fungicide 
used extensively on winter wheat and to 
provide canopy management in oilseed 
rape. 
Acquires pesticide with formulation 
not approved in the UK with active 
ingredient Tebuconazole* from 
Chinese manufacturers (minimum 
three separate suppliers) under 
pretext of repackage and re-export 
outside of the EU. 
*Tebuconazole is a triazole fungicide used 
agriculturally to treat plant pathogenic fungi. 
Product repackaged and distributed through 
legitimate UK agricultural merchant and buyer group 
network - sold as a parallel import of Product X. 
OLAF (European Ant-Fraud Office) investigation 
identifies potential Chinese sources and establishes 
that Importer B has imported 42,000kg of active 
ingredient – there has been minimal re-export and 
suggests that the majority has been distributed and 
used in the UK. Investigation also shows minimal 
legitimate parallel import of Product X from Ireland. 
HSE acquire product and analyse – confirmed as a not 
approved product with solvent constituent identified 
as Dimethylformamide (DMF)* at levels of approx. 8% 
*DMF has been linked to cancer in humans, and it is thought to 
cause birth defects. In some sectors of industry, women are 
banned from working with DMF. Most manufacturers of DMF list 
'Life' or 'Chronic' as a health hazard in their MSDS since DMF is not 
readily disposed of by the body. 
HSE prosecute Importer B in accordance with Plant 
Protection Products (Sustainable Use) Regulations 
2012 (PPP(SU)R 2012) for placing on the market an 
unapproved product (fine only) and are met with 




A subsequent investigation by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) found that 
the product had been imported from China. Moreover analysis of additional test 
purchases of this product suggested that it had been sourced from at least three 
separate manufacturers. The investigation further revealed that Importer B had 
acquired something in the order of 42,000kg of this product. It was believed that this 
had been destined for the UK and that it had found its way into circulation through the 
legitimate pesticide trade. 
 The case resulted in Importer B being prosecuted for a technical offence under 
the Plant Protection Products Regulations 2011 (PPPR 2011) which deals with the 
placing on the market an unauthorised product. It is an offence for which the maximum 














Appendix 5: The ‘Hornet’ Model of counterfeit pesticide distribution 
 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) describe the parallel trade in pesticides 
as follows: 
Parallel trade permits allow a company to import and place on the UK market a 
product already authorised in another Member State (Member State of Origin) 
under the EU Biocides Regulation (EU BPR), provided an identical product is 
already authorised under EU BPR in the UK (reference product) (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2015).  
Such trading facilities are the cornerstone of the free trade in goods across the EU, 
however, in the case of pesticides it is one that has been subject to abuse by rogue 
traders. The means by which this abuse occurs has been dubbed the Hornet Model by 
the author:  
 In the Hornet Model the rogue trader makes multiple applications to HSE for 
permits to import named pesticides from a variety of EU states outside of the 
UK. It is likely that an amount of pesticide will be acquired in strict accordance 
with the permit. This provides legitimacy to the trader and a source of 
documentation should it be necessary to prove the authenticity of a product 
they subsequently trade into the UK market.  
 At the same time the rogue trader will have sourced and acquired counterfeit 
product from a third party source at a much cheaper price than the genuine 
product is available in the UK or elsewhere in the EU. Ostensibly, at least so far 
as any regulatory body is concerned, this product is destined for re-export out of 
the EU having been repackaged and branded to add value. This is a legitimate 




 However, in practice the counterfeit product is not re-exported, rather it is 
switched into the parallel trade market and repackaged to meet this need. The 
Hornet description reflects the fact that simultaneous trading is occurring, the 
two wings of the hornet, and a legitimate and seemingly harmless public face.  
 At the same time the hornet has a considerable sting in its tail – the selling of 
counterfeit products to distributors and farmers who are unaware of its 















Figure 9.2: The ‘hornet’ model of counterfeit pesticide distribution 
 
 










into the legitimate 












Figure 9.3 has been removed for copyright reasons 
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Appendix 6: SPSS output for the Mann-Whitney tests carried out on survey data 
Test 1: Awareness - Police staff / Pesticide users 
 




Test 3: Knowledge - Police Staff / Pesticide users 
 





Appendix 7 has been removed for copyright reasons 
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Appendix 8: Seeking an appropriate theoretical model 
 At the outset of this study it was acknowledged that there was no commonly 
used theoretical approach to the thesis subject. This was unsurprising given its relative 
newness and the lack of academic engagement as was recognised in the review of the 
literature. However, in the course of the study the key features of the crime, and the 
primary influences over its proliferation, became apparent. This facilitated a return to 
the literature, and more specifically to that concerned with criminal justice theory, to 
consider if there was an explanatory model that might accommodate what had been 
observed.  
 Hopkins Burke, in considering modes of governance, argues that crime control 
throughout most of the twentieth century was dominated by an interventionist 
approach. Drawing upon Feeley and Simon (1994) he concludes that the resulting 
process “was concerned with the identification of the individual criminal for the purpose 
of ascribing blame, and the imposition of punishment and treatment” (Hopkins Burke, 
2005, p.244). The work of King (1981) is also useful in this context. In considering 
various models of criminal justice the characteristics and complexities of this particular 
paradigm are understood using a crime control model wherein the police are primarily 
concerned with fighting crime and bringing the guilty to justice. In King’s model the 
allocation of police resources is seen as predominantly being the product of how often 
a crime event happens and the relative impact of that particular ‘happening’, giving a 
rudimentary measure of how serious a particular crime was considered to be. In 
practice then the allocation police resources broadly followed recorded crime trends - 
essentially a linear response. 
This intervention model of criminal justice held good until the 1970’s when UK 
politics started to be increasingly influenced by broadly libertarian principles. As 
Hopkins Burke (2005, p.244) observes Garland (1996) recognised that the 
274 
 
governmental style that grew out of this new politics was largely organised around 
economic forms of reasoning. Pfeffer and Salancik are useful here in that they suggest 
that organisations, whether they be small or large, public or private sector, are 
“inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment” and that “the very key 
to organisational survival is their ability to acquire and maintain resources” (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003, pp.1-2). In this shifting political environment it was probably inevitable 
that policing strategy would increasingly come to reflect the new economic imperative.  
The popular view of crime that ran parallel to this was entirely compatible with 
the new economic liberalism. Seen as largely a matter of opportunity the focus 
increasingly fell on criminogenic situations rather than criminal individuals, exemplified 
in the situational crime prevention strategies so forcefully promoted by Clarke (1997). It 
has been argued that such strategies were driven by insurance companies responding 
to escalating levels of theft and burglary by pressurising governments to focus on crime 
prevention (O’Malley, 2010, p.26). This fundamentally new approach replaced the time-
honoured practice of preventing crime through police presence with the creation of 
situations and environments intended to make offending more risky and less attractive 
to the potential offender. Criminal behaviour, and the pursuit of the criminal individual, 
now came second to more economically efficient strategies for crime prevention based 
on risk assessment.  
In an environment increasingly dominated by economic considerations and 
where the police are, as Ericson and Haggerty (1997) described, part of a network of 
organisations responsible for the identification, management and communication of risk 
the linear response model of police resource allocation became increasingly untenable. 
Policing could no longer be seen as a simple function of incidence and consequential 
damage because this takes no account of probability, the principle which is the very 
foundation of a risk based approach to policing. It is important to understand the 
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principle that underlies the model; it may be stating the obvious to say that risk 
assessment is probabilistic rather than determinist but recognising this to be the case is 
crucial to understanding the sea-change that the adoption of this risk based approach 
has brought to contemporary rural policing.  
Risk is rarely the sole influencing factor in any policing strategy. Nonetheless, 
where it at least partly shapes policing practice it is characterised by preventative 
interventions based on predictive techniques (O’Malley, 2010). Where these are rooted 
in statistical mathematics and calculations of probability they may be described as 
actuarial and the resulting policing practices as actuarial justice. Bernard Harcourt 
(2006, p.1) gives a useful working definition of actuarial practice when used in the 
criminal law context, describing it as: 
…the use of statistical rather than clinical methods on large datasets to 
determine different levels of criminal offending associated with one or more 
group traits, in order (1) to predict past, present or future criminal behaviour and 
(2) to administer a criminal justice outcome.  
 
Sometimes referred to as ‘mechanical prediction’ actuarial practices are widely 
recognised as having their origins in the rapid expansion of insurance-based risk 
calculations over the latter part of twentieth-century (Feeley & Simon, 1994). The 
management techniques most closely associated with this trend are now firmly 
entrenched in criminal justice practice, offender management being an oft-cited 
example (Kemshall, 2003). Where they appear they are often linked to rational choice 
theory (Harcourt, 2006), a utilitarian view of the cause of crime which relies on the 
presumption that an individual will weigh the benefit of committing crime against the 
likely or potential cost. It therefore follows that crime can be controlled by influencing 
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that choice through the use of measures which increase the potential cost to the 
criminal. This notion of individual choice is seemingly paradoxical when considering a 
wholesale shift in policy focus away from the individual and toward managing 
criminogenic situations. However, as Simon (1987) argues, actuarial practices lean 
toward the objectification of individuals, the implication being that criminals may be 
aggregated into homogenous groups, ignoring individual criminal propensity in favour 
of the creation of ‘situation’ where the cost of crime outweighs the potential benefit. It is 
then a strategy that presumes the validity of rational choice whilst downplaying the 
importance of the individual.  
Of significance to this study there are indications within the results to suggest 
that such ‘situation creating’ may be prevalent in the contemporary policing of rural 
crime and may even be the defining feature of policing in the rural environment. We 
see this made manifest in, for example, the proliferation of rural crime initiatives and 
rural based ‘watch’ schemes highlighted in the word cluster analysis. It may reasonably 
be hypothesised that this emphasis on situational crime prevention is indicative of an 
actuarial influence; the relationship between the prevailing police interpretation of what 
constitutes a rural crime and the dominant insurance perspective of crime in the 
countryside. It is an increasingly important relationship, as witnessed by in-depth 
interviews with police rural crime policy setters carried as part of this study who 
embraced actuarial data as a measure of the effectiveness of rural policing.  
Whilst liaison and cooperation between police and industry is surely to be 
encouraged and developed it is important to recognise that risk, in this or any other 
context, is not value free and it follows that any such a relationship will reflect this. As 
Freudenberg (1988,1993) argues the prevailing definition of any risk is inevitably the 
product of vested interest. It may therefore be hypothesised that it is just such an 
interest, made manifest through actuarial influence and acting upon police rural crime 
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policy and practice, which has been a primary factor in counterfeit pesticides failing to 
make it onto the rural crime agenda. Actuarial practices are therefore seen as a key 
component of the social and political construction of crime and as such they are 
responsible for the normalisation of a narrow police perception of offending in the rural 
setting. Considered in the context of the risk based model of policing it is this influence 
that has defined how theft from farms has come to be prioritised and actively managed 
whilst other crime problems, counterfeit pesticides included, attract a distinctly passive 
approach. 
To aid understanding of how this influence manifests itself the interpretation of 
results will draw on the previously cited work of the critical theorist Bernard E. Harcourt, 
and specifically his criticism of predictive methods based on actuarial principles when 
used in the criminal justice setting (Harcourt, 2006). Harcourt proposes three reasons 
why we should be sceptical of the value of actuarial practice in the criminal justice 
setting. Two of his criticisms, namely that any reliance on probabilistic methods 
produces a distortion in the carceral population and that the proliferation of actuarial 
methods is beginning to distort our understanding of just punishment, are of limited 
interest and relevance to this study. Harcourt acknowledges that not all of his criticisms 
will be persuasive in every context (Harcourt, 2006, p.3), however, a third criticism is 
highly pertinent for here he contends that an increasing reliance on predictive methods 
may well increase the overall amount of crime rather than reduce it.    
Important to understanding the significance of Harcourt’s theorising is the 
concept of a relative elasticity of offending, that is to say the degree to which changes 
in policing strategy and practice will affect crime patterns. The relevance of the concept 
is that if, as Harcourt suggests is perfectly possible, those potential offenders targeted 
by the police through actuarially driven situational crime prevention practices are less 
responsive to the initiative than the non-targeted group then the overall amount of 
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crime will likely increase (Harcourt, 2006). In the context of this study this hypothesis 
gives rise to a relatively simple idea; if the police focus their attention and resources on 
situational crime prevention strategies which target a narrowly defined group of 
potential criminals, and this group do not respond as anticipated, then crime will not go 
down and in addition the police inadvertently create opportunity for non-targeted 
groups to engage in their chosen form of criminality relatively unhindered.  
Harcourt qualifies his own theorising by acknowledging that it is bound to be 
problematic in the absence of a reliable means of measuring relative elasticity of 
offending. However, whilst an absolute measure may be elusive it is worth 
remembering that a notable conclusion from the original literature review was that large 
scale counterfeiting is almost exclusively the domain of organised criminality, and that 
organised crime groups are characterised by their opportunistic and entrepreneurial 
nature. It would therefore be a reasonable assumption that the relative elasticity for this 
particular group is high if only by virtue of their innate ability to recognise a low risk, 
high return opportunity. This of course renders Harcourt’s criticism of actuarial practice 
highly pertinent in the context of this study if, within any given policing area, organised 
criminal groups are cognisant of the opportunities presented by the counterfeit 
pesticide market and further recognise that this is a crime that falls outside of the 
prevailing rural crime focus. The theory therefore has a genuine resonance with the 








Appendix 9: Summary of recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
That an independent industry information hub be created that would; 
 gather, collate, and disseminate as appropriate industry generated ‘real-time’ 
intelligence concerning counterfeit pesticides in the UK; 
 conduct ongoing horizon scanning to identify emerging trends which would 




That a formal link be created between an independent industry information hub and 
national strategic policing bodies, for example the NCA, and other appropriate 
intelligence agencies to share intelligence relating to counterfeit pesticides. 
 
Recommendation 3 
That the pesticide industry should support the continuation and expansion of initiatives 
to raise awareness of the counterfeit pesticide problem amongst the farming and 
supply sector communities and that further work be undertaken to; 
 raise and maintain awareness amongst operational police officers and 
Trading Standards staff in those areas with a significant farming community; 
 have awareness of the counterfeit pesticide problem included in relevant 
further/higher education and industry study and training programmes where 





That the pesticide industry, through the auspices of representative and professional 
practice bodies, should support the professional development of amenity sector 




That an evidence based immediate response strategy for any counterfeit pesticide 
incident be developed that is acceptable for dissemination by professional bodies and 
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11.0 A postscript to the thesis; the likely consequence of the United Kingdom 
leaving the European Union 
On 23rd June 2016, ten days after this thesis was submitted, the United 
Kingdom voted in a referendum to determine whether its future should be as part of the 
European Union. Against general expectation the outcome of that vote was that it 
should not. 
A significant proportion of this thesis has been concerned with an abuse of 
parallel trading provisions which exist by virtue of membership of the EU. It would be 
naïve to think that an end to these trading provisions will bring an end to the threat 
posed by counterfeit pesticides. Indeed it seems inevitable that both manufacturer 
victims and concerned enforcement agencies will enter a period of considerable 
uncertainty. Not least because, at least at the time of writing, there was no indication as 
to what the future trading relationship between the UK and the EU might look like. We 
therefore cannot begin to anticipate how those responsible for the trade in counterfeit 
pesticides will seek to capitalise on this changed relationship. 
This thesis has proposed that a means of tackling a counterfeiting problem is to 
be found in understanding the underlying dynamic which creates a benign operating 
environment for the counterfeiter. A likely consequence of the UK leaving the EU is that 
a new dynamic will emerge which may, or may not, further encourage the activities of 
Organised Crime Groups who are involved in counterfeiting. For this reason there is an 
urgent need to continue research into this subject. 
